

WORLD BANK GROUP

**GAFSP PORTFOLIO EVALUATION IN
FRAGILE AND CONFLICT SITUATIONS
(2009048)**

**Final Report
Volume I – Main Report**

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BIFT	Business Investment Financing Track
CfP	Call for Proposals
CBO	Community-Based Organization
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CU	Coordination Unit
EoI	Expression of Interest
ESSF	Environmental and Social Sustainability Framework
FCS	Fragile and Conflict-affected Situation
FCV	Fragility, Conflict and Violence
FFS	Farmer Field Schools
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FIF	Financial Intermediary Fund
FSNMS	Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring System
FY	Fiscal Year
GAFSP	Global Agriculture and Food Security Program
GBFT	Grant Based Financing Track
GBV	Gender-based Violence
IA	Implementing Agency
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
IPRM	Integrated Project Risk Management
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MMI	Missing Middle Initiative
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PO	Producer Organization
PrSW	Private Sector Window
RRA	Risk and Resilience Assessment
SC	Steering Committee
SE	Supervising Entity
TAC	Technical Advisory Committee
WBG	World Bank Group

For abbreviations of GAFSP project names, please see Annex H.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

The Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) was established by the World Bank in 2010 to improve food and nutrition security for rural communities in IDA-only countries. Grant support to governments and producer organizations – also referred to as Implementing Agencies (IAs) – is channeled through Supervising Entities (SEs). This Evaluation involved a portfolio-wide assessment of GAFSP's grant interventions in Fragile and Conflict Situations (FCS). It included a mixed method approach of documentary review coupled with consultations (including a survey of FCS project leads). It also comprised four country case studies and the development of a theoretical framework on the interactions between FCS and food security interventions.

Findings - GAFSP Engagement in FCS

Covering 32 FCS countries, GAFSP has provided considerable support since its inception, with US\$ 1.1 billion in funding to 73 FCS grant interventions accounting for 60% of the total value of the GAFSP portfolio. The majority of countries have been either always or mostly FCS-listed during the implementation of GAFSP as a program. Furthermore, for three-quarters of the FCS grants, the country was FCS-listed either on approval and/or during implementation. The level and type of FCS vary greatly, but over half of the countries can be classified as severely or highly fragile/conflict-affected. Finally, over the years, two-fifths of all grant applications were presented by countries that were FCS-listed in the year of proposal submission. Even if the same selection criteria apply, there is no difference in the success rate between FCS and non-FCS proposals.

Findings - FCS-Sensitive Project Design and Implementation

Most FCS project designs address fragility/conflict in general terms, recognizing numerous aspects as drivers (including climate-related shocks, inequalities and exclusion of specific groups, weak governance and institutional capacity, and economic vulnerability). However, more targeted FCS-sensitive considerations at preparation and during implementation differ. Even if many projects rely on more generic context or risk analyses and do not have a clearly defined FCS-sensitive approach, most seek to address aspects of fragility/conflict and adopt measures of FCS-sensitivity to at least some extent. The selection of target areas/populations depends on the type of intervention, but most projects concentrate on specific locations (rather than adopting a country-wide approach). For projects focusing on basic agricultural improvements and food security, the selection of target areas/populations is guided by the identification of locations/groups experiencing high levels of food insecurity, poverty, socio-economic marginalization, and/or exposure to climate shocks. Within the FCS portfolio, marginalized groups – mostly women, but also for example youth – have also been prioritized by projects.

Projects also include activities focusing on the underlying fragilities of countries or areas of intervention, seeking to enhance agricultural practices, develop value chains and improve access to markets, as well as to promote climate-resilient production and sustainable management of scarce natural resources. Seeking to address the institutional fragility of IAs, almost all projects include capacity strengthening components, which is considered important also for risk management purposes. To this end, some projects also adopt community-based and participatory approaches as well as other procedures (such as grievance redress mechanisms, securing of land rights, and emergency contingencies). Affected by the limited

institutional capacities of IAs, monitoring frameworks are generally weak, not sufficiently tailored or adapted to specific FCS contexts.

Implementation arrangements also vary. One quarter of the country-led investment projects are supported by targeted technical assistance (TA) interventions seeking to address IA's institutional fragilities. Part of the FCS grant portfolio also includes interventions led by POs, the relevance of which is particularly recognized in contexts of fragility/conflict. Partnerships have played a crucial role in supporting both project design and implementation. Around half of the projects partnered with various organizations at international, national and local levels to support understanding of the specific context and preparation of project design as well as delivery and outreach.

The integration of the three cross-cutting themes in design and during implementation depends on the project. Climate resilience and nutrition security are more commonly a top priority of grant interventions, being considered quite extensively within context or risk analyses and covered by various activities. Regarding the transversal area of women empowerment, gender is more often targeted by preparatory assessments and considered less burdensome to integrate in FCS projects, but few interventions include dedicated gender-transformative, or even gender-related, activities. With some exceptions (mostly related to nutrition security), cross-cutting indicators are usually included only at the output level; hence limiting the possibility of assessing the effectiveness of interventions.

Findings - Program Oversight

Supervision and support from GAFSP and SEs have included some elements of FCS-sensitivity. In terms of GAFSP grant selection, fragility/conflict aspects were generally not considered in the awarding of grants prior to the special call for FCS countries in 2019. Themes related to fragility/conflict were addressed within the broader objectives of the subsequent two calls, but selection requirements/guidelines did not specifically indicate that FCS-sensitivity should be taken into account. The time between the launch of a call and the deadline for proposal submission is also considered too short for FCS countries, especially for more 'reactive' projects (i.e. those that are developed in response to a GAFSP funding call and hence not already conceived projects seeking financing). Furthermore, the tracking of fragility/conflict-related aspects within projects by the Program is relatively weak. SEs are in the process of 'institutionalizing' fragility/conflict-sensitive approaches and tools, which project designs have increasingly relied on. SE support during implementation varies and is generally appreciated. However, some parallel investment and TA interventions - which should be implemented as joint projects by involved SEs - have faced challenges in coordinating activities. More strategic coordination among SEs for engagement in FCS countries is also limited.

Findings - Challenges and Achievements

Influenced by various factors, some of which concern common fragility/conflict-related barriers identified within the theoretical framework, FCS projects have mostly been able to adjust to changing circumstances even if performance remains comparatively low. Projects have been positively supported by SEs and partnerships, and in a few cases also by strong IAs and project teams. In most cases, however, the weak institutional capacity of IAs has negatively affected performance. Funding constraints and weak monitoring frameworks have also challenged project implementation and supervision. In terms of external factors, projects have been negatively influenced by active conflicts, insecurity and political instability, as well as by climate change-related events and other crises. Nevertheless, projects have mostly been able to adapt

to challenges and changing circumstances by extending the duration (commonly), revising activities and/or locations, engaging with local partners, and/or receiving additional GAFSP funding. Negatively affected by aspects of fragility/conflict, performance ratings are generally poorer for interventions in countries that are FCS-listed on approval and/or always or mostly during implementation. Some project designs have been too ambitious considering the level of fragility/conflict. Nevertheless, apart from more general agriculture improvements, GAFSP-supported FCS interventions have achieved important results positively contributing to addressing fragility/conflict; such as improved institutional capacity, enhanced community resilience, economic empowerment, and improved management of scarce natural resources.

Lessons Learned

Based on the experience of the GAFSP portfolio in FCS countries, several fragility/conflict-related learnings can be drawn (which are also in line with the FCS-sensitive best practices and operational principles identified within the theoretical framework):

- ▶ First, the thorough analysis of the (local) context and risks from an FCS perspective is essential for a proper understanding of relevant fragility/conflict drivers. Assessments of capacity gaps are also important.
- ▶ Second, the institutional fragility of many IAs challenges the management and implementation of projects. Interventions should hence always include targeted institutional strengthening actions, ideally based on capacity gaps assessments.
- ▶ Third, the complexity and ambitiousness of project designs need to be proportionate to the institutional capacity of IAs (and implementing partners).
- ▶ Fourth, project design, implementation and monitoring benefit from relevant collaborations. Working with partners - providing additional and/or complementary expertise and services - is especially important when capacity constraints of IAs challenge outreach and service delivery.
- ▶ Fifth, the adoption of community-based approaches and community-managed processes can support both the planning and delivery of interventions, but also the mitigation of conflict and the building of more resilient communities.
- ▶ Sixth, the selection of target populations (and areas) depends on the context and type of intervention, but in general terms women and youth are important from an FCS perspective.
- ▶ Seventh, there is scope to address fragility within all types of interventions. Projects focusing on basic agricultural productivity and food security have the potential to improve conditions for poorer and more fragile areas and communities, while by projects supporting the development of larger scale commercialized agriculture and food markets systems seek to address the underlying fragility of many countries.
- ▶ Eighth, attention to climate-smart agriculture - stressing the sustainable use of scarce natural resources - has the possibility to mitigate not only the risks of climate change, but also scarcity-related causes of fragility/conflict.
- ▶ Ninth, the preparation and implementation of projects in FCS contexts (should) take time. This is especially the case when the institutional capacity of IAs is limited.
- ▶ Tenth, insufficient monitoring and evaluation (M&E) frameworks and data collection hamper the tracking and demonstration of results. It also hinders timely responses to changing circumstances.

Recommendations

- ▶ Recommendation #1. GAFSP should be leveraged as a multi-stakeholder platform for the setting of strategic priorities around FCS agriculture and food security

engagements. It could also serve as a knowledge platform for sharing learnings from FCS engagements and FCS-sensitive best practices within agriculture and food security interventions.

- ▶ Recommendation#2. Leveraging GAFSP as a partnership platform, SEs should foster more tactical coordination of agriculture development and food security interventions projects in fragile/conflict-affected contexts. This should go beyond the complementarity of individual parallel investment/TA projects by engaging with other relevant development partners from a strategic and/or operational point of view.
- ▶ Recommendation #3. Continued GAFSP engagement in FCS contexts is strongly encouraged, but requests for funding from FCS countries can be accommodated within any 'normal' GAFSP call open to all IDA-only countries (i.e. dedicated calls for only FCS countries are not considered necessary). However, without losing the value of GAFSP as a competitive process, a minimum share of funding within calls open to all eligible GAFSP countries could be dedicated to (valid) projects in FCS or FCS countries could be prioritized within the eligibility criteria.
- ▶ Recommendation #4. The awarding of GAFSP grant funding should remain a competitive process also for FCS countries, but FCS-sensitive aspects (such as fragility/risk assessments, institutional strengthening, relevant partnerships, climate resilience or youth focus, and project designs adequate to countries' institutional capacity) could be incentivized through the selection criteria and strengthened within call instructions.
- ▶ Recommendation#5. Towards improving the quality of proposals from FCS countries, and hence eventually also project design, the recently introduced two-step application process should be strengthened by involving a more technical first screening. The timeline for proposal submission should also be extended.
- ▶ Recommendation#6. The provision of TA during the application phase - and namely after the first screening - can assist in improving project design and proposal quality. would be particularly useful for promoting fragility/conflict specific contextual/risk analyses and capacity gap assessments. Preparatory support could be provided either through the SEs or by the setting up of a dedicated group or roster of external professionals.
- ▶ Recommendation #7. GAFSP could consider the establishment of a dedicated window through which projects already under implementation can apply for additional financing in case of unforeseen events. This would allow interventions to address challenges and adjust to changing circumstances (which is particularly important in fluid fragility/conflict-affected contexts).
- ▶ Recommendation #8. Other possible themes relevant from an FCS perspective (such as youth and climate resilience) could be considered for upcoming calls for GAFSP funding.
- ▶ Recommendation #9. The FCS-sensitiveness of GAFSP's M&E system should be strengthened. This could involve FCS 'flagging' projects both on approval and during implementation, as well as improved reporting on fragility/conflict-related aspects within the Portfolio Reviews. Such efforts would also serve to support the building of knowledge within the GAFSP platform.
- ▶ Recommendation #10. Future portfolio/project assessments could consider more specific topics relevant from an FCS perspective. This could for example involve a more systemic analysis of how climate change interacts with structural drivers of fragility/conflict, as well as of if and how projects actually promote improved capacity of communities to withstand climate shocks (and in turn mitigate fragility/conflict).

1 INTRODUCTION

Preamble. This Final Report (the 'Report') is the last deliverable submitted within the framework of the Cross-portfolio Evaluation of Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) Support in Fragile and Conflict Situations (FCS); hereinafter referred to as the 'Evaluation' or the 'Assignment'. The Report is submitted to the World Bank, or the 'Client', of the World Bank Group (WBG) by Syntesia (lead firm) in collaboration with MDF Training and Consultancy (partner); hereinafter collectively referred to as the 'Consultants'. Building on earlier versions, this Report takes into account the additional information and comments received from the Client as well as the GAFSP Steering Committee and its Evaluation & Strategy Working Group.

Authorship, Acknowledgement and Disclaimer. This Report was written by Maria Grandinson (Syntesia), with important contributions on selected aspects from: Frans van Gerwen (MDF), including the Ethiopia and Liberia case studies; Enrico Giannotti (Syntesia), notably the Haiti case study; Michelle de Rijck (MDF), namely the survey of project leads; and Maria Candelaria David and Giulia Stecchi (Syntesia) for the theoretical framework. Throughout the implementation of the Assignment, the Evaluation team benefited from valuable assistance from staff of the World Bank and other GAFSP Supervising Entities (SEs), and their support is kindly acknowledged. The authors would also like to thank all those who dedicated their time providing feedback and sharing experiences; for this we are particularly grateful. Finally, the views expressed in this Report are those of the authors only and should not be attributed in any way to the World Bank, its staff and, in general, the WBG.

Report Structure. The remainder of this Report is structured as follows:

- ▶ Section 2 provides a background of GAFSP;
- ▶ Section 3 outlines the methodological approach of the Evaluation;
- ▶ Section 4 defines a theoretical framework on the interactions between fragility/conflict and food (in)security;
- ▶ Section 5 presents an overview of GAFSP's engagement in FCS countries;
- ▶ Section 6 summarizes the findings from the assessment of FCS-sensitive considerations in the design and implementation of GAFSP-funded projects;
- ▶ Section 7 provides an account of the FCS-related oversight of GAFSP and its SEs;
- ▶ Section 8 includes a summary of the factors influencing implementation progress and the results achieved; and
- ▶ Section 9 outlines the main lessons learned and recommendations.

The Report also includes the following eleven annexes:

- ▶ Annex A - Overview of GAFSP Framework
- ▶ Annex B - Consultations - Stakeholder Interviews
- ▶ Annex C - Consultations - Survey of Project Leads
- ▶ Annex D - Bibliography for Literature Review
- ▶ Annex E - FCS Listed Countries: FY10-FY25
- ▶ Annex F - Level of Conflict, Fragility and Climate Vulnerability
- ▶ Annex G - Number of Approved FCS Grants by Country and Call for Proposals
- ▶ Annex H - FCS Classification of GAFSP FCS Grant Portfolio
- ▶ Annex I - Number of GAFSP Proposals and Awards
- ▶ Annex J - Application of Theoretical Framework
- ▶ Annex K - GAFSP FCS Grants' Performance Ratings

Finally, this Report (Volume I) is accompanied by Volume II with four country case studies across three regions; namely East Asia and the Pacific - (i) Timor-Leste, Latin America & the Caribbean - (ii) Haiti, and Sub-Saharan Africa - (iii) Ethiopia and (iv) Liberia.

2 PROGRAM OVERVIEW¹

This section provides a brief overview of the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP), hereinafter also referred to as the 'Program'. This includes an outline of its main objectives, allocations and overall grant portfolio, while Annex A provides further details on its pillars and outcome areas, structure as well as governance and management mechanisms.

Objectives. Hosted by the WBG, GAFSP was established in 2010 to improve food and nutrition security for rural communities in the poorest countries. To these ends, GAFSP is structured around five pillars and consequent food system outcomes as well as the three cross-cutting themes of (i) building climate resilience, (ii) empowering women farmers and (iii) strengthening nutrition security. Through multi-lateral and multi-sectoral assistance in response to requests from countries and regions, it offers financial and technical resources to support projects along the entire agriculture value chain in low-income (i.e. IDA²-only) countries. Finally, projects are implemented by governments and, as of 2016, producer organizations (POs) – hereinafter collectively referred to also as Implementing Agencies (IAs) – as well as managed and overseen by Supervising Entities (SEs). Under GAFSP's Grant Based Financing Track (GBFT), the SEs currently include: (i) the World Bank; (ii) three regional multilateral development banks, i.e. the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Inter-American Development (IADB); and (iii) UN agencies, i.e. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and World Food Programme (WFP).

Allocations. To date, under the GBFT, GAFSP has approved a total of US\$ 1.9 billion in funding.³ Grant financing is assigned through competitive open calls for proposals (CfPs). The first four calls between 2010 and 2016 were for country grants open to all GAFSP eligible (i.e. only-IDA) countries,⁴ while the fifth CfP in 2019 specifically targeted country grants in fragile, conflict and violence (FCV) contexts. In 2020, an additional funding call was launched to support efforts of already financed initiatives in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. The sixth call in 2021 also invited PO applicants and hence included a country-led track and a PO-led track. The PO grants were introduced following the successful results of the Missing Middle Initiative (MMI), a five-year pilot effort launched by GAFSP in 2016 with a dedicated CfP towards supporting smallholder farmers in enhancing their income and productivity. The seventh (and latest) CfP in 2023 was also split into two tracks (i.e. one for countries and one for POs), but also included a 'top-up' part aimed at filling the financing gap (as also identified as a key issue by a 2018 program evaluation of GAFSP)⁵ for already GAFSP-funded country-led projects.

Portfolio Overview.⁶ Since its inception in 2010, GAFSP has approved a total of 124 grants in support of 105 projects in 51 different countries.⁷ As illustrated in Figure 2.1 overleaf, around half (51%) of the GAFSP grants fund projects in the Sub-Saharan Africa region. The majority of GAFSP's

¹ Unless otherwise indicated, this section is based on information provided in the ToR (approved by the GAFSP Steering Committee on April 26, 2024) as well as retrieved from the GAFSP 2022 Annual Report and GAFSP website (www.gafspfund.org).

² International Development Association.

³ Based on the 'GAFSP basic project info PortfolioMaster Dec 2023' excel file, as shared and integrated by the Client.

⁴ One in 2010, one in 2012, one in 2013, and one in 2016.


⁵ LTS International and Unique, Program Evaluation Final Report: Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP), 13 June 2018.

⁶ This sub-section is based on information in the 'GAFSP basic project info PortfolioMaster Dec 2023' file, as shared and integrated by the Client.

⁷ Most grants support a unique project, but some grants fund the same project. These projects are composed of both an investment part and a TA part respectively funded by an investment grant and a TA grant. The 124 grants can hence be 'packaged' into a total of 105 projects (where there is a distinct phase 1 and phase 2 of the same initiative, they have been counted as separate projects). These include three regional projects covering more than one country (namely two country-led projects in the Pacific and one PO-led MMI project in East Africa).

funding lines (61%) are larger country-led investment grants (managed by one of the multilateral banks or IFAD), which also account for the bulk of the approved funding amount (93%). Another 15% are country-led technical assistance (TA) grants (managed by FAO or WFP). The remaining 30 grants (24%) in the GAFSP-funded portfolio are PO-led (managed by any of the SEs). These include five grants supporting the five-year pilot MMI launched in 2016.

Figure 2.1 Regional Distribution of GAFSP Grant Portfolio



n = 124

3 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

This section commences with a presentation of the objectives of the Evaluation (Section 3.1). It subsequently summarizes the methods for the collection and elaboration of primary as well as secondary information (Section 3.2).

3.1 Purpose and Scope

The Evaluation involves a portfolio-wide assessment of GAFSP's engagement and contribution in FCS. As such, it serves as a complement to the recently completed GAFSP Program Evaluation carried out under a separate assignment. The cross-portfolio exercise focuses primarily on learning by extracting lessons learned from the experience of the Program and GAFSP-supported projects in FCS thus far. By assessing GAFSP's performance from a specific FCS perspective, the Evaluation also includes an element of accountability.

To this end, the Assignment involved a detailed analysis of the extent of GAFSP's engagement as a program in countries listed as FCS by the WBG (FCS Engagement). This was followed by an assessment of the extent to which (i) GAFSP-supported projects have integrated features that consider fragility/conflict in the conceptualization and implementation of their intervention (FCS-Sensitive Design and Implementation), as well as (ii) GAFSP as a program and SEs have supported FCS-sensitive design and implementation (Program Oversight). Subsequently, it included the identification of factors influencing implementation progress and the analysis of results achieved (Challenges and Achievements). Finally, the Assignment also involved the development of a theoretical framework on the interactions between conflict/fragility and food (in)security (Theoretical Framework).

The Assignment only covers support to governments and POs in FCS countries under the GBFT. It hence does not include the recently launched Business Investment Financing Track (BIFT), or the Private Sector Window (PrSW) – see further Annex A. Furthermore, the Evaluation considers the **entire implementation period thus far**; i.e. from the establishment of GAFSP in 2010 to date. While the FCS Engagement analysis (Section 5) covers all 73 grants classified as FCS grants within the GAFSP-funded portfolio, focus within the assessment of FCS-Sensitive Design and Implementation (Section 6) as well as Challenges and Achievements (Section 8) is placed on the 45 FCS grants that had closed relatively recently and projects under implementation in the beginning of the Assignment.⁸

3.2 Data Collection Sources and Tools

Introduction. The Assignment relied on different information sources for the collection and elaboration of evidence. As further elaborated in the paragraphs below, these included: (i) a **desk review of documentary sources**, leading to the extrapolation of both quantitative and qualitative evidence; (ii) in-depth **interviews with internal and external stakeholders** towards gathering mostly qualitative primary information; (iii) a **survey of project leads** (or managers) in order to collect more structured primary information on FCS-sensitive design and implementation; and (iv) **focus group**

⁸ These 45 grants include all but five of the 32 FCS grants under implementation at the beginning of the Assignment as well as 18 FCS grants that closed in FY19 or later. Five FCS grants under implementation – namely one grant/project in Madagascar, one grant/project in Malawi and three grants (supporting two projects) in Nepal – were excluded from the analysis include since these three countries were FCS-listed more than five years prior to the grant approval. The 45 grants targeted by the FCS-sensitive assessment also include six grants (namely three in Lao PDR, one in Nepal, one in Sierra Leone, and one in Togo) in countries that were not listed as FCS either upon approval or during grant implementation, but since these countries were listed as FCS within five years prior to the grant, fragility-sensitive aspects are (or at least should be) considered important. Finally, the six FCS countries not covered include Afghanistan (in which the project was recently cancelled) and Madagascar (in which the grant – currently under implementation – was approved more than five years after the country was last FCS-listed), as well as Chad, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Solomon Islands (in which the only projects were still under preparation in the beginning of the Assignment).

discussions (FGDs) with farmers supported by the projects covered by the case studies (see Box 3.1 below).

Box 3.1 Case Studies

Based on a combination of the various means and sources of information summarized in the paragraphs below, the Assignment involved the preparation of **four country case studies** (attached in Volume II) to provide a more in-depth assessment of selected FCS countries and respective projects. These covered three regions and a total of eight grants (supporting seven projects); namely:

- **East Asia & the Pacific - Timor-Leste**, including (i) the Sustainable Agriculture Productivity Improvement Project (SAPIP), World Bank.
- **Latin America & the Caribbean - Haiti (online)**,⁹ including (ii) the Technological Innovation for Agroforestry and Agriculture Program (PITAG), IADB; (iii) the Rural Productivity and Connectivity Program with a Territorial Approach (PAPAIR), IADB; and (iv) the ROPAGA-led Promotion of Resilient Agroforestry in Grand'Anse: Scaling up and Professionalizing Small-Scale Initiatives to Build Back Better, WFP.
- **Sub-Saharan Africa - Ethiopia**, including (v) the Agriculture Growth Project (AGP) II - Investment, WB; and (vi) the Agriculture Growth Project (AGP) II - TA, FAO.
- **Sub-Saharan Africa - Liberia**, including (vii) the Smallholder Agricultural Productivity Enhancement and Commercialization (SAPEC) program, AfDB; and (viii) the Smallholder Agriculture Development For Food and Nutrition Security (SADFONS) project, AfDB.

Documentary Review. The desk review covered the following four categories of documentary sources: (i) Program documents, including (a) GAFSP Framework Document, Governance Document and Operations Manual, (b) Processing Guidelines for GAFSP-funded Projects, (c) GAFSP Annual Reports and Annual Portfolio Reviews, (d) GAFSP Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Plans (including the GAFSP ToC) and Results Framework, (e) CfP-related documentation, (f) minutes of SC and TAC meetings, and (g) relevant GAFSP knowledge products and publications; (ii) Project documents, including (a) grant proposals, (b) project (design/appraisal) documents, (c) project progress reports (also referred to as SMRs, as prepared by the SEs), and (d) project completion reports for closed projects; (iii) SE documentation, such as policies, procedures, guidelines, practices, etc. on how to analyze and address situations of fragility/conflict; and (vi) Other relevant literature and statistics, including (a) research and literature on the interrelationship between situations of fragility/conflict and food/nutrition security interventions to support the development of the theoretical framework for the Assignment, (b) international datasets or indices (for example the Fragile States Index), and (c) other studies or reports on pertinent aspects, including the cross-cutting themes. Overall, the review **covered around 450 documents**.

Consultations - Stakeholder Interviews. Interviews with various stakeholders **involved a total of 100 representatives from different entities**. These comprised: (i) the World Bank, including the GAFSP CU and projects leads; (ii) the other six SEs, including GAFSP SC representatives and focal points, FCS and M&E experts, as well as project leads; (iii) other GAFSP SC representatives, and namely the Asian Farmers' Association (AFA); (iv) independent members of the GAFSP TAC; (v) IAs of case study projects; (vi) implementing partners (including ActionAid, another GAFSP SC representative) of case study projects; and (vii) other key informants (such as other development partners engaged in relevant initiatives in the case study countries). The complete list of interviewed stakeholders is attached in Annex B. The interviews were carried out both in-person and online, based on a qualitative and semi-structured list of discussion points and questions.

⁹ Mali was originally planned as the fourth case study country, but due to protracted visa procedures challenging the field visit it was replaced by a virtual case study in Haiti (which could not be visited for security reasons, but still French-speaking and allowing the Evaluation to cover another region of GAFSP support as well as a highly conflict-affected country).

Consultations - Survey of Project Leads. The survey was based on a structured questionnaire (attached in Annex C). It was made available in English and French and administered online. The survey was sent to leads (or managers) of 42 GAFSP-funded grant interventions.¹⁰ A unique token was provided to access the survey to ensure only one response per grant was collected. To maximize responses, project leads received personalized invitations and follow-up emails. If leads were unavailable, the GAFSP focal points within relevant SEs encouraged participation. For a couple of older closed projects, the questionnaire was shared in an offline format for internal input. A total of **27 grant interventions replied to the survey** (64% response rate, exceeding the 50% target). Nineteen of these are under implementation - including three near closure – and eight closed, and 20 had FCS status upon approval. The response group covers a diverse range of SEs, FCS countries and regions, project types, and funding cycles. An additional two project leads provided qualitative input via interviews, which was incorporated into the qualitative analysis but not counted in the 27 survey responses. Finally, due to skip logic, not all 27 projects answered every question (actual response numbers are listed for the visual presentation of replies).

Consultations - Focus Group Discussions with Farmer Groups. Within the framework of the field visits for three of the country case studies, **five FDGs** were conducted with beneficiary farmer groups. In Ethiopia, two FGDs were held in the Wondo and Genet Melga areas. In Liberia, one FGD was conducted with a farmers' cooperative in Careysburg in Kakata (18 women and 10 men). Finally, in Timor-Leste, two FGDs were held in the Ermera municipality in the Loes watershed; one with the Hametin farmer group in Atsabe (30 members, including 8 women) and one with the Bele Bele farmer group in Hatolia (16 members, including 7 women).

¹⁰ Three project leads were no longer with the relevant SEs and since no substitutes could be found, these three grant interventions could not be invited to participate in the survey.

4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK¹¹

Food/nutrition insecurity often coexists with conflict/fragility at the country level, influencing and reinforcing each other.¹² A thorough understanding of these underlying dynamics is essential when designing food security interventions in Fragile and Conflict Situations (FCS). On the one hand, the potential or actual influence of fragility and violence must be considered to ensure the successful roll-out of activities and the achievement of targeted results. On the other hand, the intervention's design should account for its potential effects on the local context to avoid inadvertently worsening the situation and, ideally, to contribute to its resolution.


This section aims to provide a theoretical framework for food/nutrition security interventions in FCS. To do so, it first examines the interaction between FCS and food security (Section 4.1). Next, it analyzes the effects of FCS on interventions and vice versa (Section 4.2). The theoretical framework is based on a thorough review of available literature and documents. It is worth noting that, in several cases, the literature focuses mostly on the relationship between food aid and conflict situations; however, relevant elements have been incorporated in the theoretical framework by adapting them to the GAFSP intervention logic, and to interventions targeting agricultural production and food systems development in a more general sense. Finally, the framework has been integrated with feedback from relevant SE representatives during an online 'sense-making' workshop on February 21, 2025.

4.1 Interactions between FCS and Food Security

The links between food insecurity and fragility and conflict situations as mutually reinforcing phenomena are well documented in the literature. Relevant research generally agrees on the multicausal nature of this relationship, highlighting the various interconnected forces that endogenously amplify each other. Figure 4.1 overleaf presents an overview of the causal relationship between conflict and fragility situations and food insecurity and vice versa.

¹¹ In addition to the sources specifically referenced in footnotes below, this section also draws on the other relevant literature. The complete bibliography is attached in Annex D.

¹² While much of the literature focuses on conflict within this relationship, fragility— as defined by the World Bank (see Box 5.1 in Section 5.1.1 below)— also plays a significant role. Therefore, efforts have been made to adapt the literature to address both scenarios.

Figure 4.1 Food Insecurity and Conflict/Fragility

Conflict and fragility negatively affect food security through multiple channels. The onset of conflict and violence leads to the destruction of assets and lands, disrupting staple crops production and damaging livestock and market infrastructure. National supply and transportation chains are also frequently affected, as conflict restricts access and disrupts the movement of goods and people. Additionally, rising insecurity depletes human capital through displacement, injury, and loss of life, including among skilled farmers. It also alters household dynamics, as more men than women are recruited into conflict. As a result, food supply chains, mainly production and distribution, collapse, further exacerbating food insecurity. In response, affected population typically adopt a variety of coping and defensive mechanisms. These include shifting agricultural production primarily to subsistence methods; reallocating labor; concealing or even destroying livestock (and other visible assets); altering land-use patterns; and engaging in economic cooperation with local leadership groups. Additionally, individuals may adopt other strategies aimed at minimizing the risks of victimization and insecurity.¹³

¹³ (i) FAO, "Technical Note. Peace, Conflict and Food Security. What do we know about the linkage?", 2016, <https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/3fc73834-753a-469b-8580-1edf00e875bd/content>; (ii) Shemyakina, O (2022) War, Conflict, and Food Insecurity. Annual Review of Resource Economics, Vol. 14, Issue 1, pp. 313-332, 2022, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-111920-021918>; (iii) Breisinger, C; Ecker, O & Trinh Tan, J. (2015), Conflict and food insecurity: How do we break the links? In 2014-2015 Global food policy report. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. Chapter 7, pp. 51-59.

Fragile situations, where agriculture is often the primary source of income and/or subsistence, can significantly impact food security. In these settings, food systems typically struggle to balance supply and demand because of damaged roads and markets, distorted, low levels of farm productivity, limited institutional capacity, and severely constrained household purchasing power. Additionally, fragile contexts often deter private-sector investment due to instability, weak rule of law, and physical insecurity.¹⁴ Fragility situations can create a vicious cycle, further worsening food insecurity, and increasing fragility, with long-lasting effects.

On the other hand, food (in)security issues can exacerbate fragility and conflict. Food insecurity can heighten social grievances, particularly when government responses are politicized, such as using food as a weapon by providing it to certain population groups in exchange for political support while denying access to others in opposition. This practice was condemned by the UN Security Council in 2018.¹⁵ Additionally, corruption or the mismanagement of natural resources and food by elites can further destabilize fragile situations. Rising food prices due to scarcity can also fuel social unrest. At the individual level, food insecurity can drive participation in military organizations or rebellions, where fighters are recruited through ideological or material incentives, thus increasing armed civil conflict.¹⁶ Moreover, competition over scarce resources essential for agricultural production, such as land and water, not only serve as structural cause of conflict but can also escalate existing tensions.

Finally, the relationship between food insecurity and fragility/conflict is further influenced by climate change, intensifying their interaction and exacerbating existing challenges. For example, natural disasters can fuel conflict by deepening social grievances, increasing resource scarcity, or widening inequalities among groups. At the same time, climate change directly affects food security by reducing arable land, disrupting agricultural production, and driving migration and/or forced displacement.¹⁷ Moreover, different sources of fragility amplify the impact of climate shocks on FCS and food security, such as heavy reliance on rainfed agriculture, inadequate climate-adaptive infrastructure, and limited resources to recover from climate shocks.

Box 4.1 Structural and External Factors Affecting Conflict and Fragility

Structural causes of conflict and fragility are deeply intertwined with resource scarcity and unequal access, particularly in land and water distribution. This inequality is further exacerbated by **gender disparities**, as women tend to have significantly less access to these resources than men, making them more vulnerable to conflict-related hardships. Additionally, legal and illegal concessions for agricultural and mining activities – such as palm oil and rubber plantations in Indonesia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Liberia – often trigger land disputes and foster conflict.

At the global level, conflicts like the **war in Ukraine** have severely disrupted food supply chains, reducing grain exports and driving up food prices. Countries heavily reliant on imports, such as Liberia, have faced worsening food insecurity, with the most vulnerable populations bearing the brunt. In fragile and conflict-affected states, this dependency on external food sources heightens fragility and instability, often forcing communities into irregular and precarious means of securing sustenance, further fueling tensions and potential conflict.

¹⁴ Townsend, R. et al. (2021). Future of Food: Building Stronger Food Systems in Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Settings. World Bank, Washington, DC. <http://hdl.handle.net/10986/36497> License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.

¹⁵ See <https://press.un.org/en/2018/sc13354.doc.htm> and <https://www.siani.se/blog/food-insecurity-a-weapon-of-war/#:~:text=Food%20as%20a%20weapon%20of,malnutrition%2C%20or%20other%20related%20harm>

¹⁶ Ibid, Martin-Shields, C. and Stojetz, W. (2018). Food security and conflict. Empirical challenges and future opportunities for research and policy making on food security and conflict. FAO Agricultural Development Economics Working Paper 18-04. Rome, FAO. Licence: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO.


¹⁷ FAO, "Technical Note. Peace, Conflict and Food Security. What do we know about the linkage?" 2016, <https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/3fc73834-753a-469b-8580-1edf00e875bd/content>

4.2 Food/Nutrition Security Interventions in FCS

4.2.1 Effects of FCS on Food/Nutrition Security Interventions

The framework outlined above, which explores the interaction between food (in)security and fragility and conflict, serves as a lens to analyze how FCS affect the implementation of interventions such as those supported by GAFSP. Based on a re-elaboration of the GAFSP intervention logic,¹⁸ Figure 4.2 below presents a conceptualization of how conflict and fragility disrupt the implementation of interventions.

Figure 4.2 Effects of FCS on GAFSP Interventions



Conflict and fragility situations can hinder the implementation of interventions by limiting the extent to which financed activities can achieve their expected immediate results, creating '**delivery barriers**'. At the same time, FCS can also affect the achievement of outcomes and the contributions to the ultimate impacts of the intervention, even when outputs have been partially or even fully delivered, leading to '**conversion barriers**'. A review of the literature allowed for the identification of various factors and mechanisms that can act as either or both delivery and conversion barriers, depending on the situation. These include:

- ▶ **Security concerns for staff and target population.** First and foremost, conflict settings put persons' life and safety at risk. This concerns both the staff involved in the implementation and management of project activities, and the population targeted by them. The onset of intensification of conflict in an area can lead to a suspension of activities, and possibly to the evacuation of staff. In more general terms for women, gender-based violence (GBV) can be of great concern, also in areas that are not conflict-affected.
- ▶ **Weak institutional governance and capacity.** Institutional fragility, characterized by weak governance and limited government capacity, often hinders the establishment of effective

¹⁸ GAFSP, "GAFSP Monitoring and Evaluation Plan 2022", https://www.gafspfund.org/sites/default/files/2023-09/Revised%20ME%20Plan%202022%20Aug%202023%20Final%20and%20Edited_0.pdf

coordination mechanisms at national and local levels. In these cases, the institutional capacity to manage project implementation is either limited or entirely absent, increasing the risk of poor management and possible setbacks during implementation.¹⁹

- ▶ **Political instability and pressure.** Competition for power among various ethnic and political networks, along with broader political instability, can expose interventions to political pressure, which can undermine essential cooperation within and between institutions, leading to frequent leadership turnover. As a result, institutional learning is disrupted and the long-term sustainability of interventions is threatened.²⁰ Political pressure can also be structurally embedded in governance systems.²¹
- ▶ **Difficulties in transfers and transports.** Access limitations due to inadequate infrastructure, challenging terrain, and sparse population distribution create significant barriers to project implementation, making it difficult to transport inputs and hindering interactions between supervising and implementing entities (including project teams) and beneficiaries.
- ▶ **Infrastructural and physical damages.** Conflict causes physical destruction in the agricultural sector, affecting project interventions' effectiveness and results. Conflict can damage agricultural infrastructure, including irrigation systems, storage facilities, and agricultural extension facilities, among others.²² Rebuilding and restoring is not easy and time-consuming as access to this region has remained restricted for quite some time. Similarly, during and after conflicts, agricultural land may be contaminated by Unexploded Ordnance (UXO), and conflicts contribute to the pollution of water sources and agricultural land.²³ The damage can be even more severe in fragile situations where infrastructure is already underdeveloped, and the state's capacity and resources to address the physical damage are limited.
- ▶ **Highly volatile contexts.** New outbreaks or intensification of conflict can be difficult to anticipate, posing significant challenges on the implementation of project activities. Such events can lead to forced displacement and disrupt local and regional supply chains, directly impacting project implementation.²⁴ These circumstances may require adjustments to the targeted population or planned activities. In extreme cases, they could necessitate the complete suspension or termination of the project. Volatility and insecurity in the context of agricultural development have a serious negative effect on investments that are needed for long-term improvements in land-productivity conditions (dams, irrigation, drainage, storage facilities etc.), as the farmers do not have security if they can enjoy the benefits of these investments in the longer term.
- ▶ **Emergency-led nutritional choices.** In food-insecure contexts, individual preferences can sometimes counteract intervention goals. Beneficiaries often prioritize caloric intake over

¹⁹ (i) Global Panel (2020), Strengthening food systems in fragile contexts. Policy Brief No. 15. London, UK: Global Panel on Agriculture and Food Systems for Nutrition, https://www.glopan.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/10989-Fragile-Context-Policy-Brief_3Aug.pdf; (ii) Bunse, S and Delgado, C. (2024), Promoting Peace through climate resilient food security initiatives, SIPRI Research Policy Paper, <https://doi.org/10.55163/NFAX5143>

²⁰ Bunse, S and Delgado, C. (2024) Promoting Peace through climate resilient food security initiatives. SIPRI Research Policy Paper, <https://doi.org/10.55163/NFAX5143>

²¹ As seen for example in the ethnic federalist governance systems in Ethiopia. This has led to regular conflicts in specific regions and between regions, including leading into the civil war in Tigray (2020-2022) and more recent conflicts in the Amhara and Western Oromia regions.

²² This has happened during the civil war in Tigray in Ethiopia, where several infrastructural investments were damaged or destroyed.

²³ "Supporting Agriculture in Protracted Crisis"

²⁴ Kemmerling, B., Schetter, C., & Wirkus, L. (2021). Addressing food crises in violent conflicts. United Nations Food System Summit, https://sc-fss2021.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/FSS_Brief_Addressing_Food_Crises_in_Violent_Conflicts.pdf

nutritional quality, opting for high-energy foods that may lack essential nutrients. This preference can undermine efforts aimed at improving overall dietary diversity and long-term health outcomes.²⁵

- ▶ **Vulnerability to climate crisis.** Finally, FCS countries are less resilient and more vulnerable to climate change-related events, which can jeopardize the project's activities or even the achievement of project outcomes and impacts. Flooding, hurricanes and other extreme weather events limit access and cause destruction, affecting both implementation, supervision and achievement of interventions.²⁶

4.2.2 Potential Effects of Food/Nutrition Security Interventions on FCS

While fragility/conflict affect the implementation and effectiveness of food-related interventions, the reverse can also be true. If not well managed, food security interventions can lead to detrimental effects on the context, with negative consequences on the population (or specific group of people) facing conflict or fragility and, potentially, exacerbating the situation. On the other hand, as described in the next section, if carefully designed, food security and agricultural interventions have the potential to contribute positively to FCS. The bullet paragraphs below include an overview of possible dynamics related to food interventions that could affect FCS.²⁷ It is worth noting that several of the elements described do not apply exclusively in or to FCS. However, their potential negative effect is much more intense in these contexts, due to weaker institutions and governance, existing social tensions, and lower ability to manage and mitigate risks.

- ▶ **Conflict can be fueled by distrust and perceptions of inequality**, particularly in contexts marked by resource scarcity and ethnic divisions. A lack of transparency in food security programming - especially in the selection of participants, partners and staff - can intensify local tensions, foster perceptions of favoritism, and erode community trust in implementing agencies. Such distrust not only undermines project effectiveness but can also trigger antisocial behavior, riots or violent acts.²⁸
- ▶ **Heightened grievances and deepened social divisions can intensify conflict**, particularly when poorly planned interventions disproportionately harm marginalized groups. By reinforcing elite dominance over agricultural production and natural resources, such interventions exacerbate economic inequalities. Socially, these interventions may stigmatize vulnerable groups, such as women, girls, youth, refugees, and displaced individuals, further marginalizing them and increasing their risks. This, in turn, can heighten social or identity-based tensions, deepening divisions within communities and potentially escalating conflict.²⁹ This dimension also relates to use of natural resources (land and water) by various groups

²⁵ (i) Global Panel. (2020). Strengthening food systems in fragile contexts. Policy Brief No. 15. London, UK: Global Panel on Agriculture and Food Systems for Nutrition, https://www.glopan.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/10989-Fragile-Context-Policy-Brief_3Aug.pdf; (ii) Kemmerling, B., Schetter, C., & Wirkus, L. (2021). Addressing food crises in violent conflicts. United Nations Food System Summit 2021, https://sc-fss2021.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/FSS_Brief_Addressing_Food_Crises_in_Violent_Conflicts.pdf

²⁶ Al Keyhani, A., Belgharbi, I., Giancarlo, A., & Szoke, M. (2022). Food for peace: Reducing climate security risks and sustaining peace through food and agricultural intervention. Geneva Graduate Institute Applied Research Project 4.8.

²⁷ The literature on food aid highlights its potential negative effect of reducing demand for local substitutes, lowering local food prices, and disrupting markets. However, these effects have been excluded from this evaluation as they fall outside the scope of GAFSP activities.

²⁸ Darwish, S. (2023). Integrating Conflict Sensitivity into Food Security Programs. Washington, DC: Implementer-Led Design, Evidence, Analysis and Learning (IDEAL).

²⁹ "IFAD strategy for engagement in countries with fragile situations". IFAD. 2016. "The Programme Clinic: Designing Conflict-Sensitive Interventions". 2019. FAO. <https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/00b20fb0-c2e0-4d7f-a28e-45802862cd02/content>

(such as pastoralists and sedentary farmers), which often represents the root cause of conflict in certain rural communities.

- ▶ **Conflicts between governance systems can be created or worsened**, as food security interventions sometimes disrupt the balance between formal and informal governance. When interventions inadvertently legitimize non-representative or illegitimate institutions, they can empower dominant actors at the expense of inclusive governance. This disruption may weaken local authority structures, marginalize certain groups, and contribute to further instability in already fragile contexts.³⁰
- ▶ **The misappropriation of resources in fragile and conflict-affected settings** can exacerbate political grievances and ongoing conflicts. Project funds and outputs diverted by violent actors can fuel tensions and reinforce conflict dynamics. In insurgencies and other irregular conflicts, the covert nature of belligerents and their lack of conventional identifiers make it particularly challenging to distinguish legitimate beneficiaries from combatants, complicating effective resource allocation.³¹
- ▶ **Competition over scarce natural resources can exacerbate existing grievances**, particularly when interventions override customary resource-sharing agreements or disrupt traditional infrastructure arrangements. Such actions hinder sustainable conflict resolution and intensify tensions among user groups, undermining peacebuilding efforts in fragile environments.³²

³⁰ Hendrix, C and Brinkman, H 2013 Food Insecurity and Conflict Dynamics: Causal Linkages and Complex Feedbacks. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(2): 26, pp. 1-18, DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.bm>

³¹ Hendrix, C and Brinkman, H 2013 Food Insecurity and Conflict Dynamics: Causal Linkages and Complex Feedbacks. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(2): 26, pp. 1-18, DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.bm>; Kemmerling, B., Schetter, C., & Wirkus, L. (2021). Addressing food crises in violent conflicts. United Nations Food System Summit 2021.

³² "Conflict Analysis and Conflict Sensitivity Risk Assessment". 2021. WFP. https://www.anticipation-hub.org/Documents/Training_and_Educational_Material/Anticipatory_Action_in_Conflict_Settings/Conflict_Analysis_and_Conflict_Sensitivity_Risk_Assessment_Guidance_Note_WFP_Jan_2021.pdf

5 GAFSP ENGAGEMENT IN FCS

This section presents the analysis of GAFSP's engagement in FCS contexts. It involves an overview, as well as classifications based on the FCS status, at both the country level (Section 5.1) and grant level (Section 5.2). It concludes with an analysis of the number of proposals and awards since GAFSP inception in 2010 (Section 5.3).

Summary Findings

Since its inception in 2010, GAFSP has provided considerable support in fragile/conflict-affected contexts, funding 73 grant interventions in 32 FCS countries. The majority of countries have been either always or mostly FCS-listed during the implementation of GAFSP as a program. Furthermore, for three quarters of the FCS grants, the country was FCS-listed either on approval and/or during implementation. The level and type of FCS vary greatly, but over half of the countries can be classified as severely or highly fragile/conflict-affected. Finally, over the years, two fifths of all grant applications were presented by countries that were FCS-listed in the year of proposal submission (and there is no difference in the overall success rate between FCS and non-FCS proposals).

5.1 Country Level

5.1.1 Overview

Since its inception to date, GAFSP has supported initiatives in 32 countries listed as FCS by the WBG (see Box 5.1 below) in at least one fiscal year (FY)³³ during the implementation of GAFSP as a program. For the purpose of this Evaluation, all these countries are considered as 'FCS countries' since an FCS-listing, even if only for a few years, likely indicates some level of fragility/conflict also before and/or after the listed period. It should also be noted that, while this Assignment considers only FCS-listed countries, fragility/conflict situations may also exist in areas, or 'pockets', within countries that are not FCS-listed.³⁴ Under this definition, FCS countries constitute the majority (63%) of the 51 countries supported by GAFSP thus far. Additionally, GAFSP's historical FCS outreach includes all but four of the FCS countries that are currently listed as IDA-only³⁵ (see Annex E for full list of FCS-listed countries with and without IDA-only status). Furthermore, approved GAFSP funding to date in support of projects in FCS countries – as defined by this Evaluation – amounts to US\$ 1.1 billion (which represents 60% of the total funding of the US\$ 1.9 billion approved under GBTF).

Box 5.1 Definitions of Fragility and Conflict

As of FY20, the WBG distinguishes between 'fragility' and 'conflict' when classifying countries as FCS. In particular:³⁶

- **Fragility** is defined as a systemic condition or situation characterized by an extremely low level of institutional and governance capacity which significantly impedes the state's ability to function effectively, maintain peace and foster economic and social development.
- **Conflict** is defined as a situation of acute insecurity driven by the use of deadly force by a group – including state forces, organized non-state groups, or other irregular entities – with a political purpose or motivation. Such force can be two-sided – involving engagement between multiple organized, armed sides, at times resulting in collateral civilian harm – or one-sided, in which a group specifically targets civilians.

³³ The WBG FY starts in July one year and runs until June the following year.


³⁴ For example, areas of large and/or protracted forced displacement (such as the Kakuma Kalobeyei refugee-hosting area in northwestern Kenya) can indeed be considered as 'fragile'.

³⁵ Namely Djibouti, Eritrea (currently inactive), Mozambique, and Sudan; see <https://ida.worldbank.org/en/about/borrowing-countries#:~:text=Eligibility%20for%20IDA%20support%20depends,in%20the%20fiscal%20year%202024>

³⁶ Classification of Fragility and Conflict Situations (FCS) for World Bank Group Engagement - <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/fb0f93e8e3375803bce211ab1218ef2a-0090082023/original/Classification-of-Fragility-and-Conflict-Situations-FY24.pdf>


As presented in Figure 5.1a below, **most GAFSP-supported FCS countries are in Sub-Saharan Africa** (59%), while East Asia & the Pacific also hosts an important share (25%). The remaining five FCS countries supported by GAFSP are found in Europe & Central Asia (Tajikistan), Latin America & the Caribbean (Haiti), Middle East & North Africa (Yemen), and South Asia (Afghanistan and Nepal). With 61% of the approved grant funding amount, Sub-Saharan Africa is also the largest recipient region in value terms (see Figure 5.1b below). East Asia & the Pacific account for an additional 12% of grant funding, while the other four regions receive the remaining 28%.

Figure 5.1a Regional Distribution of GAFSP FCS Countries



n=32

Figure 5.1b Regional Distribution of GAFSP FCS Funding (US\$ million)



5.1.2 FCS Status

For the purpose of this Evaluation, the **GAFSP FCS countries are grouped into three main categories** with regard to their FCS status during the years of GAFSP implementation thus far (i.e. between FY10 and FY25). In particular:

- ▶ Always FCS – countries listed as FCS throughout the FY10-FY25 period;
- ▶ Mostly FCS – countries mainly listed as FCS except for (i) the first few years (not initially), (ii) the last few years (not lately), or (iii) a few years around the middle (not midway) of GAFSP implementation; and³⁷
- ▶ Partly FCS – countries listed as FCS only for (i) the first few years (initially), (ii) the last few years (lately), or (iii) a few years around the middle (not midway) of GAFSP implementation.³⁸

³⁷ 'Few' years mean six or less during the course of the 16 FYs of GAFSP implementation. Furthermore, 'midway' refers to a couple of countries that were listed as FCS for most years in the beginning and at the end of the GAFSP period, but not around the middle. See further Annex E.

³⁸ 'Few' years mean six or less during the course of the 16 FYs of GAFSP implementation. Furthermore, 'not midway' refer to a couple of countries that were listed as FCS for a few years around the middle of the GAFSP implementation, but not in the beginning or the end of the GAFSP period. See further Annex E.

As illustrated in Table 5.1 below, the **majority of the 32 GAFSP FCS countries are classified as either 'Always FCS' (12) or 'Mostly FCS' (10)**. The remaining 10 countries have only been listed as FCS for a few years in the FY10-FY25 period. These include three countries – namely Lao PDR, Malawi and Tajikistan – which have only been FCS listed once or twice. See Annex E for further details on these countries' FCS status during GAFSP implementation.

Table 5.1 Categorization of FCS Status by Country

Classification	Countries
Always FCS (12)	Afghanistan, Burundi, ³⁹ CAR, Chad, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, <u>Haiti</u> , Kiribati, Myanmar, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Yemen (Republic of)
Mostly FCS (10)	Côte d'Ivoire, <u>Liberia</u> , Mali, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Sierra Leone, South Sudan, <u>Timor-Leste</u> , Togo, Tuvalu
Partly FCS (10)	Burkina Faso, <u>Ethiopia</u> , Gambia (The), Guinea, Lao PDR, ⁴⁰ Madagascar, Malawi, ⁴¹ Nepal, Niger, Tajikistan ⁴²

The four case study countries are underlined.

5.1.3 Level of Fragility/Conflict

An FCS-listing as such does, however, not say anything about differences in the degree of fragility/conflict. In fact, **the severity of conflict or fragility varies greatly between countries** (and over time). Albeit assessing the intensity of conflict or fragility is not a straightforward or objective exercise, a selection of accessible international indices has been used to further classify the GAFSP FCS countries (except Tuvalu)⁴³ based on their average levels of conflict and fragility, as well as climate vulnerability, for available years over the course of the implementation of GAFSP as a program. This classification - which goes from severe to low - is illustrated in Figure 5.2 overleaf, while Annex F provides further information on the relevant indices (and their numbers) used by the Consultants for this exercise.

With regard to conflict, 10 of the GAFSP FCS countries are experiencing severe conflict, and five are facing high levels of conflict. Some countries, like Afghanistan and Myanmar, have experienced persistent conflict, while others, such as Ethiopia and Niger, have seen spikes in conflict in recent years. In terms of fragility, ten countries are classified as moderately fragile. However, eight countries are identified as having high levels of fragility, and six are facing severe fragility. While some countries, like Burundi and Liberia, have experienced intermittent peaks of fragility, others, such as Ethiopia and Mali, have seen a gradual deterioration over time. Finally, while not considered a fragility aspect within the FCS classification (see Box 5.1 in Section 5.1.1 above), most countries are severely or highly vulnerable to climate change (a relevant aspect of their overall fragility for most FCS countries), with only two countries (i.e. Nepal and Tajikistan) classified as moderately vulnerable.

Overall, there is considerable variation between countries, but over half are either severely or highly fragile/conflict-affected. Their levels of conflict do not always correspond to their levels of fragility, underscoring the need for context-specific, adaptive interventions. For instance, while Ethiopia and Mali face severe levels of conflict, they experience moderate fragility. Similarly, Afghanistan and Haiti experience both severe conflict and fragility. In contrast, countries like Liberia and Timor-Leste, which experience low levels of conflict, face moderate fragility (but, as most other countries, high vulnerability to climate change). Finally, with the exception of Kiribati and the Solomon Islands, countries categorized as 'Always FCS' are commonly more fragile and/or conflict-affected than others.

³⁹ Except in FY10.

⁴⁰ Only in FY21 and FY22.

⁴¹ Only in FY14.

⁴² Only in FY10 and FY11.

⁴³ Which is not covered by the indices used.

Figure 5.2 Level of Fragility, Conflict and Climate Vulnerability

Country	FCS Status	Conflict Level	Fragility Level	Climate Vulnerability
Afghanistan	Always FCS	Severe	Severe	Severe
Burkina Faso	Partly FCS	High	Moderate	High
Burundi	Always FCS	High	High	High
Central African Republic (CAR)	Always FCS	Severe	Severe	Severe
Chad	Always FCS	Severe	Severe	Severe
Côte d'Ivoire	Mostly FCS	Low	High	High
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	Always FCS	Severe	High	Severe
Ethiopia	Partly FCS	Severe	High	High
Gambia, The	Partly FCS	Low	Moderate	High
Guinea	Partly FCS	Low	High	High
Guinea-Bissau	Always FCS	Moderate	High	Severe
Haiti	Always FCS	Severe	Severe	High
Kiribati	Always FCS	Low	Low	Severe
Lao PDR	Partly FCS	Low	Low	High
Liberia	Mostly FCS	Low	Moderate	High
Madagascar	Partly FCS	Severe	Low	High
Malawi	Partly FCS	Low	Moderate	High
Mali	Mostly FCS	Severe	Moderate	Severe
Marshall Islands	Mostly FCS	Low	Moderate	Severe
Micronesia, Federated States of	Mostly FCS	Low	Low	Severe
Myanmar	Always FCS	Severe	High	High
Nepal	Partly FCS	Low	Low	Moderate
Niger	Partly FCS	High	High	Severe
Sierra Leone	Mostly FCS	Low	Moderate	Severe
Solomon Islands	Always FCS	Moderate	Moderate	Severe
Somalia	Always FCS	High	Severe	Severe
South Sudan	Mostly FCS	High	Severe	Not available
Tajikistan	Partly FCS	Low	Low	Moderate
Timor-Leste	Mostly FCS	Low	Moderate	High
Togo	Mostly FCS	Low	Moderate	High
Tuvalu	Mostly FCS	Not available	Not available	Not available
Yemen, Republic of	Always FCS	Severe	Severe	High

Sources: Conflict - (i) Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) Conflict Index and (ii) Global Peace Index; Fragility - (i) Fragile States Index and (ii) Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA); and Climate vulnerability - (i) Notre Dame Gain Index.

5.2 Grant/Project Level

5.2.1 Overview


Since its inception, GAFSP has approved a total of 73 grants (supporting 60 different projects) in the 32 FCS countries (hereinafter 'FCS grants'), accounting for 59% of all approved GAFSP grants. In line with the regional distribution of the FCS countries and funding (see Section 5.1.1 above), and as illustrated in Figure 5.3 overleaf, the majority of the FCS grants support projects in Sub-Saharan Africa (59%) and East Asia & the Pacific (19%). Lao PDR (seven grants), followed by Nepal (six grants) and Haiti (five grants) have received the highest number grants.⁴⁴ GAFSP's support for these countries has been consistent, with continued funding awarded also under the last two CfPs (see further Annex G).⁴⁵ The approved grants include 47 country-led investment grants, 13 country-led TA grants and 13 PO-led grants. Finally, in terms of implementation status (and deducting the two recently cancelled

⁴⁴ In value terms, approved GAFSP funding to these three countries amount to US\$ 251 million (or 21% of GAFSP FCS funding).

⁴⁵ In some cases, GAFSP has also provided continued support by funding subsequent phases of the same project or program. For example, in Ethiopia it has funded both AGP I and II, while in Laos PDR both ANP I and II have received GAFSP financing.

grants in Afghanistan),⁴⁶ 24 FCS grants are closed and 34 are active,⁴⁷ while 13 are still under preparation.⁴⁸

Figure 5.3 Regional Distribution of GAFSP Grants in FCS Countries



n=73 in most FCS interventions can be considered an indication of its contribution to **filling a critical financing gap that SEs (or other development partners) are not able or not willing to fund**. This complementarity – and especially for the PO-led track – is anecdotally confirmed also by consulted stakeholders (“GAFSP support is unique”; “Most donors are shying away ... It provides value added in areas where there is a vacuum”; “It fills a very essential gap”).

In a few countries, GAFSP-funded interventions also represent an important base upon which SEs can expand their engagement (“GAFSP has become a crucial foundation, with subsequent projects building on its achievements”). For example, in The Gambia, AfDB could leverage the accomplishments of FASDEP for subsequent investments in the country.

5.2.2 FCS Status

Of the 73 FCS grants, 45 (61%) were approved in a FY in which the country was effectively FCS-listed. Furthermore, the countries’ FCS listings vary during the course of grant implementation. In line with the logic of the categorization of the FCS status at the country level (see Section 5.1.2 above), Figure 5.4 overleaf presents an overview of the

Box 5.2 GAFSP Complementarity and Value Added

GAFSP funding ranges from 6% to 100% of the total funding for supported interventions, with an **average contribution of 80%**. Of the approved grants,⁴⁹ GAFSP fully finances 40 projects (55%), including almost all the TA and PO-led interventions,⁵⁰ while three others are nearly fully funded. In contrast, only five grant interventions receive minimal funding from GAFSP, accounting for less than 20% of the total project costs. In these cases, the bulk of the funding is primarily provided by the relevant SE (or, in the case of AGP in Ethiopia, by other development partners). The important role of GAFSP funding classification of the FCS status at the grant level during implementation. Of the 58 closed and active FCS grants in the beginning of this Assignment, around half (48%) support(ed)

⁴⁶ In 2024, two grants (one TA and one investment) supporting one country-led project in Afghanistan (which never commenced implementation) were cancelled due to the deteriorating security situation in the country. One investment grant for a country-led project in Myanmar is about to be cancelled given the political situation. While the two cancelled grants in Afghanistan never commenced, the investment grant in Myanmar was first disbursed (and hence started implementation) in FY20 and had yet to be cancelled at the beginning of this Assignment. For the purpose of this Evaluation, therefore, this grant is still considered as under implementation.

⁴⁷ Of the 33 grants currently under implementation in the beginning of the Assignment, four were expected to close by the end of 2024. Another two grants (one in Burkina Faso and one in South Sudan) just entered into implementation at the very end of 2024 and have hence not been included in the subsequent assessment of FCS-sensitivity in project design and implementation.


⁴⁸ Out of the 13 projects currently in preparation, three (one in Guinea-Bissau and two in Lao PDR) are expected to be operational even if the first disbursement has not yet been recorded.

⁴⁹ Including the three recently / soon to be cancelled grants in Afghanistan and Myanmar.

⁵⁰ The 40 fully financed projects include 16 of the 47 investment interventions (with investments in South Sudan and Yemen receiving full financing twice), 12 of the 13 TA interventions and 12 of the 13 PO-led projects.

projects in countries listed as FCS in all FYs of grant implementation ('Always FCS'). Another 7% of grants are in countries listed as FCS in most FYs except for a few years in the beginning or the end of implementation ('Mostly FCS'), while 16% are in countries listed as FCS only for a few years either in the beginning or the end of implementation ('Partly FCS'). However, for 16 FCS grants (29%) the concerned country was not listed as FCS in any FY during the grant implementation period ('Never FCS').

Figure 5.4 Categorization of FCS Status during Grant Implementation



Moreover, for 13 of these 16 'Never FCS' grants, the country was not listed as FCS in the FY of approval either. In addition, for five of the 13 grants currently under preparation (and hence for which the classification of FCS status during grant implementation is not yet available), the country was also not FCS-listed upon approval.⁵¹ Consequently, deducting these 18 (13 plus five) grants, **a total of 55 grants can thus far be considered as 'true' FCS grants** (i.e. in a country that was FCS listed upon grant approval and/or at least at some point during the course of grant implementation). This represents 75% of the FCS portfolio of 73 grants and 44% of the total GAFSP portfolio of 124 grants. Further details on the FCS status of the 32 GAFSP FCS countries upon approval and during the implementation of their respective grants please see Annex H.

Figure 5.5 FCS Classification at the Grant Level

FCS status during implementation	FCS status on approval		Total
	Yes	No	
Always FCS	28	1	29
Mostly FCS	2	2	4
Partly FCS	2	7	9
Never FCS	3	13*	16
Not applicable (under preparation)	8	5*	13
Not applicable (cancelled)	2	0	2
Total	45	28	73


* Not 'true' FCS grants.

⁵¹ Namely one grant in Guinea, two grants in Lao PDR, one grant in Liberia, and one grant in Togo.

5.2.3 Level and Type of Fragility/Conflict

As presented in Figure 5.6 below, **most surveyed projects define the intensity of fragility/conflict as either high or medium both at design and during implementation.** For a small share of projects, the fragility/conflict level changed between start and implementation, with the overall portion of high intensity situations increasing. Half of the surveyed projects are completed, and medium to high fragility/conflict dominates also at time of closure.

Figure 5.6 Project Leads' Feedback on Intensity of Fragility/Conflict at Different Project Stages



n=24

The types of fragility and conflict also vary. As can be expected given the objectives of GAFSP, surveyed projects are generally affected by food insecurity, which is considered both a symptom and cause of fragility/conflict (see also the theoretical framework in Section 4). In this regard, international conflicts (i.e. war in Ukraine) and global food inflation (especially after the Covid-19 pandemic) have worsened the situation for countries highly dependent on food imports. Also in common with the delivery/conversion barriers outlined by the theoretical framework, both national coordination and local project activities are disrupted by violence (e.g. widespread gang activity, road controls, etc.) and environmental shocks (i.e. climatic hazards like droughts and heavy rains). Furthermore, at the national level, project implementation is impacted by both political instability (including not only government changes and governance failures, but also presidential assassination) and economic challenges (notably inflation, currency depreciations, scarcity of fuel, and economic polarization). Finally, additional issues at the sub-national/local level affecting implementation in project intervention areas include:

- ▶ Inter-group conflicts, e.g. ethnic and communal tensions, inter-clan disputes and displaced populations destabilizing project areas;
- ▶ Presence of armed non-state actors, with restrictions on agricultural practices, displacement and high insecurity;
- ▶ Resource and infrastructure scarcity, including limited access to land, as well as fragile food and water resources;
- ▶ Institutional weaknesses, notably poor governance capacity (or limited personnel) and inadequate technical innovation; and
- ▶ Other community challenges, with cultural barriers and fragile traditional systems exacerbating vulnerability.

5.3 Grant Proposals and Awards

Since the first call in 2010, GASFP has received a total of 293 complete proposals from 68 FCS and non-FCS countries⁵² and awarded 124 grants,⁵³ representing an overall success rate of 42%. **Of the total number of grant applications, 109 (37%) were presented by countries that were FCS-listed in the year of proposal submission.** After the 15 FCS grant proposals submitted in response to the first CfP, proposal numbers from FCS countries declined until the special FCV call in 2019. The dedicated FCV call attracted 23 grant proposals from 22 FCS-listed countries, nine of which had previously never applied for GAFSP funding (including six small island developing states which are particularly affected by climate change fragility).⁵⁴ Also, the sixth CfP resulted in a good number of FCS proposals within both the country-led (22) and PO-led (14) track. Some FCS countries have submitted more grant proposals than others, with Mali topping the list with 11 proposals, followed by DRC and Lao PDR (nine each) as well as Ethiopia, Gambia (The), Malawi, Nepal, and Yemen (eight each).

Of the FCS proposals, 47 (43%) were approved. Even if the same selection criteria (see Box 5.3 below) apply to both FCS and non-FCS countries, there is hence **no difference in the overall success rate between FCS and non-FCS proposals.** In fact, if the average award rate across the seven calls plus the MMI call is considered, it is slightly higher for FCS (48%) than for non-FCS (44%). Finally, of the four FCS countries currently listed also as IDA-only that are not (yet) in the GAFSP portfolio (see Section 5.1.1 above), only one (Eritrea) has never applied for GAFSP funding because it is inactive and hence not eligible for GAFSP funding.⁵⁵

For further details see Annex I.

Box 5.3 GAFSP Grant Selection Criteria

The first through fourth CfPs evaluated proposals based on: (i) country need, considering poverty, food consumption and prevalence of underweight children; (ii) country readiness, including the policy environment; and (iii) proposal quality with regard to objectives, activities, implementation arrangements, amount of financing requested, timeframe, risk management, and partnerships. Under the fifth, FCV-targeted, call, country need was assumed for all countries. In the sixth CfP, the selection criteria included (i) project description, (ii) context and, for the country led track, policy environment, (iii) cross-cutting themes, and (iv) implementation, sustainability and budget. Finally, the most recent, seventh call (which also accepted applications in French) considered – for the country-led track – (i) impact on country food systems driven by crises, (ii) project description, and (iii) operation readiness, as well as – for the PO-led track – (i) project description, (ii) attention to the thematic areas, and (iii) implementation, sustainability and budget.

⁵² This number also includes the countries covered by the three regional projects in East Africa and the Pacific.

⁵³ Proposals for and the award of additional financing for already financed grant interventions are not considered.

⁵⁴ Afghanistan, Chad, Comoros, Kiribati, Kosovo, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu.

⁵⁵ Among the other three countries, Djibouti has applied three times, Mozambique has submitted five grant proposals (two of which when it was FCS-listed), and Sudan has applied twice.

6 FCS-SENSITIVE PROJECT DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

This section presents the core findings from the FCS project portfolio assessment, resulting from the documentary review, survey of project leads and interviews with stakeholders. It commences with a review of general considerations for fragility/conflict in design (Section 6.1). It then outlines the ways in which FCS projects have sought to address fragility/conflict within the selection of target areas/populations and activities, as well as their risk management approaches and monitoring frameworks (Section 6.2). The implementation arrangements in terms of project leadership, government coordination and partnerships are also considered (Section 6.3). The section concludes with an overview of the integration of the three cross-cutting themes within the FCS portfolio (Section 6.4). Please note that this section covers the 45 FCS grants that, in the beginning of the Assignment, had closed relatively recently and projects under implementation (see Section 3.1 above).

Summary Findings

Most FCS project designs address fragility/conflict in general terms, recognizing numerous aspects as drivers, but more targeted FCS-sensitive considerations at preparation and during implementation vary. Even if many projects rely on more generic context or risk analyses and do not have a clearly defined FCS-sensitive approach, most seek to address aspects of fragility/conflict and adopt measures of FCS-sensitivity to at least some extent. The selection of target areas/populations depends on the type of intervention, but most projects focus on specific locations (rather than adopting a country-wide approach). Projects also include activities focusing on the underlying fragilities of countries or areas of intervention. Seeking to address the institutional fragility of IAs, almost all projects include capacity strengthening components, which is considered important also for risk management purposes. To this end, some projects also adopt community-based and participatory approaches. Affected by the limited institutional capacities of IAs, monitoring frameworks are generally weak, not sufficiently tailored or adapted to specific FCS contexts.


Implementation arrangements also vary. One quarter of the country-led projects are supported by targeted TA interventions seeking to address IA's institutional fragilities. Part of the FCS grant portfolio also includes interventions led by POs, the relevance of which is particularly recognized in contexts of fragility/conflict. Around half of the projects also established partnerships with various organizations at international, national and local levels to support understanding of the specific context and preparation of project design as well as delivery and outreach during implementation.

The integration of the three cross-cutting themes in design and during implementation depends on the project. Climate resilience and nutrition security are more commonly a top priority of grant interventions, being considered quite extensively within context or risk analyses and covered by various activities. Regarding the transversal area of women empowerment, gender is more often targeted by preparatory assessments and considered less burdensome to integrate in FCS projects, but few interventions include dedicated gender-transformative, or even gender-related, activities. With some exceptions (mostly related to nutrition security), cross-cutting indicators are usually included only at the output level; hence limiting the possibility of assessing the effectiveness of interventions.

6.1 Considerations for Fragility/Conflict in Design

In general terms, most FCS projects consider aspects of fragility/conflict in their design. As illustrated in Figure 6.1 below, the majority of surveyed projects report to have considered FCS to a very great or considerable extent when identifying and designing the intervention; i.e. FCS was either comprehensively taken into account (fully integrated into design) or actively considered (significantly influencing design), also for grants where the country was not FCS-listed on approval. In another six projects, it was regarded to a moderate extent (influencing some aspects of design). Only two surveyed projects – which were not FCS-listed on approval – either did not consider fragility/conflict or only considered it to a minimal extent (i.e. with limited impact of project design).

Figure 6.1 Extent of FCS Considerations in Design



n=27

6.1.1 Drivers of Fragility/Conflict


The causes of fragility/conflict are many. Although the WBG's FCS listings do not consider climate change vulnerability, the importance of this fragility aspect is highlighted by all surveyed project leads considering shocks related to climate change (drought, floods, hurricanes etc.) and/or climate-driven displacement and migration as possible causes of fragility/conflict at the preparatory stage (see Figure 6.2 overleaf). For example, in the case in Liberia, specific attention to fragility within the design of both SAPEC and SADFONS included considerations related to climate change in terms of its effects on agricultural production and productivity.

In most cases, other key drivers considered in the design of surveyed projects include (i) inequalities and exclusion of specific groups (leading to unequal access to resources, services and opportunities), (ii) weak governance and institutional capacity, and (iii) economic vulnerability (such as high levels of poverty and unemployment, unequal distribution of economic benefits, inflation, and/or import dependency – see Box 6.1 overleaf). Just above half the surveyed projects also considered other aspects; such as (i) external shocks and global trends (pandemics, economic downturns of global financial crises, disruptive technological/cyber events),⁵⁶ (ii) demographic pressures (i.e. rapid population growth), and (iii) historical grievances and unresolved conflicts (including legacies of

⁵⁶ These can include events such as (i) cyber attacks targeting critical infrastructure, financial systems or government institutions (leading to economic and political destabilization, (ii) hacking or data breaches, (iii) manipulation of public opinion, (iv) digital surveillance and repression, etc.

violence and presence of armed groups), and (iv) national resources competition (i.e. disputes over land, water, etc.). Finally, cross-border factors (such as spillovers from conflicts in neighboring countries, trans-national crime⁵⁷ or violent extremism⁵⁸) were considered by around one-third of surveyed project leads.

Figure 6.2 Drivers of Fragility/Conflict



n=27

Box 6.1 Reducing Dependency on Food Imports

An important goal in several FCS projects has been to decrease national dependency on food imports (such as AGP II in Ethiopia and SAPEC and SADFONS in Liberia). Supporting national food sovereignty requires investing in increasing national production of strategic food crops. For example, with a consistent and strong focus on rice, cassava and horticulture, both projects in Liberia sought to decrease the country's reliance on importing these crops and hence address one of its greatest socio-economic fragilities (both historically and presently). This driver has become more important in recent years with the war in Ukraine, which has caused international scarcity of grain and inflation of food prices, as well the overall global inflation of food (and energy) prices following the Covid-19 pandemic.

6.1.2 Fragility/Conflict Analyses

The use of context /situational or risk assessments that specifically address fragility/conflict varies. At the time of proposal preparation and project design, 15 surveyed projects had conducted or relied on such assessments. Of the remaining projects, seven had not done or used such an assessment (while five project leads did not know or could not remember). The FCS status on approval (or subsequently during implementation) did not influence the reliance or not on targeted fragility/conflict analysis during project preparation. I.e. five grants in countries that were not FCS-listed on approval - including two 'Never FCS' grants during implementation (i.e. the two West Africa FSRPs in Sierra Leone and Togo) - had nevertheless done/used such assessments when designing the intervention, while six grants in countries that were FCS-listed on approval did not do/use them. On the other hand, since attention to fragility/conflict is in the process of being 'institutionalized' within most SEs (see further Section 7.2.1 below), the use of fragility/conflict analyses appears more common

⁵⁷ I.e. illegal activities that cross national borders and are often coordinated by organized criminal networks, such as drug trafficking, human smuggling, arm deals, money laundering, illegal logging or poaching, etc.

⁵⁸ Involving the use of ideologically, religiously or politically motivated violence to achieve radical objectives (terrorism, radicalization, religious or ethno-political violence, etc.).

for more recently awarded grants. In fact, the 15 projects that used/relied on such assessments include ten of the 14 surveyed grant interventions awarded under the last three CfPs.⁵⁹

The approaches and frameworks used to assess fragility/conflict, or the risks of fragility/conflict, also vary. Some surveyed project leads report reliance on country analyses and other ‘institutionalized’ approaches of the SEs; such as IFAD’s Social, Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures (SECAP), WFP’s Environmental and Social Sustainability Framework (ESSF) and World Bank’s Risk and Resilience Assessment (RRA) – see further Section 6.2.1 below. Other projects addressed fragility/conflict and vulnerability within other types of risk assessments – tools like the Integrated Project Risk Management (IPRM) model are mentioned – or climate, geo-political, socio-economic and social impact analyses.⁶⁰ However, within the FCS portfolio, most contextual or risk assessments are quite generic, often lacking more targeted or detailed attention to specific (and local) fragility/conflict drivers. The importance of the use of thorough assessments is nevertheless recognized by surveyed projects (including those that did not involve a FCS-sensitive design) and interviewed stakeholders (*“It is highly important to critically assess the potential likely risks and design appropriate mitigation measures to prevent the adverse situations and/or reduce the magnitude of the impacts and better safeguard and build resilience of the target beneficiaries”; “Need to nip fragility in the bud and foresee it at design stage”*). Finally, few FCS project designs include targeted institutional/capacity needs assessments of the IAs. This is considered an important shortcoming by interviewed stakeholders (*“One major challenge is that projects often overlook the institutional capacities required for successful implementation”*), as also concluded by the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) report for the special FCV call.

Among the 15 surveyed projects that had done or used fragility/risk analyses, almost all had taken the findings into account to a very great (6) or considerable (7) extent when designing and preparing the project, while the remaining two projects had done so to a moderate extent. Again, there is no difference between projects in countries that were and were not FCS-listed on approval. In fact, the two projects that took the findings into account only to a moderate extent were both FCS-listed on approval (as well as ‘Always FCS’ during implementation). Furthermore, the 15 projects found such targeted assessments useful to either a considerable or very great extent.

6.1.3 Fragility/Conflict Approach

Even if most FCS project designs consider drivers of fragility/conflict, **many do not have a clearly defined FCS-sensitive approach**, lacking an explicit fragility/conflict focus within its development objectives or intervention logic. As further outlined in the following sections, **however, most seek to address aspects of fragility/conflict and adopt measures of FCS-sensitivity to at least some extent** in the selection of target areas/population, the implementation of activities, the definition of risk management and monitoring frameworks, as well as within their implementation arrangements (especially partnerships).


In general terms, as presented in Figure 6.3 overleaf, the **majority of surveyed projects planned to mitigate and/or respond to fragility/conflict aspects already occurring**. These include all (or almost all for ‘responding to’) grant interventions in countries that were FCS-listed on approval, as well as four in countries that were not (including two grants which then became ‘Partly FCS’ during implementation). More than half of the projects (also) sought to strengthen preparedness for

⁵⁹ Namely six of the eight grants awarded under the fifth (special FCV) call, one of the three grants under the sixth CfP and all three grants under the seventh call (including the two West Africa FSRP in Sierra Leone and Togo).

⁶⁰ Some projects (such as SMAPIEH in Somalia) also carried out security assessments focusing on safety and accessibility within the project intervention areas.

fragility/conflict that could arise, while one third considered preventing fragility/conflict from occurring (respectively including four and two grants in countries without FCS status on approval). Only one project (in a country that was not FCS-listed on approval) did not plan to address aspects of fragility/conflict (*"By then these issues were not observed as critical factors that can influence negatively the project implementation"*).

Figure 6.3 Approach to Addressing FCS



n=27

Box 6.2 Categorization of FCS Design Sensitivity

A 2021 World Bank evaluation of its engagement in conflict-affected situations introduces a taxonomy that categorizes projects based on their level of conflict-sensitivity in the design documentation.⁶¹ This classification comprises the following four categories:

- **Lean into conflict**, where projects (i) identify conflict drivers, (ii) explicitly address them in design (theory of change, purpose, scope, location, targeting, etc.), and incorporate adaptive implementation mechanisms, including those to mitigate risks to assets and people;
- **Minimize exposure risk**, where projects (i) recognize conflict drivers and (ii) include mechanisms to reduce risks to assets and people;
- **Avoid conflict**, where projects (i) acknowledge conflict drivers but choose to avoid engagement in conflict-affected areas or populations, without explicitly addressing the drivers or incorporating adaptive mechanisms; and
- **Neglect conflict**, where project documentation neither identifies nor addresses conflict issues.

While this taxonomy refers to conflict, and not (institutional and/or socio-economic) fragility, the Consultants have attempted to apply it to classify the fragility/conflict-sensitiveness of the design of the 45 FCS grants subject to the FCS-sensitivity analysis. Based primarily on the survey responses (which are self-reported and hence to some extent possibly biased) but also on the documentary review, the **great majority (39) of FCS grant interventions can be considered as 'leaning into fragility/conflict' to at least some extent**. These include all 11 grants awarded under the special FCV call, but also 12 interventions in countries that were not FCS-listed on approval.

Only two grants can be classified as 'avoid fragility/conflict'; i.e. the investment and TA parts of AGP II in Ethiopia (which was not listed as FCS on approval). As outlined by the Ethiopia country case study (see Volume II), the AGP II investment and TA interventions did not carry out any fragility or conflict assessments and do not focus on particularly vulnerable populations or areas at risk. Even if it did not generally consider fragility/conflict in its design, it did not completely neglect it either. The investment grant identified substantial risks in terms of institutional implementation capacities (due to delays encountered under AGP I) as well as environmental and social risks related to climate change and political unrest in the country. Subsequently, with conflict arising and following a 2022 mid-term evaluation of AGP II and FAO reporting, the proposal for additional financing in 2021 in response to the Covid-19 pandemic and the

⁶¹ WBG (Independent Evaluation Group), World Bank Engagement in Situations of Conflict: An Evaluation of FY10-20 Experience, 2021, p.25.

request for a no-cost extension identified several political instability and security factors as key bottlenecks for AGP II progress (even if there were no specific provisions for how to respond to these challenges).


The remaining four grants can be considered to 'minimize exposure risk'. These also include two joint investment/TA projects; namely AFN I in Lao PDR (not FCS-listed on approval) and CFAVCSP in Myanmar (listed as FCS on approval). The designs addressed some fragility aspects, but did not expect fragility/conflict to become a major issue and did not explicitly target geographical areas or populations affected by fragility/conflict.

6.2 Addressing Fragility/Conflict

6.2.1 Target Areas and Populations

Most FCS projects focus on specific, concentrated areas rather than adopting a country-wide approach. Some prioritize more vulnerable and affected populations, including those facing food insecurity, climate shocks, chronic malnutrition, and unequal access to productive resources. Among the surveyed projects, as presented in Figure 6.4 below, the majority deliberately targeted geographical locations and/or specific populations (likely to be) affected by fragility/conflict. In fact, most of them targeted such areas/groups to a considerable or very great extent. For example, in Haiti, the selection location was driven by the need for post-disaster recovery. PITAG aimed to restore agricultural capacity following hurricane damage, while PAPAIR and the ROPAGA-led project provide relief to communities affected by earthquake. Nevertheless, almost one-third intentionally avoided fragile/conflict-affected geographical settings to at least a moderate extent. In many cases, such areas were avoided because of high levels of violence, and within the less insecure areas targeted fragility was nevertheless usually taken into account (*"Priority was given to localities with the security and physical accessibility to enable successful implementation of activities. Among these localities, we chose those most vulnerable in terms of food and nutritional security"*). Furthermore, also here, the targeting (or not) of areas of fragility/conflict is not related to the FCS status on approval.

Figure 6.4 Targeting Fragility/Conflict-affected Locations and Groups



n=27

The selection of target locations/groups follows different principles depending on the type of intervention. On the one hand, projects targeting basic improvements in agricultural productivity and food security tend to focus on more vulnerable areas or populations. For example, in the case of Timor-Leste, where agriculture is dominated by subsistence farming and the use of traditional farming methods, SAPIP sought to increase productivity of smallholder agriculture by introducing improved farming practices. To this end, it made sense for the project to target comparatively more fragile areas and poorer communities. On the other hand, interventions promoting commercialized agricultural production and development of food market systems commonly focus on locations or groups with

potential for commercial agricultural development (and hence usually less affected by fragility/conflict, though may become so during implementation).


For projects focusing on growth through commercialized agricultural production and development of food market systems, the selection of areas/populations is primarily based on those with significant agricultural production potential. The experiences of SAPEC and SADFONS in Liberia and AGP II in Ethiopia show that these kinds of projects require farmers with at least a minimum of means and potential for commercial farming. FCS-related targeting is hence less common, and possibly less relevant, for interventions that target more growth-oriented commercialization and market systems development compared to those that focus on more basic agricultural improvements and food security (where fragility/conflict is regularly a key driver for project identification). Nevertheless, even if the projects in Ethiopia and Liberia did not target particularly fragile areas/groups, they did include a focus on climate-related vulnerabilities.

For projects focusing on basic agricultural improvements and food security, the selection of target areas/populations is guided by the identification of locations/groups experiencing high levels of food insecurity, poverty, socio-economic marginalization, and/or exposure to climate shocks.⁶² To this end, surveyed projects addressing food security, vulnerability and/or marginalization have relied on vulnerability assessments and tools like the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC - see further Box 6.3 below), the Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring System (FSNMS) of FAO and WFP, and Participatory Rural Appraisals (PRAs). In the case of SAPIP in Timor-Leste, targeted villages in the areas of intervention were selected based on food/nutrition insecurity levels. Key informants also confirm that the project is indeed mostly reaching out to comparatively un(der)-served areas and fragile communities (*"Most are far and difficult to reach"*), including the Oecusse exclave. The areas of intervention also cover a variety of the country's indigenous ethnic groups. Likewise, in Haiti, ROPAGA selects beneficiaries based on two main criteria, with food vulnerability as the primary factor. Priority is given to farmers affected by hurricanes and/or earthquake, followed by an assessment of their capacity to work.

Box 6.3 Use of Sub-National Food Security Classifications

When determining the geographical areas of intervention, **half of the surveyed projects considered the sub-national dimensions of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)**⁶³ to either a very great or considerable extent. One-fifth did not use the regional IPC, while another one-fifth of project leads do not remember/know. The remaining share considered it to a moderate or minimal extent.

Figure 6.5 Use of Regional IPC



⁶² Additional criteria include relatively stable security conditions, ease of access, and alignment with ongoing or planned government and donor initiatives.

⁶³ The IPC provides a common scale for classifying the severity and magnitude of food insecurity and acute malnutrition at both national and regional levels. It includes three different scales - namely (i) Acute Food Insecurity, (ii) Chronic Food Insecurity and (iii) Acute Malnutrition - and considers five different phases/stages of food insecurity severity - i.e. (i) minimal, (ii) stressed, (iii), crisis, (iv) emergency, and (v) famine. See further www.ipcinfo.org

Within the FCS portfolio, marginalized groups - mostly women, but also youth, minorities and indigenous peoples, as well as persons with disabilities - have also been prioritized by projects.

For example, like many other projects (see Section 6.4.3 below), SAPIP in Timor-Leste targeted a certain share of women farmers (30%). It also intended to focus on youth, but - albeit not excluded - this target group was eventually not specifically addressed or tracked during implementation. In Haiti, various projects incorporated measures to actively promote women's participation, setting clear and significant inclusion targets (ensuring that at least 40% of all beneficiaries are women). Focus has also been placed on youth (an important target group in FCS contexts - see Box 6.4 below). In a few cases, marginalized groups were targeted not only to address their underlying fragilities as such, but also to prevent conflict ("*Minority groups were included to avoid inter-clan resource triggered conflict*").

Box 6.4 The Importance of Youth

Rural to urban, or international, migration in search of (more profitable) livelihoods is particularly acute among youth, who leave behind an aging population.⁶⁴ This 'distress' migration can often turn into risky endeavors. For example, in Liberia many of the mining activities attracting young people are illegal and subject to conflicts, while youth in for example DRC have been recruited by rebellious groups as soldiers. (Undocumented) international migration patterns are closely related to illegal human trafficking and involvement of criminal groups, causing violence and taking a human toll. The decline of youth engagement in agricultural activities is often related to perceived poor profitability of agricultural businesses, limited access to resources and low social image (and related social stigmas).⁶⁵ From a fragility/conflict perspective, attention to youth is hence important within the context of agricultural and rural development. In Haiti, PAPAIR employs several strategies to engage young farmers, including targeted communication campaigns, priority enrollment, customized technological packages, etc. The ROPAGA-led project also prioritizes youth participation (at least 30%) and includes specialized training programs and seed capital grants to support youth-led ventures. Apart from these and a few other interventions, however, **more systematic attention to addressing youth-related challenges is limited within the GAFSP FCS portfolio.**

6.2.2 Activities

Focusing mostly on mitigation/response but also on prevention/preparedness, FCS projects include various activities seeking to address the underlying fragilities of the countries or areas of intervention. Towards improving agricultural productivity and food security, most projects target enhancement of agricultural practices through training of farmer groups and cooperatives, introduction of new technologies, provision of inputs, direct on-farm investments, and/or access to finance. They also support further developments of the agricultural sector by promoting the development of value chains (targeting storage, processing and quality improvements) and improved access to markets (by linking farmers/producers to markets - processing plants, supermarkets, hotels, schools, etc. - as well as by rehabilitating road infrastructure). With regard to the latter, SAPEC in Liberia demonstrated that infrastructure investments are important to support agricultural development in fragile conditions (such as the extremely poor road infrastructure).⁶⁶ In fact, the poor conditions of rural (feeder) roads in the country were included as a specific rural fragility aspect for SAPEC (this component was, however, not maintained in SADFONS).

Seeking to reduce the effects of climate change, many projects promote climate-resilient production by supporting the adoption of climate-smart and conservation agriculture technologies (see further Section 6.4.2 below). Interventions also target natural resource management, promoting soil and

⁶⁴ FAO. 2016. Addressing rural youth migration at its root causes: A Conceptual Framework.

⁶⁵ Ongama Giwu et. al. 2024. Evaluating factors influencing youth participation in agricultural enterprises: Implications for food security and agribusiness. In: The Southern African Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business Management 16(1) (November 2024).

⁶⁶ However, the institutional fragility of Government entities in developing tenders and managing effective procurement processes challenges effective, timely and efficient procurement of works. In the private sector, the same institutional fragility limits the number of eligible companies that can bid for works.

water conservation, restoration of degraded land, and sustainable management of irrigation infrastructure.⁶⁷

To address the institutional fragility of IAs, almost all projects also include resources and activities to strengthen capacity (even if, as outlined in Section 6.1.2 above, few base planned actions on institutional needs assessments). For example, the case study projects in Ethiopia, Haiti, Liberia, and Timor-Leste all included components seeking to strengthen the institutional capacity of relevant country counterparts. In the case of Ethiopia and AGP II, this also involved a dedicated TA grant intervention implemented by FAO to enhance the organizational and human capacity of IAs at the central and local level (as well as of target farmer groups). In Timor-Leste, SAPIP sought to strengthen not only the capacity of the IA at the national and municipal level (for example by developing the first results-driven M&E system for the agricultural sector in the country), but also to establish institutions at the watershed level. Similarly, in Haiti, one of ROPAGA's components specifically targets the improvement of its management skills and organizational capacity. The crucial importance of strengthening institutions in FCS contexts, particularly at the local level, is highlighted by most stakeholders interviewed.

6.2.3 Risk Management

As mentioned in the previous section, **many projects address the risks of underlying fragilities by targeted activities**. For example, institutional fragility is commonly tackled by capacity building and strengthening activities. In this regard, the setting-up of qualified and apolitical project teams can be important not only to push implementation forward, but also to liaise with and resist political forces. Continuous dialogue with relevant government counterparts is also mentioned as mitigating potential push-back (e.g. FSRP in Yemen). Similarly, some projects focus on climate resilience and natural resource management to address risks related to climate change and scarcity of water and land.

Furthermore, the adoption of a community-based approach is considered an important mechanism for managing risks in supported areas. As further presented in Section 6.3.3 below, the effective engagement of communities is considered valuable from an operational point of view in that it serves to inform on the local context and promote outreach. However, it is also – and indeed especially – important for promoting local conflict mitigation and resolution (as well as building resilience at the grassroots level – see further Section 6.3.3 below). To these ends, some projects specifically target the involvement of community groups (both formal and informal). For example, in Timor-Leste, SAPIP supported the creation (mostly ex novo) of farmer groups and the participatory drafting of agricultural development plans at the village level. Under AGP II in Ethiopia, farmers groups and cooperatives were linked to local level institutions for planning and management of scarce resources. In Haiti, local communities targeted by the ROPAGA-led project were actively involved from the outset through a needs assessment conducted by ActionAid (implementing partner), ensuring that key risks were identified and addressed. Engagement with local authorities helped align the project with local policies and secure institutional support, while consultations with farmer organizations and community leaders clarified project objectives.

Finally, project procedures also matter. For projects including direct support to farmers (e.g. RESEPAG II in Haiti and SAPIP in Timor-Leste), transparency – including clearly defined selection criteria and approval processes – and grievance redress mechanisms assist in mitigating causes of conflicts between and within communities as well as risks of political interference. Identifying or

⁶⁷ Particular contexts also call for special actions. For example, GAFSP funding through ADB allowed for the inclusion of demining activities in relevant SRIWMSP intervention areas in Lao PDR. In some countries, mine clearance is in fact a very concrete and important activity related to the effects of conflict in rural areas.

securing land rights are also important for certain interventions. The few project designs considering involuntary resettlement or displacement as a risk had either already prepared a resettlement policy framework / action plan (MNHP in DRC and READ in South Sudan) or foresaw the preparation of livelihood improvement plans (West Africa FSRP in Burkina Faso). In budget terms, a couple of projects include contingency for emergencies. The inclusion of such a budgetary item/emergency component is for example becoming increasingly systematically included in FAO projects, as well as through the World Bank's Contingency Emergency Response Component (such a component was for example financed by GAFSP within the West Africa FSRP in Sierra Leone). Finally, with regard to security, some project designs include the regular monitoring of ongoing and evolving conflicts as well as training in security risk management (e.g. FRSP in Yemen).

6.2.4 Monitoring

Adequate results frameworks, and the availability of data, are important for the proper measurement and demonstration of performance towards intended objectives. However, **FCS projects' M&E frameworks are generally weak, not sufficiently tailored or adapted to specific FCS contexts** (*"That is one of the things missing in most of the projects"*). For example, in Timor-Leste, the tracking of SAPIP results has been difficult because of the initial lack of baseline data and insufficient results framework. The framework was eventually populated with relevant indicators (also towards at least partly measuring institutional strengthening), while a combined baseline (albeit retroactive) and midline assessment was carried out to support the tracking of indicators at the farmer/community level. The collection of baseline data was also delayed for the TA part of PARSANKO in CAR. In general, apart from gender-related indicators (see further Section 6.4.3 below), projects' M&E frameworks do not disaggregate between other intended beneficiary/user groups. There are also no indicators relating to the evolution of fragility/conflict situations. A general limitation of many M&E frameworks and indicators is that most respond to (outreach of) activities and outputs and not to more qualitative and longer-term outcomes of interventions. Additionally, as further outlined in Section 8.1.2 below, data collection can be subject to delays, particularly in times of conflict and in cases of extreme weather events due to restricted or no access. In some cases, these challenges are structural (e.g. Liberia and Timor-Leste during the rainy seasons), limiting the capacity to respond in a timely manner to changes in local circumstances.

Monitoring is clearly affected by the institutional capacities of the IAs, and in particular of the project teams (e.g. SAPIP in Timor-Leste). In situations of institutional weakness, M&E requirements can be considered overly demanding, with data collection a persistent challenge (*"FCS often lack the necessary conditions to support effective M&E frameworks and are typically reluctant to allocate significant funding for these purposes"*). On a positive note, some projects adopting a community-based approach (see Section 6.2.3 above) have engaged farmer groups and alike in the participatory collection of data (e.g. SAPIP in Timor-Leste).⁶⁸ Collaborations with local organizations - as well as online monitoring arrangements - have also (at least partly) overcome obstacles with limited (or no) access to certain locations for security or climatic reasons. Furthermore, in the case of some follow-up projects (such as AGP I and II in Ethiopia and SAPEC and SADFONS in Liberia), there are clear signs of lessons learned in previous phases that benefit the design and scope of monitoring frameworks in subsequent phases. In both countries clear improvements of monitoring frameworks were observed.

⁶⁸ In fact, one of farmer groups visited in Timor-Leste keeps detailed monthly records of production and sales for all members towards reporting to the SAPIP team.

6.3 Implementation Arrangements

6.3.1 Project Leadership

As outlined in Section 2 above, GAFSP-funded projects are either country-led or PO-led. Except in a few rare cases (such as FSRRP in Yemen - see Box 6.5 below), the country-led interventions are primarily implemented by relevant ministries or other government entities. **Country-led investment projects can be supported by parallel TA interventions, which are often targeted at addressing institutional constraints or fragilities within IAs.** The TA grants provide complementary expertise and resources to support IAs in project implementation. Although some face coordination challenges (see Section 8.2.2 below), interviewed stakeholders generally consider parallel TA support to be particularly important in FCS contexts (*"TA is the best derisking mechanism"*). In the total FCS portfolio, 13 (28%) of the 47 approved country-led investment grant interventions are supported by dedicated TA grants implemented primarily by FAO, but also by WFP (in the case of Lao PDR and Nepal).

Box 6.5 The Case of Yemen

At the appraisal stage of the country-led FSRRP in Yemen (awarded under the special FCV call in 2019), the country became an active conflict zone. Recognizing that the Yemeni government did not control parts of the country, the project required **third-party implementation**. Supervised by the World Bank, the project is now implemented by another two SEs (i.e. FAO and WFP) as well as by UNDP. These three UN agencies hence ensure the delivery of project activities in both the South and the North of Yemen. The agencies' Country Representation Offices are responsible for the implementation of their respective activities as well as for coordination of relevant activities at the sub-national level, where the project is supported by FAO, UNDP and/or WFP staff at the governorate level (who also monitor activities in different areas of interventions).

Furthermore, **FCS grant portfolio also includes interventions led by POs** (18%). Interviewed stakeholders stress the relevance of the PO-led track, particularly in situations of fragility and/or conflict. POs are appreciated for their on-the-ground presence, facilitating outreach and service delivery even in challenging contexts (*"Gives us opportunities to allow us to work in the most difficult of circumstances"*; *"They serve their members in demanding situations where access to other means of support is a challenge"*). They are also recognized for their flexibility and ability to rapidly respond to changing circumstances, including the Covid-19 pandemic⁶⁹ (*"PO projects are quick to adapt, they are more dynamic, and know what the community needs"*; *"They are well positioned to provide quick response against unexpected crises"*). A couple of stakeholders also mentioned their role in facilitating not only economic but also social cohesion and resilience within their communities. It should, however, be noted that while 'circumventing' governments through direct support to POs can be useful for outreach in many contexts, it can also risk governments feeling by-passed, affecting the legitimacy of the intervention.⁷⁰ At the country level, it is hence important that country-led and PO-led projects are considered as complementary efforts.

6.3.2 Government Coordination


Alignment with government counterparts at all levels has generally been good. Among the surveyed project leads (see Figure 6.6 overleaf), the majority report that their SEs have been able to properly coordinate to a very great or considerable extent with national government counterparts (i.e. the IAs for country-led projects and relevant ministries or other national public entities for PO-led

⁶⁹ See GAFSP, Missing Middle Initiative (MMI): Lessons Learned from the Covid-19 Crisis, May 2020.

⁷⁰ For example, although not an FCS country, Nicaragua recently revoked the license for one of the POs leading a GAFSP-funded grant intervention.

projects). The same holds for regional/provincial and local/district government actors when applicable. Only a couple of projects faced challenges at the sub-national levels.

Figure 6.6 Extent of Alignment with Government Counterparts



According to surveyed project leads, **national-level coordination is facilitated by encouraging government counterparts to take the lead in project design and preparation.** After all, GAFSP funding should be driven by country demand, aligning and integrating the project with national policies and plans.⁷¹ Relevant national counterparts should naturally also be part of project governance structures (including possibilities of co-chairing committees). At the regional/local level, the direct engagement of relevant public stakeholders in the implementation of activities as well as in monitoring and supervision is considered instrumental not only for promoting local ownership but also for mobilizing communities and project beneficiaries. For example, in Timor-Leste, SAPIP-funded training and other support to farmers was delivered together with extensions workers of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (the IA) at the municipal level. Finally, at all levels, continuous communication (through regular coordination meetings, joint reviews, etc.) is also mentioned as essential.

On the other hand, according to surveyed project leads, **proper alignment with government counterparts is challenged by several factors.** These include (see also factors influencing implementation in Section 8.1 below):

- ▶ Capacity constraints, including shortage of staff or weak technical and operational capacity of public institutions;
- ▶ Poor collaboration between government ministries and conflicting mandates;
- ▶ Limited coordination among (and sometime even competition between) international development partners;
- ▶ Misalignment between government and SE financial management systems, leading to inefficiencies;
- ▶ Slow administrative processes, affecting approvals and implementation;
- ▶ Limited presence of government actors at the sub-national levels; and
- ▶ Changes in political leadership, involving revisions of government priorities or threats of policy shifts, affecting project continuity and sustainability of efforts.

⁷¹ This could also require joint planning with other ministries (and hence not only the IA).

6.3.3 Partnerships

Both the preparation and implementation of FCS grant interventions have been supported by partnerships with stakeholders at different levels. Around half of the 45 projects covered by the FCS-sensitive assessment envisaged partnerships at the design stage. More specifically, during preparation, 11 of the surveyed projects had established partnerships with organizations with expertise, experience, and/or mandate useful for fragility/conflict-sensitive project preparation.⁷² Seven of these 11 projects created partnerships did this with UN agencies, national non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and/or civil society organizations (CSOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs). A handful also partnered with international/regional humanitarian organizations and NGOs as well as research institutions and other entities. The survey shows that partnerships established at the design stage by the 11 projects continued during implementation. An additional four surveyed projects also engaged in new partnerships to support implementation efforts.

With regard to UN agencies, many FCS projects have been supported by FAO and WFP as implementing partners (instead of as SEs for TA interventions paralleling country-led investment projects). For example, among the case study projects, both SADFONS (Liberia) and SAPIP (Timor-Leste) worked with FAO, while SADFONS also collaborated with WFP. FSRRP in Yemen is also partnering with FAO and WFP as well as UNDP (see Box 6.5 above). Partnerships with international/regional NGOs and humanitarian organizations include (members of) the three CSO representatives on the GAFSP Steering Committee (SC) - see further Box 6.6 below - as well as for example the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),⁷³ Oxfam⁷⁴ and SOCODEVI (*Société de coopération pour le développement international*).

Box 6.6 Partnerships through SC CSO Representatives

The CSO representatives of the SC have also been involved in the implementation of a few GAFSP-funded FCS projects. ActionAid has been engaged as implementing partner in the PO-led project in Haiti (ROPAGA) and in the AFS project in The Gambia. Furthermore, one of AFA's member associations is involved in the implementation of the investment part of AFN II in Lao PDR, while a member association of ROPPA (*Réseau des Organisations Paysannes & de Producteurs de l'Afrique de l'Ouest*) is engaged in the poultry and aquaculture MMI project Mali. Even if partnerships with members of these three CSO is relatively limited at the operational level, a couple of interviewed stakeholders believe that, on a more strategic level, GAFSP has created enabling conditions for the involvement of CSOs in grant interventions by including CSO representatives in the SC.

Relevant partners also include national NGOs. For example, in Myanmar, FAO is partnering with a local NGO for the implementation of CFAVCSP, effectively reaching out into the project's areas of intervention. In fact, this partnership allows for the continuation of the TA part of the project, while the investment part has been put on hold (see further Box 8.4 in Section 8.2 below). Some projects, especially those adopting a community-based approach (see Section 6.2.3 above), engage CBOs and CSOs - if organized and apolitical - to promote understanding of the local context and outreach ("*They have] the capacity to bring the perspectives and the views from the ground*"; "*Strong producer organizations can facilitate swift and efficient outreach for interventions*"). Partnerships with organizations at community level are in fact considered particularly valuable for meeting needs and building resilience in very fragile and conflict-affected contexts ("*They are more able to react to challenges and find the way to reach those most in need*"; "*The scaling-up of [community associations/groups] provides a concrete response to the problems of fragility and conflict. It fosters*").

⁷² Of the remaining 16 projects, five had not established partnerships at the design stage (all targeted TA interventions which serve to support the implementation of the parallel investment projects), while 11 projects leads did not know or did not remember.

⁷³ I.e. FSRRP in Yemen.

⁷⁴ E.g. RENUGL in DRC and SAPIP in Timor-Leste.

social cohesion and a sense of togetherness, strengthening the resilience of communities in the face of socio-economic challenges”). In practice, it is more common for community organizations to be consulted at the design stage rather than involved in implementation. However, some CBOs or other more informal arrangements (such as Dimitra Clubs – see Box. 6.7 below) are also engaged during implementation.

Box 6.7 Dimitra Clubs⁷⁵

The Dimitra Club model – spearheaded by FAO – is a **community-driven development approach** facilitating rural people’s empowerment, enhancing women’s leadership and contributing to improved livelihoods and gender equality. It consists of groups of women, men and young people – mixed or not – who organize on a voluntary basis to bring about changes in their communities and resolve problems using their own resources, without relying on external support. By encouraging interaction across genders and within local communities, Dimitra Clubs enhance **collective action** (often related to food security). They promote access to information and communication, networking, community participation, autonomy, and ownership. Dimitra Clubs are active in Burundi, Burkina Faso, CAR (including the GAFSP-funded PARSANKO project), DRC, Ecuador, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, South Sudan (including the GAFSP-funded READ project), and Uganda.

A few projects are also working with research institutes and academia. For example, both case study projects in Liberia engaged with these types of partnerships (nationally and internationally), which allowed for the pooling of expertise in agricultural development and food security in a context of scarce institutional capacity. Other projects have also worked with research entities (e.g. CAPAD in Burundi and FANSEP in Nepal). In Haiti, PITAG supported applied and adaptive agricultural research through national and international institutions to develop and improve sustainable agricultural technologies. These types of collaborations are considered particularly useful for advancing climate-smart activities.

At the design stage, UN agencies as well as other international organizations provide technical support or strategic inputs for conflict-sensitivity and risk analyses as well as baseline assessments useful for guiding project design (including the identification of intervention areas), while national and local organizations offer insights into community dynamics and vulnerabilities (facilitating the selection of activities and beneficiaries at the community level). These partners were engaged through consultative workshops, bilateral meetings and involvement in proposal preparation stages. During implementation, partners are also important for addressing the capacity constraints of IAs.⁷⁶ They are engaged primarily in capacity building and training efforts (also specifically related to fragility and conflict management) as well as other types of service delivery (particularly in conflict zones and very fragile settings), but also in project coordination and supervision.

In general, partnerships are recognized for their technical (and, in some cases, scientific) expertise, as well as their roles in coordinating with national/local government counterparts. In a few cases, implementing partners also contribute financially to the project. Furthermore, partnerships can be beneficial for linking project activities, using specific complementary expertise and networks of the partners. A good example of this was found in SADFONS (Liberia), where the produce of farmers benefiting from support under the project were linked to a specific market; namely a homegrown school feeding program of the Government of Liberia implemented with financial and technical support from WFP. Through collaboration between the IA and WFP, effective market linkages were established with this important and sustainable food-market. The importance of relevant partnerships is stressed by both surveyed project leads and interviewed stakeholders (*“Partnership during design phase has been crucial”; “Provided useful insights”*). Benefits of partnering with UN

⁷⁵ See further: <https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/ac21119c-423a-40fa-8c13-8ba261bb462c/content>

⁷⁶ In this regard, the implementation of SAPIP in Timor-Leste could for example have benefited from further partnerships.

agencies, NGOs and other organizations with presence in fragile/conflict-affected contexts are also highlighted by the 2022 Portfolio Review (*"These entities offer the most efficient means of delivering project services in the remote, conflict-impacted zones where the impoverished face the most pressing needs"*).


It should be noted (as also highlighted by the 2022 Portfolio Review) that **coordination - including agreeing on roles and responsibilities - with implementing partners (as well as with IAs) takes time and effort, hence requiring due attention and resources**. Furthermore, the engagement of national NGOs and local community organizations can be difficult in some countries because of the lack of recognition by government counterparts (e.g. Myanmar, where operational restrictions apply for the implementing partner NGO of CFAVCSP). Finally, the importance of a more strategic and lasting dimension of partnerships is also highlighted by some stakeholders (*"It should not only be about the CfP as such, but it should be about building partnerships"*). These types of partnerships support resilience in the longer term.


6.4 Cross-Cutting Themes

6.4.1 Overview

The extent to which the three cross-cutting themes have been integrated into FCS project design varies. As presented in Figure 6.7a&b below and overleaf, climate resilience and nutrition security are usually among projects' top ambitions (80% and 75% respectively). Women empowerment was a primary ambition in only half of the surveyed projects, though it remained an important objective for others. The three aspects also differ somewhat regarding the extent to which they are considered a component of fragility. Of the three cross-cutting themes, climate resilience emerges as the most recognized aspect of fragility, with almost all surveyed project leads identifying it as a key factor. While women empowerment is less recognized as a main aspect of fragility, this cross-cutting theme is assessed more deliberately than the others, integrated without significant burden, and measured using more specific indicators. Finally, dedicated climate/gender/nutrition experts are often included in project teams to support its implementation.

Figure 6.7a&b Extent of Integration of Cross-Cutting Themes in Design






n=24

Box 6.8 GAFSP Influence on Integration of Cross-Cutting Themes in Design


Among the surveyed projects, **GAFSP seems to have played an important role in guiding projects on the inclusion of the cross-cutting themes in design.** Surveyed project leads note that the integration of the themes is very well reflected in the awarding process and that the possibility of projects to drive impact in these areas is a strong added value of GAFSP. However, they also acknowledge that requirements to include numerous elements at the appraisal stage can make the integration of the cross-cutting topics challenging, especially in FCS contexts. Additionally, and especially for some PO-led projects, some interviewed stakeholders framed the inclusion of these themes as a “box-ticking” exercise, suggesting that “at worst, this approach risks diverting farmers’ focus from their primary objective – strengthening their agricultural capacities”.

Figure 6.8 Extent of Influence of GAFSP Indications on Inclusion of Cross-Cutting Themes in Design



n=24

Furthermore, among the surveyed projects, **all three cross-cutting themes have mostly been integrated also at the implementation stage** (see Figure 6.10 overleaf). Further details on the integration of the three cross-cutting themes in the design and implementation of FCS grant interventions are presented in the following sub-sections.

Figure 6.10 Extent of Integration of Cross-Cutting Themes in Implementation

n=24

6.4.2 Climate Resilience

During the design phase, climate resilience has been considered quite extensively within analyses of country contexts and risks, including dedicated climate risk and vulnerability assessments. Survey results also show that this theme has been systematically integrated into planning frameworks. Its integration into the design aligns with the SC Climate Decision Note, which requires proposals to reference relevant climate risks within the context and policy environment descriptions and to acknowledge whether projects address climate as a cross-cutting theme.

Climate resilience has primarily been integrated through various activities, including the adoption of climate-smart technologies and conservation agriculture such as improved resilient seeds, solar irrigation pumps, agroforestry, and organic and sustainable production approaches. For example, PITAG in Haiti has a strong research component focused on the development/improvement of sustainable agricultural technologies, including disease-resistant and heat-tolerant crop varieties, towards strengthening resilience against environmental shocks. Additionally, climate-smart practices have been widely promoted among farmers, mainly through Farmer Field Schools (FFS).⁷⁷ In CAR, PARSANKO relied on this method to support farmers and POs, helping them strengthen their structure and professionalization.

Some projects also incorporated climate-related infrastructure, such as the construction and rehabilitation of water supply points and irrigation systems. For instance, PAMP II in Tajikistan developed an efficient and sustainable water resource management system, improving irrigation services for farmers. Finally, albeit less frequently, projects such as FSRP in Togo focused on climate change prevention by strengthening risk detection mechanisms to enhance preparedness and ensure timely responses to climate shocks.

⁷⁷ <https://www.fao.org/farmer-field-schools/overview/en/>

6.4.3 Women Empowerment

Some project designs included an analysis of gender gaps, particularly in the agricultural sector, as part of the country context description. The most frequently identified gaps relate to access to inputs and agricultural productivity, including market access, entrepreneurship, commercialization support, extension services, and training. These are followed by gaps in access to and control over productive assets (including land).⁷⁸ Additionally, some projects, such as CFAVCS in Myanmar and PARSANKO in CAR, included gender consultations to engage women in the design of the activities. These efforts proved to be quite effective in empowering women's role in various activities and decision-making settings.

Women empowerment has been incorporated primarily by setting participation thresholds in certain components, prescribing that a specific percentage of beneficiaries are women. However, only a few projects have included dedicated gender-related activities specifically designed to benefit women as the primary target group. In these cases, activities mostly focused on promoting equitable access for women and girls to agricultural resources, credit and training. In Haiti, PITAG and PAPAIR support women's agricultural activities by providing specialized technology packages with reduced co-financing requirements. The ROPAGA-led project prioritizes women in key activities such as vegetable cultivation and seed capital grants. Women's participation is further encouraged through training quotas, priority access to funding for women-led enterprises, and leadership roles in project governance. Other projects focused on increasing women's participation in the agricultural sector. For instance, SIVAP in Malawi implemented a 50% women's quota in management, training, community representation, and decision-making, while also providing training to cooperatives to enhance women's leadership and involvement in local farmers' groups.

Only a handful of projects incorporated gender-transformative activities. For example, in addition to the Dimitra Club engagements of the PARSANKO project in CAR and the READ project in South Sudan (see Box 6.7 in Section 6.3.3 above), AFN II in Lao PDR aims to transform gender power dynamics by addressing social norms, practices, attitudes, and beliefs. This includes explicitly engaging men and boys to challenge concepts of masculinity and gender within their community and ethnic groups. However, GBV is only briefly considered in these projects, and no project addresses its mitigation. A couple of interviewees pointed to this shortcoming, noting that it is a common issue in FCS. A couple of stakeholders also recognize that integrating women inclusion into project design and implementation may be challenging in some contexts, as such empowerment approaches can disrupt traditional, unequal social, cultural, and religious beliefs.

Interviewed informants also noted that while gender gap is often mentioned in project documentation, it is rarely addressed in practice, and activities to close the gap are frequently implemented ineffectively. Survey responses also indicate that **M&E frameworks typically lack gender-sensitive indicators beyond basic sex-disaggregated outreach data**, with limited attention given to addressing systemic gender inequalities and structural barriers. For example, the Liberia case study highlights that while women participate in projects like SAPEC and SADFONS, they generally represent less than half of the targeted beneficiaries, and it remains unclear to what extent they benefit from the economic activities.⁷⁹

While there are exceptions (at least at the design stage - see Box 6.9 overleaf), overall, these findings suggest that the **quality and intensity of the inclusion of gender considerations could be improved**, with a clearer focus on how gender will be integrated into project design and a push for activities that go beyond agricultural empowerment.

⁷⁸ Gender cross-cutting review April 2024

⁷⁹ It should also be noted that the GAFSP M&E framework also lacks more targeted gender-sensitive indicators beyond the output and outreach level.

Box 6.9 Best Gender Practices in FCS Project Design

A recent GAFSP portfolio review on gender,⁸⁰ outlines several **best practices related to gender within the design of FCS grant interventions**. These include:

- Engagement of gender/social inclusion specialist with the core project team (e.g. READ in South Sudan and FSRP in Malawi);
- Issuing of both women and men on land titles, allowing women to apply for loans and government support programs (SRIWMSP in Lao PDR);
- Inclusion of men (husbands and elders) in nutrition awareness training (e.g. READ in South Sudan);
- Inclusion of strong gender leadership actions (e.g. NAFHA in Nepal, SADFONS in Liberia, SRIWMSP in Lao PDR); and
- Implementation of a detailed gender gap analysis and a clear vision of women's empowerment (e.g. SSLRP in South Sudan and FSTP in Malawi).

6.4.4 Nutrition Security

Nutrition security is typically considered at design phase when defining the country profile, mainly establishing the linkages between agriculture and nutrition security. Project activities tackle nutrition security through the promotion of nutrition-sensitive agriculture productivity, enhancing the production of diverse and nutritious crops that enrich the quality of diets (including micronutrient-rich foods and indigenous/wild food crops). Additionally, some projects - such as FSRP in Sierra Leone, AFN II in Laos PDR, AGP II in Ethiopia, and CFAVCSP in Myanmar - include the creation of home gardens and small livestock raising to promote the production of nutrient-rich fruits and vegetables adapted to local conditions. Training at community level was also provided to producers of rice, cassava and horticulture to improve local diets in food producing communities in both Ethiopia (AGP II) and Liberia (SADFONS).

Project activities included nutrition training and awareness raising. Direct nutrition interventions include nutrition awareness campaigns in schools and communities to help households understand how they could use increased food production and income to improve diets and prevent malnutrition, but also how to purchase more nutritious food. For instance, FASDEP in The Gambia included training in schools and communities on basic nutrition knowledge, food preparation and the proposed 'from the garden to the table' nutrition training program. In Haiti, PAPAIR integrated nutrition modules into each FFS to help beneficiaries make informed agricultural choices for better household nutrition. Additionally, the AFS project in The Gambia provided the delivery of nutritious school meals in schools. Finally, some projects, such as AFN II in Laos PDR and FSRP in Sierra Leone, included the provision of assistance to nutrition competes at local and national levels, increasing the institutional capacities and ensuring that planning activities adequately include multi-sectoral issues.

The inclusion of nutrition-related indicators in the M&E framework is mostly covered in all projects. However, **with some exceptions, indicators are typically included only at the output level**, including for instance the number of people receiving improved nutrition services and products and the number of farmers who received support to produce quality seeds, rather than at the outcome and impact level (this is for example the case for the case study projects in Ethiopia, Liberia and Timor-Leste). Nevertheless, a few FCS projects also seek to capture nutrition at the impact level (as 'strongly encouraged' by the 2022 GAFSP M&E Plan); such as: (i) chronic malnutrition rate in children under five (e.g. PNSADR in Burundi and PReSAN-KL in Mali); (ii) improved food security and nutritional status of vulnerable groups and households measured by wasting prevalence (FASDEP in the The Gambia); (iii) Dietary Diversity Score (e.g. CFAVCS in Myanmar and FSSRP in Yemen); and (iv) Food Insecurity Experience Scale (e.g. RENUGL in DRC and PITAG in Haiti). Without such indicators, there are limited possibilities to assess the effectiveness of interventions and long-term nutritional results.

⁸⁰ GAFSP Gender Portfolio Review (April 2024).

7 PROGRAM OVERSIGHT

This section includes an assessment of the FCS-sensitivity of GAFSP procedures (Section 7.1) as well as of support and coordination by SEs (Section 7.2).

Summary Findings

Supervision and support from GAFSP and SEs have included some elements of FCS-sensitivity. In terms of GAFSP grant selection, fragility/conflict aspects were generally not considered in the awarding of grants prior to the special FCV call. Themes related to fragility/conflict were addressed within the broader objectives of the subsequent two calls, but selection requirements/guidelines did not specifically indicate that FCS-sensitivity should be taken into account. The time between the launch of a call and the deadline for proposal submission is also considered too short, especially for more 'reactive' projects developed in response to a GAFSP funding call, and the tracking of fragility/conflict-related aspects within projects by the Program is relatively weak. SEs are in the process of 'institutionalizing' fragility/conflict-sensitive approaches and tools, which project designs have increasingly relied on. SE support during implementation varies and is generally appreciated. However, some parallel investment and TA interventions have faced challenges in coordinating activities. More strategic coordination among SEs for engagement in FCS countries is also limited.

7.1 GAFSP

7.1.1 Grant Selection

The GAFSP funding process is competitive, and all grant proposals are assessed against the same criteria (see Box 5.3 in Section 5.3 above), irrespective of the country being FCS-listed or not. **With few exceptions,⁸¹ fragility/conflict aspects were generally not considered, or at least not spelled out, in the awarding (or non-awarding) of grants prior to the special FCV call in 2019.** After the fourth CfP, recognizing the great need for support but limited readiness as well as number and quality of proposals for FCS countries, the fifth call targeted only FCS-listed countries.⁸² This CfP assumed the need to be equal for all applicant countries and hence only evaluated proposals based on country readiness and proposal quality. The proposal template included specific indications on considering fragility/conflict when defining project's objectives, target areas, actions/activities, and risk management. Leading up to this call (which also included a longer submission period – see below), countries could also apply for a grant to receive TA support (provided by FAO and WFP) for project design and proposal preparation. This opportunity was used, and appreciated, by most countries/proposals. In support of a selection process which included an assessment of how proposals addressed fragility/conflict, an FCS specialist was also engaged in the TAC for this special call. Finally, the FCV call allowed for higher SE supervision fees (9% compared to 5%).

Furthermore, **themes related to fragility/conflict were considered within the broader objectives of the sixth and seventh calls.** While the sixth CfP included a focus on medium- to long-term responses to the Covid-19 pandemic (as well as the three cross-cutting themes and collaboration with

⁸¹ For example, the post-conflict nature of Liberia was recognized in the awarding of the SAPEC program under the first CfP. In the evaluation of a proposal from Côte d'Ivoire in response to the third call, proposed infrastructure development was considered to "prevent conflict with sedentary crop farmers". Reversely, under the second CfP, even if Mauritania is not an FCS-listed country, the proposal quality was deemed weak related to some important issues, including the failure to address land rights and the potential for agro-pastoral conflict. The same is true for CAR under the fourth call, where the proposal's lack of clear indications on land distribution considering the country was "engaged in a post-conflict peace, reconciliation and rebuilding process" is pointed out.

⁸² The possibility of giving additional weight to country need was also discussed.

the private sector), the seventh call focused on multi-layered crises; i.e. climate change, Covid-19 and conflict, including the effects of the war in Ukraine (which exacerbated the vulnerability of many GAFSP countries, such as Liberia, dependent on food imports).

However, **selection requirements or guidelines under the last two calls did not specifically indicate that FCS-sensitivity should be taken into account** (*"The GAFSP application template is not fit for conflict/fragility purpose"*). As for the fifth call, (country) need in terms of food insecurity and poverty is no longer a selection criterion in its own right but rather reflected in the project description when describing target areas/populations. The situation or context analysis could (should) hence include elements of a fragility/conflict assessment (even if not necessarily called so). It is hence assumed that fragility/conflict-related aspects are addressed within the project description by defining challenges and how the project intends to address them. Fragility/conflict could (should) also be considered when outlining the implementation arrangements and risk management approach. In general, projects are assessed for their appropriateness to and capacity to deliver within the context, regardless of the country's FCS status (*"The project should fit the context"; "Look at commitment based on what [the project] deliver, and what [it] can deliver depends on the context"*).

Finally, in more general terms, **time between the launch of a call and the deadline for proposal submission is considered as too short** by some stakeholders (*"CfP timelines are tight"*). While the two/three-month period for the first three calls was extended to around four months for the fourth and sixth CfPs (and six months for the fifth, special FCV, call), the seventh call returned to a two-month submission period. A shorter notice period can lead to more rushed submissions with less quality control/enhancement by SEs (which is considered particularly important in FCS contexts, as well for the PO-led track). This is especially the case for 'reactive' projects (i.e. those that are developed in response to a GAFSP funding call), compared to more 'proactive' projects (i.e. already conceived projects seeking financing).

Box 7.1 Changes in Application Procedures

Starting with the sixth call, the application process was divided into a country-led and a PO-led track. While this involved separate assessments of proposals from governments and POs, the requirements, guidelines and submission templates were more or less the same for both tracks. This led to some PO-led submissions (from both FCS and non-FCS countries) being designed as 'mini-country' proposals, and hence - given their much smaller budget sizes - too ambitious or complex in terms of proposed activities and targeted results (*"The PO-led calls include too many criteria"*).

The seventh call in 2023 introduced a two-step application process, i.e. a first expression of interest (EoI) stage and a second final proposal stage, seemingly to promote a more limited number of (better-quality) proposals for TAC to review. However, the EoI stage did not involve a 'technical' pre-assessment of the proposed project, but rather a due diligence check of completeness, government endorsement, budget, etc. by the GAFSP Coordination Unit (CU). It has consequently not really affected the number (or quality) of final proposals from both FCS and non-FCS countries (*"The first stage filter is still letting through too many projects"; "An excessive number of proposals [are] being cleared that are largely above the funds available"*). Furthermore, the period between EoI and final proposal submission (one month) is considered insufficient for certain preparatory activities such as pre-feasibility assessments and stakeholder engagements to be carried out. Finally, a couple of interviewed stakeholders point to the application process being too complex for fragile countries with weak institutional capacity.

7.1.2 Monitoring


The tracking of fragility/conflict-related aspects within projects by the Program is relatively weak. In the portfolio file, projects are only 'flagged' as FCS if the country was FCS-listed at the time of project approval. Following the special FCV CfP in 2019, the annual portfolio reviews include a section on the performance ratings of FCS projects. As of FY23, they also comprehend some analysis

of the reasons for their generally poorer performance in comparison to non-FCS projects. However, the template for the biannual project progress reports does not include instructions for the consideration of FCS-related matters. Finally, a couple of SEs mention that GAFSP demands on bi-annual reporting – including the tracking of indicators – are too high for many IAs, especially in FCS countries given their often limited institutional capacity (*“Overload for the IAs, and out of proportion for the funding they receive”; “[Indicators] are unfeasible to measure for low capacity government officials”*).

Box 7.2 GAFSP Influence on FCS-Sensitiveness

Most surveyed project leads consider GAFSP to have had at least some influence on considerations for fragility/conflict in project design. In fact, half of the respondents report that the CfP guidelines, selection criteria, and/or other procedures promoted the inclusion of FCS aspects in the preparation of the projects to a ‘considerable’ or ‘very great’ extent.⁸³ Around 40% of these are projects funded in response to the special FCV call. For other projects, GAFSP direction has been less evident (*“Not aware of any guidance on FCS from GAFSP”*).

Figure 7.1 Extent of Influence of GAFSP Indications on Fragility/Conflict Considerations in Design



n=27

7.2 Supervising Entities

7.2.1 Fragility/Conflict-Sensitive Approaches

Fragility/conflict-sensitivity has gathered momentum in recent years, recognized by many development partners as essential for engagement in FCS countries (or in fragile/conflict-affected areas within countries). Most SEs now have targeted strategies or policies as well as dedicated departments, or at least units or offices, for FCS-related matters (including also emergency and resilience). Moreover, as further outlined in Box 7.3 overleaf, **SEs are ‘institutionalizing’ various fragility/conflict-sensitive approaches and tools** in line with their strategic directions for engagements in FCS. These are applied to various extents; i.e. either for all country programs (e.g. AfDB, IFAD and WFP), for some countries (such as IDA countries in the case of the World Bank), or based on requests from countries/donors (e.g. FAO). Most of the SE assessments refer to the country level, but FAO also carries out area-specific context analyses.

⁸³ One of the surveyed project leads mention for example GAFSP’s vulnerability analysis and climate resilience guidance. Another surveyed project also notes GAFSP supervision since the CU requested several revisions to the project design to ensure it adequately accounted for the challenging local context.

Box 7.3 FCS-Related Assessments and Guidelines of SEs

ADB. Since 2021, ADB's strategic plan in a fragile and conflict-affected context relies on a Risk and Resilience Assessment (RRA). This covers four drivers of fragility - environmental, institutional, economic, and political - which serve to analyze risk and to identify root causes and viable pathways for ADB to engage. Additionally, its Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations (FCAS) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) Approach incorporates a set of strategic planning processes that are responsive to those contexts. These include: (i) due diligence measures such as RRAs, political economy analyses and governance risk assessments; (ii) selection of project instruments or modalities specific to FCAS and SIDS contexts; (iii) sequencing and prioritization of interventions identified in country partnerships strategies; and (iv) risk- or fragility-responsive project design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation processes.

AfDB. As of 2018, AfDB carries out a mandatory Country Resilience and Fragility Assessment for all countries of engagement. This includes seven key criteria: (i) political inclusiveness, (ii) safety and security, (iii) justice, (iv) economy, (v) social cohesion, (vi) regional contagion effect, and (vii) climate change. These assessments are conducted on a regular cycle across the continent, and the results are mainstreamed into country and regional strategy papers, as well as project documents. Additionally, at the project appraisal stage, it does a Readiness Review, which considers the relevance of the project in the specific context, and in cases of FCS, it looks at pockets of fragility at the country and local level.

FAO. Developed in 2019, FAO has a well-defined and concise project-based conflict-sensitive approach that emphasizes the structured understanding of how interventions interact with the broader context. This approach encompasses key elements of a thorough Context Analysis for a country, or an area within a country. This analysis is carried out at the request of FAO's country offices or donors,⁸⁴ and includes a country/area overview, with a background on the contemporary event and policies that shape the current context, the structural causes and drivers of conflict (including mobility, food insecurity, climate change, etc.), and a stakeholder analysis. The framework also includes guidance to country offices on conflict sensitivity and pathways to sustain peace, mostly related to resource management but also sustainable agriculture practices.

IADB. Acknowledging not only situations of fragility and conflict but also those characterized by criminal violence, IADB recently developed a framework for FCCV engagement (fragility, conflict and criminal violence), which is currently being applied for the first time in Ecuador. It hence does not yet have a standardized assessment or specific tool for in-depth FCS analysis, but relies on the Institutional Capacity Assessment Platform (PACI) and country strategies for assessing fragility.

IFAD. In its country programs, IFAD includes a Fragility Analysis that identifies political/institutional, social, economic, security, and environmental causes and effects of fragility. This analysis is carried out for all countries. The country programs also include Social, Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures (SECAP), which feed into the Fragility Analysis by capturing the social and environmental dimensions and factors of fragility.

WFP. Given its core humanitarian mandate, WFP has a long history of working in conflict-affected areas and assessing risks. In addition to its Food Security Analysis for all its country programs (where the political dimension is also integrated), as of 2023, it also carries out a Conflict Analysis; a contextual assessment examining the causes/drivers of conflict and the main actors involved. This analysis is complemented by a Conflict Sensitivity Risk Assessment, which is mainly concerned with minimizing the chances of WFP inadvertently having a negative impact on the dynamics of conflict. In a complementary manner, under the Environmental and Social Sustainability Framework, WFP conducts a Strategic Assessment of Environmental and Social Risks during the design phase of a program activity to minimize potential negative impacts on the environment, people and communities.

World Bank. The primary tool of the World Bank for identifying and analyzing drivers of fragility and conflict is the Risk and Resilience Assessment (RRA). This assessment includes an analysis of FCV drivers and sources of resilience, as well as operational recommendations that can be integrated into country programming. Since 2020, the RRAs also include a multidimensional understanding of grievances and risk factors that exacerbate FCV, with due attention to gender, as well as the identification of strategic and operational entry points to promote prevention and strengthen resilience. RRAs are required for all countries requesting IDA funding.

⁸⁴ The mandatory inclusion of FCS-sensitivity for all interventions is currently being considered.

7.2.2 Institutional Support and Coordination

As also mentioned in Section 6.1.2 above, the **designs of some FCS grant interventions have benefited from the increasingly 'institutionalized' fragility/conflict-sensitive approaches and support from the SEs**; as also recognized by some project leads ("*It*) actively ensured that the context of fragility and conflict was incorporated into the project documentation"). **SE support during implementation varies**, with some SEs providing more hands-on assistance depending on the project and institutional capacity of the IA.⁸⁵ The documentary review testifies to the importance of this assistance for some projects ("*Proactive and responsive supervision and the high quality, strong commitment and flexibility of the ... team proved a strong and well-recognized factor in project success*"; "*The key factor ... was its intensive solutions-oriented implementation support, which was instrumental for the success of the project*"). Except for some procedures (mostly related to procurement), SE oversight as well as flexibility to support adjustments to changing circumstances is also recognized (see further Sections 8.1.1 and 8.2 below).

In terms of coordination between SEs, several interviewed stakeholders (as well as the 2023 Portfolio Review) point to **difficulties in coordinating activities of some parallel investment and TA grant interventions** ("*Silo thinking*"; "*It's a forced marriage*"; "*Disjointed approach*"). Effective coordination depends on the project, but in most cases the two parts are implemented as distinct projects (e.g. AGP II in Ethiopia, PARSANKO in CAR and MNHP/RENUGL in DRC), also because GAFSP support is channeled through the SEs with their own respective procedures. In the case of Ethiopia, GAFSP has financed relatively smaller World Bank contributions (of around 10% overall) to multi-donor trust funds (with a combined value of almost US\$ 850 million) supporting the first and second phases of AGP (an agricultural development flagship program of the Government of Ethiopia), which has challenged the integration of the fully GAFSP-funded TA interventions through FAO to support AGP implementation. Although the IA ensures alignment with priorities for the investment and TA interventions, the two parts are implemented separately by the two SEs. This has at times led to insufficient coordinated planning, monitoring and reporting, as well as the sharing of knowledge. On the other hand, AFN II in Lao PDR is effectively being implemented as one single project (with one project management unit as well as joint design, supervision and completion reports). It should also be noted that difficulties are generally not reported when TA providers are involved as implementing partners instead of as parallel SEs ("*With UN [agencies] embedded things work well*").

Finally, **more strategic coordination among SEs for engagement in FCS countries is limited**. Interactions are facilitated both within and beyond the SC, with some bilateral efforts to align more strategically in some countries, but more systematic coordination is generally weak in most of the GAFSP FCS countries. Especially in light of the limited institutional capacities of many IAs in FCS countries, more active high-level coordination could assist government counterparts in more effectively addressing the challenges of identifying gaps, managing the policy process, harmonizing efforts of development partners in the country, controlling foreign investments (and appropriations of land), and hence – eventually – promoting more sustainable change. As outlined in the Liberia country case study (see Volume II), the Government of Liberia has for example suffered from some of these challenges.

⁸⁵ To address the institutional fragility of some IAs (including POs), a few projects have even embedded consultants working parallel with IA staff in the management and implementation of project activities (e.g. the Strengthening Smallholder and Women's Livelihoods and Resilience in N'Zi Region project in Côte d'Ivoire).

8 CHALLENGES AND ACHIEVEMENTS

The section commences with an overview of the factors, both internal and external, influencing FCS interventions (Section 8.1). Subsequently, the ability of project to adjust to changing circumstances is addressed (Section 8.2). Finally, progress to date and results achieved are summarized (Section 8.3). Please note that this section, like Section 6, covers the 45 FCS grants which, in the beginning of the Assignment, had closed relatively recently or were under implementation (see Section 3.1 above).

Summary Findings

Influenced by various factors, some of which concern common fragility/conflict-related barriers, FCS projects have mostly been able to adjust even if performance remains comparatively low. Projects have been positively supported by SEs and partnerships, and in a few cases also by strong IAs and project teams. In most cases, however, the weak institutional capacity of IAs has negatively affected performance. Funding constraints and weak monitoring frameworks have also challenged project implementation and supervision. In terms of external factors, projects have been negatively influenced by active conflicts, insecurity and political instability, as well as by climate change-related events and other crises. Nevertheless, projects have mostly been able to adapt to challenges and changing circumstances by extending the duration (commonly), revising activities and/or locations, engaging with local partners, and/or receiving additional GAFSP funding. Negatively affected by aspects of fragility/conflict, performance ratings are generally poorer for interventions in countries that are FCS-listed on approval and/or always/mostly during implementation. Nevertheless, and even if some project designs have been too ambitious, they have also resulted in important achievements in terms of positively contributing to addressing fragility/conflict; such as improved institutional capacity, enhanced community resilience, economic empowerment, and improved management of scarce natural resources.

8.1 Factors Influencing Performance

The general and fragility/conflict-sensitive implementation of GAFSP-funded efforts in FCS countries is influenced by numerous factors, both internal and external. Some of these concern the delivery and conversion barriers outlined within the theoretical framework (see Section 5.2.1 above) and hence negatively affect project implementation and results, but other aspects are also considered to positively support the FCS-sensitivity of interventions. The key barriers and other influencing factors faced by GAFSP's FCS portfolio are summarized in the following sub-sections and paragraphs.

8.1.1 Internal Factors

SE Oversight. Close monitoring and supervision by SEs are generally considered supporting factors, as is coordination between SE headquarters/regional offices and country teams. Previous experience and parallel initiatives of the SEs in the country are also reported as beneficial (e.g. SIFWaP in the Pacific, repeated IADB collaborations with the Ministry of Agriculture in Haiti, and MMI project in the poultry and aquaculture sectors in Mali). Required procurement processes have, however, been challenging for some projects; especially when IAs have no/little previous experience with internationally recognized procedures (e.g. PARSANKO in CAR and SAPEC in Liberia).⁸⁶ The lack of

⁸⁶ Apart from the procurement procedures, sourcing has also been faced with logistical barriers and limited local suppliers. For example, as supported by SAPIP in Timor-Leste, the procurement of the hardware for the sector-wide M&E system has been delayed because of difficulties with finding a quality local supplier which can also provide the necessary technical support.

coordination among SEs, especially with regard to joint investment and TA projects, is also affecting implementation in some cases (see further Section 7.2.2 above).

Institutional Capacity. Especially in countries with tendencies for political patronage, frequent changes in political leadership (see Section 8.1.2 below) have often led to consequent institutional changes at all levels within IAs of country-led grant interventions. The lack of continuity in staffing exacerbates the institutional fragility of IAs of country-led projects, limiting their capacity to both manage and implement. This has affected for example FASDEP (The Gambia), SAPEC (Liberia) and SAPIP (Timor-Leste). In the case of SAPIP in Timor-Leste, the technical and management capacity of the IAs was also weaker than expected. Human resource constraints also challenge SIFWaP in the Pacific (especially since the recruitment of international consultants or support is not possible because of the high travel costs in the region), while some PO-led projects are faced with limited management capacity (e.g. poultry and aquaculture MMI project in Mali). Furthermore, some IAs – including those in Timor-Leste (SAPIP) and Tuvalu (SIFWaP) – also had limited prior experience with recognized procedures for managing projects funded by international donors. Finally, in some cases, IAs have limited institutional capacity to coordinate relevant initiatives, leading to fragmentation of efforts and contradictions in approaches. For example, in Liberia, the effective implementation of both SAPEC and SADFONS has been hampered by the multiple projects and development partners in the agriculture sector being poorly coordinated and aligned at higher policy level within the IA.

Project Teams. Related to the capacity of the IAs, the capacity of project management and implementation units has also affected the implementation of interventions. Several projects have suffered from overstretched project teams because of understaffing, recruitment delays and/or turnover (e.g. AGP II TA in Ethiopia and SIFWaP in the Pacific). In some cases, it is a question not of numbers but rather of experience and skills, with the recruitment of competent project staff constrained by limited human resources locally and/or, for country-led projects, political appointments (e.g. SAPIP in Timor-Leste). On the other hand, a few surveyed projects have benefited from strong project teams within the IAs, with committed and experienced staff (e.g. FSRP in Burkina Faso, FSRP in Togo and FSRRP in Yemen).

Partnerships. Working together with implementing partners – not only other SEs such as FAO, but also NGOs and CSOs – has been important, especially when the institutional capacity of IAs is weak. Collaboration with locally based partners is particularly welcomed when violence as well as climate and health crises restrict access to project intervention areas. The implementation of for example RESPAG II in Haiti and SIVAP in Malawi have benefited from strong partnerships. The adoption of community-based approaches is also recognized as supporting FCS-sensitive implementation, enhancing project relevance while mitigating societal risks (e.g. PMERSA-MTZ in Niger, ROPAGA-led project in Haiti, and SAPIP in Timor-Leste).

Funding. Some projects have been affected by budget constraints (which is partly an internal and partly an external factor). For example, the implementation of SADFONS (Liberia) started on a much smaller scale than anticipated because the IA/SE was unable to secure the necessary financing for half of the project budget not financed by GAFSP.⁸⁷ On the other hand, a couple of surveyed projects have benefitted from additional financial support from other (bilateral) donors. More generally, however, interviewed stakeholders point to insufficient funding compared to the needs in challenging contexts (*"Many grievances arise in response to these limitations; we cannot accommodate everything"*).

⁸⁷ The project was eventually awarded the additional required amount by GAFSP under the seventh call in 2023.

Monitoring. M&E frameworks established at the start of project implementation may lack baseline data (e.g. SAPIP in Timor-Leste) and are not always updated and aligned with new fragility/conflict-influenced external realities. This weakens the capacity of IAs and SEs to monitor progress as well as adapt to changing circumstances and learn from new realities on the ground. Monitoring in moments and areas of active violence (such as in the Tigray regional state in Ethiopia in 2020-2022 – see Section 8.1.2 below) is often challenged due to restricted access, while no alternative approaches for data collection and analysis are available.

8.1.2 External Factors

Active Conflict and Insecurity. Some FCS countries have faced high levels of armed conflict, restricting access to targeted areas and increasing risks for field teams and local partners. In Haiti, escalating gang activity has created a hostile environment, with kidnappings, territorial control and blockades on major transportation routes. The deterioration of security has severely disrupted transportation and logistics, making project supervision and implementation increasingly difficult. For example, GAFSP-funded projects in Haiti are often affected by road blockages by armed groups. Project implementation (as well as monitoring and data collection) in Ethiopia, albeit not an FCS-listed country upon approval, was also challenged by growing violence, particularly during the armed conflict in Tigray between 2020 and 2022 and, in more recent years, in the Amhara and (western) Oromia regional states. Nevertheless, since AGP II was implemented involving government structures at all administrative levels, on-the-ground support could mostly continue even in difficult security situations (except in Tigray, where conflict was more widespread and aggravated). This decentralized implementation capacity of the IA proved an important mitigation mechanism (even if the emergence of violent internal conflict was not envisaged during project preparation). Security challenges have also impacted project implementation in Burkina Faso (PAPSA), Myanmar (CFAVCSP) – see Box 8.1 overleaf – and Yemen (FSSRP).

Political Leadership. Political instability has too been a critical factor for many projects, as seen in countries like Afghanistan (CDIM) – see Box 8.1 below, Burundi (PNSADR - IM), The Gambia (FASDEP), Liberia (SAPEC), Sierra Leone (SCP), and Timor-Leste (SAPIP). Constant changes in government structures and/or political priorities (coupled with political interference and patronage) have disrupted project management, leading to delays in implementation. Despite many projects facing challenges with regard to political leadership, a couple of surveyed projects (including SMAPIEH in Somalia) report on strong national/sub-national government buy-in and support.

Box 8.1 Project Cancellations

In a few cases, the security or political situation became so severe that interventions had to be cancelled.

The combined investment (ADB) and TA (FAO) project in Afghanistan was under preparation and immediately put on hold when the Taliban regime regained control in 2021. ADB reengaged in 2022, but only through a special arrangement with the UN to address basic human needs (i.e. critical food support, as well as essential health and education services). It has yet to resume sovereign operations in the country. Following discussions between ADB, FAO and GAFSP on the possible restructuring of the project, the project was eventually cancelled.

In Myanmar, the joint investment (ADB) and TA (FAO) CFAVCSP project was already under implementation when the political situation took a turn for the worse following the military coup in 2021. Since then, ADB has not been able to establish communication with the new government. Because the project has already started, the investment grant cannot be cancelled unilaterally, but it is de facto inactive/suspended. In the case of Myanmar, it should be noted that it was not the conflict as such that prevented engagement, but rather the impossibility of ADB to engage with the new military government as it is considered illegitimate. On the other hand, the TA part implemented by FAO continues after several adjustments to comply with the UN engagement rules, including with the IA and readaptation to the new context (see further Box 8.4 below).

Climate Change-Related Events. Extreme weather events connected to climate change have also contributed to delays in the delivery of planned activities (and, in some cases, led to their modifications) as well as challenged monitoring and data collection. These include floodings and/or droughts causing damages (including loss of crop, livestock, etc.) or restricted access. For example, during the inception period of the SMAPIEH project in Somalia, the target area was subjected to flash flooding caused by incessant rains. The flooding restricted access to the project's primary target location in the Jowhar district, leading to a delayed kick-off due to limited travel. The flooding also temporarily halted the movement and activities of smallholder farmers in their fields. Floodings and other extreme weather events have also been experienced by projects in many other countries, for example Ethiopia (AGP II), Haiti (PITAG, PAPAIR, ROPAGA), Malawi (SIVAP), Niger (PMERSA-MTZ), and Timor-Leste (SAPIP). In some countries, seasonal weather events cause more structural access challenges. For example, in Liberia during the rainy season over the bigger part of the year, a significant part of the country is inaccessible by road. In these areas, access is only possible by air, restricting agricultural support projects to short operational windows each year.⁸⁸

Other Global, Regional and National Crises. In terms of health crises, the Covid-19 pandemic clearly impacted most active projects at the time. Liberia (SAPEC) and Sierra Leone (SCP) have also been affected by the Ebola outbreak. Furthermore, the war in Ukraine – apart from its implications on the underlying fragility in terms of food insecurity – has also constrained for example the purchase and delivery of necessary equipment and input in Burundi (PNSADR - IM). Finally, surveyed project leads note economic pressures (including inflation, fuel shortages and rising import costs) compounded by global economic instability⁸⁹. For instance, in Haiti, rising fuel prices, increased transportation costs (including the shift to air travel due to insecurity and roadblocks), double-digit inflation, and currency depreciation have collectively driven up project costs.


Box 8.2 Application of the Theoretical Framework on the Case Study Countries

To more concretely represent how fragility/conflict-related challenges or barriers affect food/nutrition security interventions, and potentially vice versa, the Consultants have sought to apply the theoretical framework (as outlined in Section 4 above) to the projects covered by the four country case studies. For example, in the case of **SAPEC and SADFONS in Liberia** the main delivery barriers – as also highlighted where relevant under internal and external factors above – included: (i) capacity challenges (at institutional level and among suppliers) affected implementation of various activities; (ii) institutional weakness resulted in insufficient donor coordination and conflicting activities at the higher policy level; and (iii) infrastructural weakness makes some target areas out of reach for numerous months per year. Furthermore, in terms of conversion barriers, results achievement was affected by (i) insufficient scale and skills of farmers and groups and (ii) participation of very poor farmers (resulting in the leak-away of some resources). Reversely, by focusing on building climate resilience and climate-smart agriculture, projects reduced the underlying fragilities of climate vulnerability and high food import dependency. The scheme also includes an overview of (i) best practices adopted at design or during implementation to mitigate the effects of the fragility/conflict, and to avoid negative effects of the project on the context as well as (ii) any elements related to the fragility/conflict context that were not sufficiently taken into account at design; as further addressed as lessons learned in Section 9.1 below. The graphic representations for all four case study countries are attached in Annex J.

⁸⁸ As mentioned in Section 4 above, inadequate infrastructure generally represents an important barrier in fragility-conflict affected contexts. For example, poor road conditions were identified as a challenge to reaching schools and completing the selection of targeted beneficiaries for FSRP in Madagascar.

⁸⁹ On the 'end-demand' side, one project lead also reports on the lack of understanding of a resilience approach by beneficiaries who are used to emergency interventions.


Figure 8.1 Liberia: SAPEC and SADFONS



8.2 Adjustment Capacity

Faced with the above-mentioned challenges and changing circumstances, the **majority of projects have adapted during implementation**. In fact, as illustrated in Figure 8.2 overleaf, most survey respondents report to have been able to adjust to changes in the fragility/conflict context to a very great or considerable extent. Notably, the ability to adapt does not appear to be linked to a country's FCS status at the time of grant approval or during implementation. Changes have also been made in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. In fact, an internal assessment of projects' responses to the Covid-19 pandemic found that, as early as May 2020, 40% of GAFSP projects had already reacted to the crisis through restructuring or specific project design adjustments.⁹⁰ Over the years, a few projects have been subject to frequent changes. For example, RESEPAG II in Haiti was restructured four times in order to respond to implementation challenges and shocks in the external context, as well as to emerging priorities.

⁹⁰ GAFSP, Missing Middle Initiative (MMI): Lessons Learned from the Covid-19 Crisis, May 2020.

Figure 8.2 Adaptation to Changing Circumstances

n=24

Based on the documentary review, **one of the most common changes is timeline adjustments**, by extending the project duration (see further Box 8.3 below). Interventions also revised activities (e.g. MNHP in DRC and RESEPAG II in Haiti), as well as target areas and populations, either to respond to new or emerging needs (e.g. RENUGL in DRC) or to relocate from insecure to safe zones (e.g. FSRP in Burkina Faso).⁹¹ Additionally, support mechanisms have been modified, such as waiving beneficiary financial contributions (e.g. PITAG in Haiti). To ensure implementation despite high insecurity, in addition to increased budget to cover expenses for heightened security risks, projects also worked/supervised remotely (e.g. AGP II Ethiopia which engaged geospatial technology). Other adaptations in such contexts include the deployment of local officials to maintain continuity despite restrictions and limited access, resolution training for local stakeholders, and engagement of (additional) implementing locally based partners and service providers. Finally, more generally, projects adjust by revising project management arrangements (e.g. PARSANKO in CAR). Several surveyed project leads also report on changes in the M&E framework.

Box 8.3 Project Timelines and Extensions

The **average original implementation period in FCS countries is approximately 4.5 years**, with most projects spanning between 3 and 6 years. The AFN II project in Laos PDR is the longest, running for seven years, while the multi-country SIFWaP in the Pacific is the shortest, lasting just under 2 years. However, as also highlighted by the Program Evaluation, the intended implementation period has been insufficient for many because of the numerous challenges and barriers faced (several of which relate to the original fragility/conflict situation).

Consequently, to date, **22 FCS grant interventions have been extended** (which represent 37% of the 60 completed and active FCS grants in the beginning of the Assignment). Ten of these have been prolonged for over two years. For example, SAPIP in Timor-Leste was extended twice, adding a total of three additional years, while RESEPAG II in Haiti involved the longest extension, spanning four years. The remaining projects were extended either by one year (seven) or between one and two years (five). In relative terms, prolongations are almost twice as common for investment grants than for TA and PO-led grants. Finally, it should be highlighted that extensions are not limited to GAFSP's FCS portfolio. In fact, 21 non-FCS grants have also been extended (which comprise half of the completed and active non-FCS grants).

⁹¹ It can also involve a gradual expansion into riskier areas as security improves.

The **preparation of projects also takes time**. On average, the time between GAFSP approval and start of implementation⁹² for FCS grants is around one year and six months. The preparatory period ranges from less than six months (e.g. MNHP in DRC) to as much as five years (West Africa FSRP in Burkina Faso). Preparatory issues include challenges with design appraisal, implementation agreements and partnership arrangements (e.g. SAPEC in Liberia). As for extensions, however, lengthy preparation periods also concern non-FCS grants (average one year and nine months); there is hence no difference between FCS and non-FCS grants in this regard.

The most important factors determining projects' abilities to adapt mentioned by surveyed projects (including those that did not consider FCS in the design but needed to respond to changing fragility/conflict circumstances during implementation) involve:

- ▶ Flexibility in project design and planning, allowing for adjustments, updates of annual work plans, and revisions of activities, targets and budget (*"Worsening conditions required dynamic approaches to sustain activities and safeguard stakeholders"*);
- ▶ Effective project management and implementation teams, including competent and trusted staff, government guidance, good oversight, and backstopping; and
- ▶ Regular monitoring of security and risks (also when fragility/conflict has been assessed at the design stage), enabling prompt adjustments when necessary.

Furthermore, one quarter of surveyed projects specifically mention **the flexibility of GAFSP** (*"GAFSP procedures have consistently been effective and have greatly facilitated the ability of the project to adapt and to smoothly implemented"*).⁹³ The SC is only involved in more radical changes,⁹⁴ and GAFSP - through the CU - has facilitated adaptation by allowing budget, activity and (especially) timeline adjustments to accommodate evolving fragility contexts. GAFSP's openness to extensions and adjustments - and in some cases additional financing (especially in response to the Covid-19 pandemic)⁹⁵ - supported projects' responsiveness to emerging challenges. This is mostly confirmed also by the SEs (*"We can repurpose with speed"*; *"The CU is very responsive and supporting, regulations for changing and adjusting are very flexible ... we don't get a lot of this from other donors which usually just want to go with the plan"*), and is particularly valued in FCS (*"In a conflict-affected area, everything goes day-by-day"*). Nevertheless, a couple of interviewed stakeholders consider the rules for requesting extensions and changes to the results framework to be too stringent in cases of sudden and drastic changes in circumstances.

Surveyed projects **also recognize the role of SEs in adapting** to changing fragility/conflict situations (*"It has demonstrated significant flexibility, especially during Covid and the invasion of Ukraine ... It has shown agility in repurposing activities"*); as testified also by the documentary review (*"The [SE] was highly proactive in identifying and proposing solutions to problems as they arose"*). Some SEs have indeed played a critical role through field presence, security monitoring and coordination at national/local levels, ensuring smooth project continuation in difficult circumstances. Capacity-building efforts by SEs further strengthened adaptation capacity, while fast decision-making and strong partner coordination facilitated smooth adjustments. However, some SE procedures - and especially those related to procurement - posed challenges in emergency contexts, limiting rapid response (*"Procurement procedures [are] a major challenge when working under emergency"*; *"Had it not been for the procedures, putting everything on pause, the PO would have already got the things done"*). One interviewed SE also acknowledges limitations with some of its policies in difficult

⁹² I.e. the date of first disbursement.

⁹³ Furthermore, more generally, a couple of surveyed projects leads also appreciate GAFSP in terms of technical support, coordination and information sharing.

⁹⁴ Such as revisions of the project development objectives or safeguards, and major (>25%) reallocations of the budget, and cumulative extensions of the projects for more than two years.

⁹⁵ 11 FCS grants interventions (including the two MMI projects in Mali) have received additional GAFSP funding.

circumstances, and is “working toward adopting a more flexible framework tailored to each country’s unique context”.

Box 8.4 The Case of Myanmar

While the ADB investment grant in Myanmar has been suspended (see Box 8.2 above), the **TA intervention led by FAO continues**. The request for changes to “get things done” was somewhat delayed because it was initially difficult to recognize that the political situation was not going to improve and hence any efforts would have to work around it. After laborious discussions over risk/performance versus need, the official restructuring into a stand-alone project was eventually approved. Work on nutrition continues as it is unrelated to the investment part, while the component on good agricultural practices was restructured (by working not only with locally based organizations, but also by training lead farmers and others in the community). The livelihoods and enterprises development component (which was clearly connected to the investment intervention) was transformed by linking it with a microfinance project already operating in the areas concerned. Finally, project locations (villages) have changed continuously because of security concerns. The project has also been challenged by reporting. Since the logical framework was combined with the investment part, performance against targets was originally considered unsatisfactory by the CU even if assessed as satisfactory by the SE (a new results framework has now been approved).

8.3 Project Progress

8.3.1 Performance Ratings⁹⁶


The annual GAFSP Portfolio Reviews assess grant/project performance based on a scale from 1 to 4; where 1 is satisfactory (meaning the project’s implementation progress aligns closely with established targets, experiencing minimal delays across its components) and 4 is unsatisfactory (corresponding to the project exhibiting little or no progress and there being critical issues threatening project implementation and outcomes). As illustrated in Figure 8.3 overleaf (with further details in Annex K), the **FCS status on approval and/or during implementation clearly affects the performance of FCS grants**.⁹⁷

First, with an average rating of 2.6, grants classified as FCS at the time of approval perform worse than their non-FCS counterparts. Second, grants that consistently or predominantly were implemented with FCS status show significantly poorer performance ratings (2.7 and 2.9 respectively) than those that have only partly or never classified as FCS. Third, consequent of the first two considerations, the performance of ‘true’ FCS grants⁹⁸ is also weaker (2.4).

⁹⁶ The analysis was carried on the 38 grants that are closed and under implementation for which performance ratings are available.

⁹⁷ As reported by the Program Evaluation, the poorer performance of FCS project also relates to the specific achievement of the food system outcomes (and especially ‘improved farm-to-market linkages’ under Pillar 2).

⁹⁸ I.e. those in a country that was FCS listed upon grant approval and/or at least at some point during the course of grant implementation.

Figure 8.3 Average Performance Ratings of FCS Grants (average for available years of grant implementation)


1 satisfactory, 2 moderately satisfactory, 3 moderately unsatisfactory, 4 unsatisfactory
n=38⁹⁹

With regard to individual performance over time, grant interventions that are consistently or mostly exposed to FCS show persistently poor performance, with a few experiencing occasional declines (which may be linked to an intensification of the conflict/fragility or the impact of external factors). Grants partially exposed to FCS exhibit some short fluctuations, with noticeable improvements toward the end of the project or in the final years. In contrast, grants that are never subject to FCS during implementation maintain good performance from start to finish.

8.3.2 Project Results

Since many of the negatively influencing factors and barriers presented in Section 8.1 above relate to the original FCS situation, **most surveyed project leads report that results have been (negatively) affected by aspects of fragility/conflict** (see Figure 8.4 overleaf). For the majority, however, the impact has been moderate or lower. Several of these projects note that they have been able to contain the (potentially worse) effects on results through the mitigation measures foreseen at the design stage and/or the adaptive strategies undertaken or adjustments made during implementation. It also involved the setting of realistic targets based on previous experience in the country. The remaining share of the projects surveyed has been affected to a considerable or very great extent. Whether or not results have been affected by fragility/conflict does not depend on the FCS status of the country on approval or during implementation (the results of several grant interventions not classified as FCS on approval or during implementation have also been influenced moderately or more by fragility/conflict).

⁹⁹ These 38 grant interventions also include a few that are not among the 45 projects targeted by the FCS-sensitive assessment.

Figure 8.4 Impact of Fragility/Conflict on Results

n=20

Conversely, some project results have (positively) contributed to addressing fragility/conflict.¹⁰⁰

In particular, consultations and the documentary review highlighted several key project results as important for preventing, strengthening preparedness for, mitigating, or responding to fragility and/or conflict situations. These include:

- ▶ **Improved institutional capacity** through stakeholder training and local ownership. Project efforts have strengthened the capacity of IAs, improved local governance and accountability mechanisms, and built project management capacity. This is the case even in extremely challenging countries such as Haiti and Yemen, where project efforts have strengthened the capacities of IAs and other stakeholders.¹⁰¹
- ▶ **Enhanced community resilience** by working with community-based institutions and supporting early warning systems and social cohesion initiatives (including the inclusion of disadvantaged groups, such as women and youth). Local management and implementation capacity also serves as an important mechanism for conflict management and mitigation.
- ▶ **Economic empowerment** through supporting access to financial services, creation of farmer groups, women and girls accessing productive resource, improved (climate smart) agricultural practices, enhanced agricultural value chains, livestock vaccinations, access to markets, etc.
- ▶ **Improved management of scarce natural resources** has been supported by many FCS grants through the introduction of climate-smart and conservational agriculture methods, use of climate-resilient agricultural varieties and agroforestry practices; all important to manage climate risks and address isolation of certain communities. It has also involved support for community-level development plans and management, reducing the risks of possible conflicts.

In terms of more general accomplishments, the documentary review testifies that **GAFSP-funded FCS interventions have led to important results** in terms of enabling (poor) farmer households to increase agricultural production, improve their food and nutritional security, as well as increase their income and assets. In particular, the case study projects have resulted in some key achievements despite the challenges and barriers faced (see Box 8.5 overleaf).

¹⁰⁰ There are no reports of projects having worsened FCS.

¹⁰¹ For RESEPAG II in Haiti, the strengthening of institutional capacity - including policy, practices and systems - is one of the project's most significant achievements. For SAPREP in Yemen, the most notable institutional outcomes included the strengthening of Social Fund for Development and other implementing partners, as well as the training and equipment of Community Animal Health Workers with local authorities.

Box 8.5 Key Results of Case Study Projects**Ethiopia (FAO and World Bank)**

AGP II enhanced natural resource management with 1.6 million farmers having adopted climate-smart technologies and conservation agriculture practices. Building on the first phase, AGP II has linked farmer groups to food markets and supported farmers in becoming commercial farmers (even if it has suffered from some constraints in establishing effective market linkages for emerging commercial farmers). Additionally, AGP has promoted nutrition by providing training raising awareness on nutrition practices to some 2.5 million people, and investing in horticulture, benefiting women who are predominantly engaged in this specific sector. AGP interventions have consistently built upon existing community-based institutions for planning and management of natural and community resources. These institutions are traditionally well developed in Ethiopian society and serve as a strong conflict avoidance and mitigating mechanism. Strong government institutions with on-the-ground presence at the local level have supported implementation, allowing for continuity of activities also during more difficult and violent times.

Haiti (IADB and WFP)

PITAG adopted a demand-driven strategy that actively engages private providers in collaboration with local communities to implement an agricultural incentives mechanism. This includes distributing technical packages and promoting sustainable practices such as agroforestry. Adoption is encouraged through financial incentives (matching grants) and technical assistance for both farmers and technology providers. As the program nears completion, it has supported over 60,000 farmers in vulnerable areas across the country. While quantitative evidence on outcomes is not yet available, key reported achievements include the adoption of sustainable agricultural technologies, such as the installation of solar-powered pumps, which are considered catalytic in the fight against climate change. Additionally, the project has strengthened the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture through training programs and the development of software to track input distribution and payments over time. Although the overall impact on food security remains complex and difficult to attribute solely to PITAG, stakeholders suggest meaningful progress has been made. Furthermore, while the PITAG research component did not yield results applicable within the project's timeframe, its findings were successfully integrated into PAPAIR. Locally adapted technological packages have been developed, including alternative fertilization methods that reduce dependence on imported agricultural inputs and viable mechanization solutions made from locally available materials. As for the ROPAGA-led project, given its recent launch, the results achieved so far are inevitably limited. Still, the strengthening of ROPAGA's organizational capacity and the improvement of its management skills already represent a positive outcome.

Liberia (AfDB)

SAPEC and SADFONS have both promoted significant changes in agricultural practices among smallholder farmers and cooperatives, applying conservation and climate smart agricultural production techniques. This has contributed to increases in cassava (over 300,000 tons annually) and rice production, even if the scale (especially regarding rice) is still small in the light of the huge deficit in national production. The projects have also raised nutrition awareness and promoted improvements in horticulture production (supporting the enrichment of diets). SADFINS has supported some 16,000 farmers, and in collaboration with WFP, established effective and sustainable linkages of smallholder farmers and cooperatives to the national home-grown school feeding program of the Government of Liberia, providing an important and stable market for key products supported under both projects. Finally, from an institutional point of view, the Project Management Unit within the IA is well established and proactive, which together with the partnerships established by the two projects form an important cluster of agricultural expertise that is also well-connected internationally.


Timor-Leste (World Bank)

Adopting a community-based approach, SAPIP has supported the establishment of watershed management councils and farmer groups (reaching some 14,500 farmers), as well as the drafting of four watershed and 44 community agriculture development plans. Based on the latter as blueprints, it has provided training and on-farm investments to almost 15,000 farmers in support of improved agricultural practices, as well as storage and other post-harvest technologies. Nearing completion, although evidence is still limited (and based on retroactive baselines), SAPIP efforts have improved productivity (16%), reduced post-harvest losses (14%) and increased sales at local markets (18%) (even if most produce remains for household consumption, hence improving the food security of supported farmers) for rice, maize, vegetables, and chicken. Progress at the (central) institutional level has been weaker, but - in collaboration with FAO - SAPIP has developed Timor-Leste's first results-based, sector-wide M&E system for agriculture. By directly implementing the first donor-funded project of a certain size, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries has also strengthened its capacity to manage projects in line with international donor procedures. Finally, despite implementation challenges (leading to extensions), SAPIP is the most disbursed project within the overall World Bank portfolio in the country to date.

8.3.3 Level of Ambition

As presented in Figure 8.5 below, **some projects have been too ambitious considering the level of fragility/conflict**. Nevertheless, for almost half of the surveyed projects, the targeted results were either not at all or only minimally ambitious. Despite difficulties, these projects report to have achieved results thanks to tailored interventions with high relevance to needs (particularly where past experiences informed planning) and the application of adaptive/mitigation measures. Those who replied to a considerable or very great extent all involve 'Always FCS' and 'Mostly FCS' grants (*"The convergence of crises - conflict, climate change, and poverty - added layers of complexity to the project, making the achievement of its ambitious targets even more challenging"*). In these cases, as well as for the moderately ambitious projects, they are considered to have been too ambitious given the limited government and institutional capacity, slow procurement, or inadequate infrastructure. In a few instances, project targets were also set without taking FCS aspects into consideration during project design.

Figure 8.5 Are Projects Too Ambitious?



n=21

Furthermore, the **level of ambition relates not only to the size (budget) or targets, but also to the type of activities to be carried out** (including those related to the three cross-cutting themes). For example, in the case of SAPIP in Timor-Leste, it was not the size of the project per se that proved too ambitious, but rather its level of complexity in terms of types of interventions (*"Way too ambitious; too much stuff, also for a non-fragile country"*), especially since the management and technical capacity of the IA was weaker than expected (see Section 8.1.1 above). Also in Liberia, the level of ambition of SAPEC did not always match the management and implementation capacity of the IA. The size of SAPEC was too large and the project budget could not be fully absorbed. Based on the experience of SAPEC, the follow-up SADFONS intervention applied a more modest and focused approach to better match the institutional capacity of the IAs to implement and supervise the project (as also illustrated by improvements in the performance ratings between the two projects). In the case of SAPEC, the intended geographical scope also proved too large given limited access to intervention areas because of poor road conditions (another aspect of the country's fragility). Several interviewed stakeholders (as well as the 2022 GAFSP Portfolio Review) also believe that some FCS projects are indeed overly complex given the unique challenges they face (*"We have been pushed to have ambitious results"*). They hence call for simpler - as well as more flexible - projects (*"Start with the basics and then if it*

works, move forward"; "We cannot always have the same [high] bar"). They also advocate for more "fit-for-purpose approaches" towards ensuring that projects align with local realities and capacities.

Box 8.6 Risk versus Impact

As pointed out by several interviewed stakeholders, **GAFSP interventions, especially in FCS, are by their nature quite ambitious and riskier** ("We do what SEs find hard to do, either unable or unwilling to do"). A couple of SEs also stress that this is indeed what GAFSP should do ("GAFSP should take the role of riskier engagements"; "GAFSP should finance different things than what other international finance institutions do"). Even if, as presented in Section 5.3 above, the success rate does not differ between proposals from FCS and non-FCS countries, and GAFSP has taken on riskier projects when there is confidence in the SE ("Taking a measured risk when the SE is competent"), a few interviewed stakeholders consider GAFSP to be risk averse, focusing on only technical soundness ("FCS is considered a minus not a plus"; "FCS is only seen as a risk"). The low 'appetite' for risk is also noted by the Program Evaluation. Finally, informants also recognize that it is in the most difficult, fragile areas that GAFSP-funded interventions can have the most impact, and that the lower performance ratings for FCS grants are not that bad, considering that they are assessed against the same criteria as non-FCS grants, which are implemented under less challenging circumstances.

9 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section starts with a presentation of the key fragility/conflict-related lessons learned based on the experience of GAFSP-funded projects in FCS countries (Section 9.1). Subsequently, the Report concludes with an outline of some strategic and operational recommendations (Section 9.2).

9.1 Lessons Learned

Based on the experience of the GAFSP portfolio in FCS countries several fragility/conflict-related learnings can be drawn. These are summarized in the paragraphs below and - as presented in Box 9.1 at the end of this sub-section - are in line with the best practices and operational principles identified through the literature review in preparation of the theoretical framework (see Section 4).

FCS-Sensitive Assessments

The thorough analysis of the (local) context and risks from an FCS perspective is essential for a proper understanding of relevant fragility/conflict drivers. This in turn facilitates the overall design of the project in terms of defining target areas/populations, activities and approaches, as well as measures to respond or mitigate risks. For timely adaptation to changing circumstances, risk assessments also require regular updates during project implementation. Furthermore, because of the institutional fragility of many IAs (including POs), assessments of capacity gaps are also important; not only to understand what kind of support is needed to strengthen institutions within projects, but also to balance the complexity and ambitiousness of project designs with the actual capacity of the IAs to manage and implement them (see 'Institutional Capacity' and 'Project Ambitions' below).

Institutional Capacity

The institutional fragility of many IAs challenges the management and implementation of projects. Interventions should hence always include targeted institutional strengthening actions, ideally based on capacity gaps assessments. Capacity building efforts are essential not only for effective project management or delivery, but also (especially) for addressing the underlying institutional fragility of the country. The setting-up of competent project management and implementation teams can serve as 'entry points' for building broader institutional capacity. Qualified projects teams can push implementation forward, but also liaise with political forces.

Project Ambitions

The complexity and ambitiousness of project designs need to be proportionate to the institutional capacity of IAs (and implementing partners). In situations of weak public institutions, overly complex project designs can challenge effective project implementation. Rather than strengthening institutions, too ambitious or overly complicated activities/components (along with necessary, but unfamiliar, project management procedures) can overburden IAs, deviating attention from (perhaps) more important core activities. In cases of institutional fragility (and especially for first time interventions), focus should be placed on institutional strengthening along with more basic or simple project designs (and procedures). In countries with high levels of violence and insecurity, implementation can also benefit from starting in less affected locations and then gradually moving into more challenging settings.

Partnerships

Both project design and implementation benefit from relevant collaborations. Working with partners - providing additional and/or complementary expertise and services - is especially important when capacity constraints of IAs challenge outreach and service delivery. Partnerships are also important for interventions requiring specific know-how (such as climate-smart actions). At the design

stage, the engagement of nationally/locally based organizations in particular facilitates the understanding of the national/local context and help tailor interventions to address specific fragility/conflict dynamics within targeted communities. They can also facilitate monitoring (see 'M&E' below). Effective collaborations, however, require continuous dialogue and coordination. They should hence serve the purpose of the project (and not just be partnerships for partnerships' sake). Project collaborations can also lead to the building of more strategic and lasting partnerships.

Community Engagement

The adoption of community-based approaches and community-managed processes can support both the planning and delivery of interventions, but also the mitigation of conflict and the building of more resilient communities. Working with CBOs/CSOs at the design stage informs the understanding of the local context and subsequent project formulation. From an operational perspective, they can also support outreach and service delivery. Furthermore, the active and systematic involvement and strengthening of community-based entities within projects (through for example the support to farmer groups or the participatory drafting of local agricultural development plans) can serve as an important mitigating mechanism to avoid and contain conflicts over scarce natural resources (see 'Climate Resilience' below) and assets/investments. Last but not least, community engagement can serve to promote sustainability and resilience.

Target Groups

The selection of target populations (and areas) depends on the context and type of intervention, but in general terms women and youth are important from an FCS perspective. The role of women is often specifically related to food crops and nutrition, and specific interventions targeting women and their specific food/nutrition-related and economic interests may strengthen results and impact among women as well as within their households and communities. Increased benefits for women could, however, affect social/cultural relations which may result in conflicts. Mainstreaming women and their needs to be combined in project design and implementation with a clear eye to possible effects on both economic and social/cultural (power) relations. The role of youth is not yet strongly embedded in projects, even if rural youth often migrate to urban areas or abroad and to other (sometimes precarious) economic activities because they do not see a future in agriculture. While this challenge is recognized, specific approaches and interventions to make agriculture more attractive to youth are not yet sufficiently developed in projects.

Types of Interventions

There is scope to address fragility within all types of interventions. Projects focusing on basic agricultural productivity and food security have the potential to improve conditions for poorer and more fragile areas and communities. While the most vulnerable locations/groups might not be easily targeted by projects supporting the development of larger scale commercialized agriculture and food markets systems (but it depends on the needs of the local context and IA capacities), such interventions seek to reduce dependency on food imports (and/or external food support) and hence an underlying fragility of many countries. This is especially important considering reduced availability of certain crops and rising global food prices. From a fragility/conflict perspective, it is important to ensure that more growth-focused interventions include provisions for measures or linkages with other actions that target vulnerable groups to avoid interventions increasing inequality and consequently the possibility of conflict. At the same time, more vulnerability-focused interventions should include sufficient provisions to enhance production and access to markets (i.e. with a view to scale). Such approaches have the potential to balance scale/efficiency versus needs.

Climate Resilience

Attention to climate-smart agriculture - stressing the sustainable use of scarce natural resources - has the possibility to mitigate not only the risks of climate change, but also scarcity-related causes of fragility/conflict. Scarcity of resources and extreme weather events can contribute to tensions and possible conflicts within communities, as well as forced displacement or 'pushed' migration (especially of youth) out of affected areas. Efforts focusing on conservation agriculture as well as climate-smart practices (e.g. the use of resilient seeds), technologies (including regular monitoring of climate-related risks) and infrastructure (such as irrigation schemes) can avoid further deterioration of land/water and improve the agricultural production potential in the longer term. Supported by community-based management of limited resources at local, watershed or regional level, they can also reduce the potential for intra- and inter-group frictions and the weakening of social cohesion.

Timelines

The preparation and implementation of projects in FCS contexts (should) take time. This is especially the case when the institutional capacity of IAs is limited. Preparatory efforts are commonly delayed, while the anticipated duration is often too short for achieving (ambitious) outcomes. However, time is needed for adequate efforts during both design and implementation. In fact, preparatory measures require sufficient space to develop solid project designs, which in turn mitigate potential lengthier implementation delays challenging the achievement of results. The ability to adjust to changing circumstances through flexible procedures is also essential in fluid FCS contexts.

M&E

Insufficient M&E frameworks and data collection hamper the tracking and demonstration of results. It also hinders timely responses to changing circumstances. The selection of indicators should be pragmatic, targeted at measuring not only relevant aspects but also results at all levels (i.e. output, outcome, impact) without overburdening the IAs (or partners), as well as based on the feasibility of collecting data. Where conflict or extreme weather events regularly restrict accessibility and hence impair data collection, alternative means - either through locally based partners and/or easy-to-use online reporting software - are called for.

Box 9.1 Best Practices and Operational Principles for Food Security Interventions in FCS¹⁰²

The adoption of 'do-no-harm' standards and fragility/conflict-sensitive approaches is essential to minimize the risks of adverse effects on and of food interventions in FCS. On the one hand, a structured understanding of the interaction between the context and project intervention allows for the mitigation of the potential adverse effects of the onset of conflict/ fragility on the interventions, and the maximization of their positive impact. On the other hand, it ensures that the interventions' potential negative impact on conflict and fragility is minimized.¹⁰³ In this regard, it should be noted that the relevant conflict-sensitive principles and practices, while tailored for food interventions, also help mitigate the detrimental impacts of conflict/fragility on the effectiveness of food interventions. The paragraphs below summarize the main conflict/fragility-sensitive principles and practices identified through the literature review in preparation of the theoretical framework (see Section 4).

#1 Conduct a thorough context analysis that explores the country profile, the root causes of conflict, the roles of key actors and groups, and existing mechanisms for resolving conflicts. The 'Do No Harm' framework, which focuses on

¹⁰² In addition to the sources specifically referenced in footnotes below, this box also draws on the other relevant literature. The complete bibliography covered by the literature review is attached in Annex D.

¹⁰³ "Operationalizing Pathways to Sustaining Peace in the Context of Agenda 2030". FAO. 2022: <https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/974b9bd4-e496-4802-ade8-ce8da45f2156/content#:~:text=and%20context%20analysis,-,Operationalizing%20pathways%20to%20sustaining%20peace%20in%20the%20context%20of%20Agenda,partnership%20between%20the%20two%20Organizations>

identifying dividers and connectors within communities, provides a useful tool for understanding these dynamics.¹⁰⁴ Not only does this aim to minimize the unintended risks of the project implementation, but potentially also allows to consider these elements in the design of operations, with a view to contribute to alleviating the root causes of conflict and/or food insecurity (e.g. contributing to the solution of conflicts around access to land and land tenure). With regard to the latter, a particularly important 'do no harm' practice is for projects to identify or secure land rights for any interventions that concerns the use of land.

2 Carry out a risk analysis focusing on conflict and fragility aspects to prevent exacerbating tensions and identify opportunities for supporting peace initiatives within the context analysis.¹⁰⁵ Additionally, a robust stakeholder analysis should be included to identify potential risks and benefits related to who is included or excluded from intervention and identifying the potential for marginalization or the creation of new tensions.¹⁰⁶

#3 Adopt a community-based targeting mechanism that provides affected populations with opportunities to participate in decision-making processes to pre-empt grievances and reduce perceptions of exclusion – two significant drivers of conflict. This approach should integrate gender and social inclusion analyses to ensure that marginalized groups - such as women, youth or displaced populations - have a voice in decision-making processes.¹⁰⁷ The inclusion of vulnerable people and marginalized groups in the programs also contributes to social cohesion and conflict mitigation.¹⁰⁸ Importantly, projects should aim at being not only gender sensitive - as is often the case - but gender transformative, by incorporating considerations on local gender power dynamics and thus preventing negative effects on local conflict, violence, and fragility.¹⁰⁹ In addition, targeting youth in interventions is crucial for long-term results and sustainability, especially given that rural-to-urban migration in search of livelihoods is particularly high among young people. Moreover, in FCS settings, lack of access to decent employment and a sense of disempowerment often push youth toward involvement in violence.¹¹⁰

#4 Engage with local communities, particularly at the grassroots level, as a potential way to avoid the political and institutional limitations of working with national governments and to avoid access limitations.¹¹¹ Similarly, collaborate with local governments, NGOs, and international actors to maximize resources and expertise, fostering capacity-sharing efforts, reaching broader populations, and achieving greater impact.¹¹² Additionally, build upon local systems and institutions for natural resource management and conflict management and resolution.

#5 Enhance institutional capacities within the food system to improve service delivery to wider rural communities, better anticipate and respond to crises, and facilitate access to more affordable food for consumers. Furthermore, enhance the institutional capacities of Government entities to coordinate and manage sector-wide interventions in agricultural and food systems development, to avoid overlaps and gaps in different donor-supported interventions and

¹⁰⁴ (i) FAO, "The Programme Clinic: Designing Conflict-Sensitive Interventions", 2019, <https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/00b20fb0-c2e0-4d7f-a28e-45802862cd02/content>; (ii) Mercy Corps, "Resilient food security in conflict-driven crises", 2021, https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/2021-11/Resilient-Food-Security-in-Conflict-Driven-Crises-082421_Clean.pdf

¹⁰⁵ (i) WFP, "Conflict Analysis and Conflict Sensitivity Risk Assessment", 2021, https://www.anticipation-hub.org/Documents/Training_and_Educational_Material/Anticipatory_Action_in_Conflict_Settings/Conflict_Analysis_and_Conflict_Sensitivity_Risk_Assessment_Guidance_Note_WFP_Jan_2021.pdf; (ii) "WFP protection and accountability policy", 2020; (iii) Darwish, S. (2023). Integrating Conflict Sensitivity into Food Security Programs. Washington, DC: Implementer-Led Design, Evidence, Analysis and Learning (IDEAL); (iv) Delgado, C; Murugani, V and Kristina Tschunkert (2021) Food Systems in Conflict and Peacebuilding settings: pathways and interconnections. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

¹⁰⁶ FAO, "The Programme Clinic: Designing Conflict-Sensitive Interventions", 2019, <https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/00b20fb0-c2e0-4d7f-a28e-45802862cd02/content>

¹⁰⁷ i) WFP, "Conflict Analysis and Conflict Sensitivity Risk Assessment", 2021. https://www.anticipation-hub.org/Documents/Training_and_Educational_Material/Anticipatory_Action_in_Conflict_Settings/Conflict_Analysis_and_Conflict_Sensitivity_Risk_Assessment_Guidance_Note_WFP_Jan_2021.pdf; (ii) Darwish, S. (2023). Integrating Conflict Sensitivity into Food Security Programs. Washington, DC: Implementer-Led Design, Evidence, Analysis and Learning (IDEAL).

¹⁰⁸ Townsend, R. et al. (2021). "Future of Food".

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ (i) WFP, "Conflict Analysis and Conflict Sensitivity Risk Assessment", 2021, https://www.anticipation-hub.org/Documents/Training_and_Educational_Material/Anticipatory_Action_in_Conflict_Settings/Conflict_Analysis_and_Conflict_Sensitivity_Risk_Assessment_Guidance_Note_WFP_Jan_2021.pdf; (ii) Darwish, S. (2023). Integrating Conflict Sensitivity into Food Security Programs. Washington, DC: Implementer-Led Design, Evidence, Analysis and Learning (IDEAL).

¹¹² (i) FAO, "The Programme Clinic: Designing Conflict-Sensitive Interventions", 2019, <https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/00b20fb0-c2e0-4d7f-a28e-45802862cd02/content>; (ii) Bunse, S and Delgado, C. (2024) Promoting Peace through climate resilient food security initiatives, SIPRI Research Policy Paper, <https://doi.org/10.55163/NFAX5143>

to ensure synergy and coordination between different agencies working in the same region with similar interventions and targeting similar target groups.

#6 Invest in long-term agricultural productivity and food market development to ensure the long-term success of conflict-sensitive food security interventions. Not only emphasize immediate nutrition needs but also focus on issues of sustainability and resilience by investing in building the skills and knowledge of local partners, communities, and governments, as well as building resilient climate-smart agricultural production and productivity. Additionally, rebuilding infrastructure such as irrigation canals and roads can help develop local markets and induce more private investment.¹¹³ Long-term investments will be required to build and enhance access to agricultural finance and leasing products and to agricultural insurance (against climate and weather risks).

#7 Incorporate continuous monitoring and flexibility to ensure interventions are tailored and responsive to evolving conflict dynamics. Moreover, establish both formal and informal feedback mechanisms to foster a learning culture and enhance the effectiveness of interventions in dynamic, conflict-affected contexts. This approach necessitates the integration of conflict sensitivity indicators within projects' monitoring and evaluation M&E frameworks.¹¹⁴ Special provisions are needed to allow for the continuity of M&E efforts in FCS contexts. This includes building more local capacity and accountability in data-collection and management within local (Government and civil society) institutions; applying new digital (and remote) methods for data-collection (satellite, drones) and by regularly (re)considering the relevance and feasibility of specific indicators for data collection.

9.2 Recommendations

Based on the assessment of and lessons learned from the FCS portfolio, the following paragraphs outline some strategic and operational recommendations for GAFSP as a program. It should be noted that GAFSP's operational model channels support through SEs and relies on them for the management of project delivery. With one exception (see Recommendation #2), the recommendations below hence focus on the integration of FCS and fragility/conflict-sensitivity within GAFSP's procedures and mechanisms. As illustrated by the lessons learned as well as the FCS-sensitive best practices and operational principles presented in Section 9.1 above, much more can be recommended at the SE/IA/project level. Furthermore, while these recommendations target aspects relevant for FCS engagement, some procedural suggestions might also be beneficial for and applicable to non-FCS interventions.

#1 GAFSP as a Partnership Platform

GAFSP should be leveraged as a multi-stakeholder platform for the setting of strategic priorities around FCS engagements. As concluded by the Program Evaluation, GAFSP functions well as a financing instrument, but not yet as a more strategic and larger alliance. GAFSP's upcoming Vision 2030 envisages the broadening of partnerships (as well as linkages between GAFSP's financing tracks), which could support the SC in the strategic orientation of GAFSP's engagement in FCS contexts. In line with the proposed operational principle of capturing and disseminating knowledge within the forthcoming Vision 2030, GAFSP could also serve as a knowledge platform for sharing learnings from FCS engagements and FCS-sensitive best practices within agriculture development and food security interventions. This could for example be supported by the setting-up of a working group dedicated to FCS.

¹¹³ (i) Townsend, R. et al. (2021). Future of Food: Building Stronger Food Systems in Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Settings. World Bank, Washington, DC, <http://hdl.handle.net/10986/36497> License: CC BY 3.0 IGO; (ii) Darwish, S. (2023). Integrating Conflict Sensitivity into Food Security Programs. Washington, DC: Implementer-Led Design, Evidence, Analysis and Learning (IDEAL); (iii) FAO, "Climate Change and Food Security: risks and responses", 2015.

¹¹⁴ Darwish, S. (2023). Integrating Conflict Sensitivity into Food Security Programs. Washington, DC: Implementer-Led Design, Evidence, Analysis and Learning (IDEAL).

#2 SE Coordination

Leveraging GAFSP as a partnership platform, SEs should foster more tactical coordination of agriculture development and food security projects in FCS countries. The more systematic coordination between SEs should go beyond the complementarity of parallel investment/TA interventions towards, ultimately, overcoming challenges with institutional capacities for broader policy development and coordination of development partners in target countries. Apart from improved strategic coordination between SEs in FCS countries, this could also involve - more operationally - the exploration of possibilities for collaboration with members of the SC CSO representatives' networks as they have, to date, had limited involvement in GAFSP-funded projects, and potentially also with private sector operators through GAFSP's PrSW.

#3 Further GAFSP Support in FCS

Continued GAFSP engagement in FCS contexts is strongly encouraged, but does not require dedicated calls. GAFSP support to fragile/conflict-affected countries (or areas) is considered indispensable for reaching its ultimate objective of improving food and nutrition security in the target IDA-only countries (and one of the proposed operational principles of the upcoming Vision 2030 foresees focusing on the inclusion of underserved countries, entities and groups). As established by the Program Evaluation, GAFSP is not an adequate financing instrument for emergencies or sudden crises, but there is potential to build resilience and have a longer-term perspective also in situations of (protracted) fragility/conflict. However, while the special FCV call encouraged proposal submissions from FCS-listed countries, promoting GAFSP's engagement in fragile/conflict-affected settings does not demand another call targeting only FCS. Requests for funding from FCS countries can be accommodated within any 'normal' GAFSP CfP allowing all IDA-only countries to participate. Rather, depending on the strategic orientation of GAFSP (see Recommendation #1 above) and without losing the value of GAFSP as a competitive process, a minimum share of funding within future calls could be dedicated to finance (valid) projects in FCS or - as for BIFT - FCS countries could be prioritized within the eligibility criteria.

#4 Selection Criteria and Guidelines

The awarding of GAFSP grant funding should remain a competitive process also for FCS countries, but FCS-sensitivity could be incentivized through the selection criteria and strengthened within the instructions for both country- and PO-led calls. I.e. certain aspects could be given extra points and more weight in the selection or encouraged within guidelines and proposal templates. For example:

- ▶ **FCS-targeted contextual/risk assessments should be encouraged** for all proposals from FCS-listed countries towards identifying drivers of fragility/conflict and mitigation measures. Fragility/conflict aspects are, however, valid also for countries that are not FCS-listed on proposal submission. Hence any intended project context that could be considered fragile should involve such an analysis. FCS-sensitive contextual/risk assessments can rely on the approaches and tools increasingly 'institutionalized' within the SEs (as presented in Box 7.3 in Section 7.2 above) or promoted by other international organizations (such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).¹¹⁵ Carrying out such assessments, however, require both capacity and resources (see 'Preparation Support' below).

¹¹⁵ OECD publishes annual 'States of Fragility' reports (based on a framework covering 56 risk and resilience indicators across six dimensions) and other relevant publications for analyzing, and engaging in, FCS contexts (such as the Development Assistance Committee [DAC] guidelines on conflict-sensitivity and 'do-no-harm'). The European Union (EU), and namely the Directorate-General for International Partnerships of the European Commission, has also developed guidance notes on conflict sensitivity in development cooperation. For best practices, see also the bibliography for the literature review supporting the theoretical framework (Annex D).

- ▶ **Ideally based on assessments of capacity gaps, projects should involve targeted institutional strengthening**, dedicating sufficient resources and relevant actions for capacity improvements within IAs at both the central and local level (including POs). For country-led intervention, this could involve either a component embedded within the project or a parallel TA intervention. The latter, however, requires adequate coordination between SEs towards not complicating efforts of supported governments (see Recommendation #2 above).
- ▶ **Considering the capacity constraints within IAs, the establishment of relevant partnerships should be prioritized**. Partnerships involve collaborations not only between SEs but also other organizations at the international and national level. Engagements at the community level (including POs and other CSOs), should also be encouraged. Proposed partnerships should, however, seek to serve the purpose and the FCS-sensitivity of the project (for example by providing a national/local understanding within FCS-sensitive contextual/risk assessments, supporting outreach in the delivery of project activities on specific topics or in certain areas, and promoting community-based management of risks).
- ▶ In line with Recommendations #8 below, **projects that include a clear focus on and targeted approaches for building climate resilience and enhancing the role of youth could also be encouraged**.
- ▶ As also highlighted by the 2022 Portfolio Review, **GAFSP indications should ensure that complexity of project design is to be balanced against the institutional capacity of IAs (as well as the local context more generally)**. I.e. ambitiousness is not rewarded for its own sake, and simpler, more basic, project designs can be favored. This should be considered also for the three cross-cutting themes, for which less might be more by properly focusing on a selected theme (or two) instead of spreading too thin trying to more superficially address them all. The same holds for project timeframes (i.e. certain contexts and interventions call for longer implementation periods).
- ▶ Finally, and more generally, **the selection criteria for the PO-led track could be simplified**. Furthermore, as also recommended by the Program Evaluation, a gradual approach of PO engagement - with country-led projects engaging with weaker POs, building their capacity until they can subsequently 'graduate' into the PO-led track - could be considered particularly relevant for FCS contexts.

#5 Application Process

Towards improving the quality of proposals, and hence eventually also project design, the two-step application process should be strengthened. This could involve a more technical screening (i.e. going beyond a mere due diligence check) of EoIs, or concept notes. This would result in a more restricted shortlist which would be invited to submit full proposals and offered the opportunity to receive TA for its preparation (see 'Preparation Support' below). If the CU does not have the capacities to carry out such preliminary screenings (since its main role is to coordinate funding allocations and supervise project implementation), they could be 'outsourced' to TAC or other technically competent professionals.

The timeline for proposal submission should also be extended. Particularly for FCS countries, IAs need more time to prepare. This is especially the case if project proposals are more 'reactive' than 'proactive'. Considering also recommendations for FCS-targeted situational/risk analyses and capacity gap assessments, a three-month period (at least) between being shortlisted and the deadline for submitting proposals is needed. A longer proposal preparation timeline is expected to improve project designs and hence facilitate a quicker start-up after GASFP approval.

#6 Preparation Support

The provision of TA during the application phase – and namely after the first screening (EoI stage) – can assist in improving project design and proposal quality. The usefulness of such a mechanism was demonstrated by the special FCV call, and also highlighted by the Program Evaluation. This kind of support – which should be dedicated to FCS-listed countries (or for projects targeting fragile/conflict affected contexts, such as areas of forced displacement, within countries that are not listed as FCS) – would be particularly useful for promoting fragility/conflict-specific contextual/risk analyses and capacity gap assessments, which require both competence and resources. Indeed, recognizing that both governments and POs have limited capacity, such assistance could be provided not only at the application stage, but also after approval (i.e. during preparation when project designs are firmed up). Preparatory support could be provided either through FAO and WFP (as for the special FCV call) or any of the other SEs, or – perhaps more ‘neutrally’ – through the setting up of a dedicated group or roster of external professionals. Apart from strengthening the quality of proposal in general, TA provision during application might also encourage more solid submissions from the (few) IDA-only countries that have applied for but never received GAFSP funding.

#7 Additional Financing

GAFSP could consider the establishment of a dedicated window through which projects already under implementation can apply for additional financing in case of unforeseen events. Instead of launching calls for additional financing when seemingly necessary (such as the call in response to the Covid-19 pandemic), this would allow interventions to adjust to changing circumstances (which is particularly important in fluid fragility/conflict-affected contexts) should project extensions or restructuring of activities/components not be sufficient to support progress towards completion.

#8 Thematic Calls for Proposals

Other possible themes relevant from an FCS perspective could be considered for upcoming calls for GAFSP funding. For example, youth is an important target group that has yet to be embedded in GAFSP-supported projects. A youth focus could also encourage an element of ‘innovation’ as modernized or high-tech agriculture – although requiring substantial investments – might be considered by young people as a more attractive option than traditional agriculture. Furthermore, while climate resilience is among GAFSP’s cross-cutting themes and hence should be considered within all calls, a stronger focus on this aspect within a dedicated call could be considered given its particular relevance in fragility/conflict-affected contexts.

#9 Program M&E

The FCS-sensitiveness of GAFSP monitoring should be strengthened. A first step would involve ‘flagging’ projects not only according to the country’s FCS listing in the year of approval, but also during the years of preparation/implementation. The categorization of projects proposed within this Assignment (i.e. Always, Mostly, Partly or Never FCS) could then subsequently be used to facilitate the analysis of and comparison across the GAFSP portfolio. Projects in countries which are not FCS-listed but operate in sub-national areas, or ‘pockets’ of fragility/conflict might also need to be FCS ‘flagged’. Reporting on fragility/conflict-related aspects should also be improved within the Portfolio Reviews (and the Annual Reports). This would also serve the building of knowledge within the GAFSP platform (see Recommendation #1 above). However, it also calls for improved data collection and reporting by projects which – even if they are already burdensome for many IAs – could be facilitated by the template for the project progress reports including instructions on considerations for FCS-related matters where relevant.

#10 Other Areas of Investigation

Future portfolio reviews or assessments of selected projects could consider more specific topics relevant from an FCS perspective. This Evaluation focused on a general assessment of the extent of GAFSP's engagement in FCS countries and of FCS-sensitive considerations in the design and implementation of FCS projects. Resources to delve deeper into some FCS-relevant issues were hence not sufficient. It would, for example, be useful to do a more systemic analysis of how climate change interacts with structural drivers of fragility/conflict in supported countries, as well as of if and how projects focusing on building climate resilience have actually promoted longer-term results in terms of improved capacity of communities to withstand climate shocks (and in turn mitigate fragility/conflict). In addition to climate-related aspects, youth could also be considered towards looking more closely at approaches that not only include young people in activities but effectively engage them as well as the challenges and bottlenecks for their empowerment. Finally, projects and approaches addressing GBV and forced displacement could also be explored further.

Annex A - Overview of GAFSP Framework

Pillars and Outcome Areas

GAFSP is structured around the following five pillars and consequent food system:

- ▶ Pillar 1 Increased access to improved inputs, technology and services → **Increased agriculture productivity**;
- ▶ Pillar 2 Improved rural infrastructure and agribusiness facilities → **Improved farm-to-market linkages**;
- ▶ Pillar 3 Improved access to inputs and services that reduce exposure to shocks (economic, health or climate) → **Reduced risk and vulnerability**;
- ▶ Pillar 4 Improved access to financial services and employment → **Improved rural livelihoods and entrepreneurship**; and
- ▶ Pillar 5 Strengthened capacity for public institutions, producer organizations and public-private partnerships → **Improved institutions**.

Structure

GAFSP operates through two funding arms; namely a Financial Intermediary Fund (FIF) – previously the Public Sector Window – and the Private Sector Window (PrSW). The **FIF was restructured** in 2019 and is currently divided into the following two financing tracks:

- ▶ **Grant Based Financing Track (GBFT)**, which offers grants through dedicated calls for proposals that are launched periodically for country governments and, since 2016, also for POs:
 - **Country grants** support national agriculture and food security investment plans developed by governments in collaboration with farmers, agri-businesses, technical experts, and civil society representatives; and
 - **PO grants** involves small-scale financing to directly assist smallholder farmers and members of POs.
- ▶ **Business Investment Financing Track (BIFT)**, a recently launched US\$ 75 million financing window,¹¹⁶ aims to support private sector companies that promote inclusive business models and initiatives that improve livelihoods of smallholder farmers through advisory services, technical assistance, incentives, and concessional finance for private sector development.

The **PrSW**, instead, is managed by the IFC and uses blended finance solutions and IFC's expertise and knowledge to invest in projects that may not attract commercial funding due to high perceived risks in the agricultural sector. It specializes in early-stage agri-business projects with a high potential for development impact.

¹¹⁶ BIFT is effective as of October 1, 2024 (see further <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/10/01/-gafsp-launches-75-million-financing-window-to-mobilize-private-investment-into-high-potential-agricultural-entrepreneur>)

Governance and Management Framework¹¹⁷

Administered by the WBG, GAFSP is governed in collaboration with numerous development partners. At the center of the governance framework, as represented in Figure A.1 overleaf, lies the **Steering Committee** (SC). Currently co-chaired by Canada and USA, the SC is composed of both voting and non-voting members. Voting members include representatives from **Contributors** (namely bilateral donors¹¹⁸ and other entities¹¹⁹), which fund the Program,¹²⁰ and regional representatives from **Recipient Countries**.¹²¹ It is responsible for selecting and allocating grants to projects in response to the CfP.

In a non-voting capacity, the SC also includes representatives from seven **Supervising Entities** (SEs), which administer GAFSP funding and support governments and POs – hereinafter also ‘Implementing Agencies (IAs) - in the execution of funded projects. These entities include: (i) the World Bank; (ii) three regional multilateral development banks, i.e. the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Inter-American Development (IADB); and (iii) relevant UN agencies, i.e. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and World Food Programme (WFP).¹²² GAFSP also works with **Civil Society Organizations** (CSOs), including producer associations. Three of these (namely two producer associations from recipient regions and one CSO from an OECD country) are represented on a non-voting basis in the SC. The three CSO SC representatives currently include ActionAid USA, Asian Farmers’ Association (AFA) for Sustainable Rural Development and Réseau des Organisations Paysannes & de Producteurs de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (ROPPA).

The day-to-day operations of GAFSP are managed by the **Coordination Unit** (CU), which is hosted by the World Bank (and namely the Global Department for Agriculture and Food). This unit assists the SC (in which it serves as an administrative, non-voting member) in the execution of its governance functions. An independent **Technical Advisory Committee** (TAC) is also set up to specifically support the SC in the review of proposals under each grant call. Finally, the SC includes one administrative, non-voting **Trustee** representative. The Trustee (namely IBRD¹²³) channels funds from Contributors and ensures that GAFSP is aligned with World Bank policies and procedures.

¹¹⁷ This sub-section primarily relies on information from the GAFSP FIF Governance Document.

¹¹⁸ Including Australia (FIF and PrSW), Canada (FIF and PrSW), Germany (FIF), Ireland (FIF), Japan (PrSW), Republic of Korea (FIF), Netherlands (PrSW), Norway (FIF), Spain (FIF), United Kingdom (FIF and PrSW), and United States (FIF and PrSW).

¹¹⁹ Notably the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.


¹²⁰ As of April 2023, the Program had raised around US\$ 2.2 billion in funding for both the FIF (mostly) and the PrSW. The largest of the twelve Contributors thus far are USA and Germany, accounting respectively for 35% and 25% of total GAFSP commitments - <https://www.gafspfund.org/donors#:~:text=As%20of%20April%202023%2C%20GAFSP%27s,have%20contributed%20over%20%24%20billion>

¹²¹ Including three from Sub-Saharan Africa (plus one alternate), two from South and East Asia and the Pacific (plus one alternate), one from Latin America and the Caribbean (plus one alternate), one from Eastern Europe and Central Asia (plus one alternate), and one from the Middle East and North Africa (plus one alternate).

¹²² In addition, private sector financing through PrSW is managed by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the WBG, while IFC and the private sector arms of the other multilateral development banks act as SEs for BIFT.

¹²³ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Figure A.1 GAFSP Governance and Management Framework



* Non-voting representatives (only funding the PrSW).

Annex B - Consultations - Stakeholder Interviews

Most interviews were held online; those done in-person (notably for the country case studies, but not only) are highlighted in italics.

Entity	Person (Position)	Comments
GAFSP Coordination Unit		
	Adama Toure (Former Program Manager)	Interviewed 23 November 2024
	Felipe F. Dizon (Workstream Lead - Strategy and Evaluations)	<i>Interviewed 21 October 2024</i>
	Yurie Tanimichi Hoberg (Evaluation Liaison)	Continuous contact
	Cecilia Magarotto (RBA Liaison, PO-led track Focal Point)	<i>Interviewed 16 November 2024</i>
	Alberta Guerra (CSO Liaison)	<i>Interviewed 21 October 2024</i>
	Alemayehu Belay Zeleke (Climate Specialist)	<i>Interviewed 21 October 2024</i>
	Andrea Pape-Christiansen (Gender Specialist)	<i>Interviewed 21 October 2024</i>
	Shijie Yang (M&E Team Lead)	<i>Interviewed 29 November 2024</i>
	Natasha Hayward (Programme Manager)	Interviewed 7 February 2025
Supervising Entities		
ADB	Srinivasan Ancha (FCS/TTL Myanmar investment project)	Interviewed 5 December 2024
AfDB	Philip Boahen (GAFSP SC Alternate, GAFSP Focal Point)	Interviewed 5 November 2024
	Prince Kwesi Otabil	Interviewed 5 November 2024
	Lady Mardell Masopeh	Interviewed 5 November 2024
	Sule Ochai	Interviewed 5 November 2024

Entity	Person (Position)	Comments
FAO	Mohamed Manssouri (GAFSP SC Alternate, Director of Investment Centre)	<i>Interviewed 25 November 2024</i>
	Benoist Veillerette (GAFSP SC representative (CFIB), GAFSP Focal Point)	<i>Interviewed 25 November 2024</i>
	Patrizia Labella (GAFSP SC representative (CFIA), GAFSP Focal Point)	<i>Interviewed 25 November 2024</i>
	Reid Cooper (CFIB, M&E expert)	Interviewed 13 November 2024
	Julius Jackson (FCS expert)	Interviewed 22 November 2024
	Phillip Priestley (FCS expert)	
	Jozimo Santos Rocha (CFIB Chief Officer in charge)	<i>Interviewed 25 November 2024</i>
	Milos Milovanovic (CFIC, Agribusiness Investment Support Specialist)	<i>Interviewed 25 November 2024</i>
	Anne-Christelle Otto (CFIB, Economist & Coordinator Pacific Islands project)	<i>Interviewed 25 November 2024</i>
	Pamela Pozarny (CFIA, Agribusiness Investment Support Specialist)	<i>Interviewed 25 November 2024</i>
	Dmytro Prykhodko (CFIC, Senior Economist)	Interviewed 25 November 2024
	Cora Dankers (CFIB, Agribusiness Officer)	Interviewed 4 December 2024
	Simon Rietbergen (CFIA, Senior Forestry Specialist)	Provided written feedback
IADB	Pedro Martel (GAFSP SC Alternate))	Interviewed 13 November 2024
	Jianjun Xu (Lead Specialist, Resource Mobilisation, Global Partnerships)	Interviewed 13 November 2024
	Agustina Schijman (Economics Lead Specialist, FCS)	Interviewed 13 November 2024
	Aurelie Flavy Gilles (Haiti)	Interviewed 13 November 2024
IFAD	Enika Basu (GAFSP SC Representative, GAFSP Focal Point)	Interviewed 30 October 2024

Entity	Person (Position)	Comments
	Marc Cortadellas Mancini (GAFSP Focal Point)	Interviewed 29 October 2024
	Yukta Kumar (Senior Fragility Officer)	Interviewed 29 October 2024
WFP	Giulia Polidori (GAFSP SC Representative, GAFSP Focal Point)	<i>Interviewed 21 October 2024</i>
	Ronan MacNamara (FCS Specialist)	Interviewed 29 November 2024
World Bank	Sara Karimbhoy (FCV, Crisis and Preparedness Gap Analysis)	Interviewed 18 December 2024
	Mohamed Khatouri (Results M&E consultant)	Interviewed 16 January 2025
Technical Advisory Committee (TAC)		
	Diana McLean (Chair country-led)	Interviewed 7 November 2024
	Carlos Arthur da Silva (Vice Chair country-led)	Interviewed 7 November 2024
	Guy Evers (Chair PO-led)	Interviewed 28 November 2024
	Daud Khan (Vice Chair PO-led)	Interviewed 28 November 2024
CSOs		
Asian Farmers' Association (AFA)	Esther Penunia (Alternate)	Interviewed 29 January 2025

TIMOR-LESTE CASE STUDY

Entity	Person (Position)	Comments
World Bank		
	Valens Mwumvaneza (TTL Timor-Leste SAPIP)	<i>Interviewed 14 December 2024</i>
	Vikas Choudhary (Former TTL)	Interviewed 27 November 2024

Entity	Person (Position)	Comments
	Bernard Harborne (Country Representative)	Continuos contact
	Eligito Dos Santos (Agriculture Consultant)	Interviewed 16 November 2024
Implementing Agency		
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, SAPIP team	Mateus Neves (SAPIP project manager)	<i>Interviewed 12 December 2024</i>
	Pedro Freitas (M&E Specialist)	<i>Interviewed 10 December 2024</i>
	Tarcisio Ximenes (Agribusiness specialist)	<i>Interviewed 13 December 2024</i>
	Marcelino Amaral (Farmer Field School coordinator)	<i>Interviewed 13 December 2024</i>
	Humberto Moniz (Small grants officer)	<i>Interviewed 13 December 2024</i>
	Manuel Maubere Soares (Safeguard officer)	<i>Interviewed 13 December 2024</i>
	Jose Gomes (Project officer, Ermera municipality)	<i>Interviewed 11 December 2024</i>
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, others	Martinho Laurentino Soares (Director General, Agriculture)	<i>Interviewed 9 December 2024</i>
	Ipolito Da Costa (Director, Agricultural extension and technical formation department)	<i>Interviewed 9 December 2024</i>
	Augusto Barros (Director, Livestock department)	<i>Interviewed 9 December 2024</i>
	Raimundo Mau (Director, Forestry department)	<i>Interviewed 9 December 2024</i>
	Cesar José da Cruz (Director, Research department)	<i>Interviewed 9 December 2024</i>
	Nelson Tou (IT, Advisor of planning)	<i>Interviewed 16 December 2024</i>
	Marcus Dejesus Martin (Director of agriculture, Ermera municipality)	<i>Interviewed 11 December 2024</i>
	Carlos Muniz (Extension officer, Ermera municipality - Atsabe administrative post)	<i>Interviewed 13 December 2024</i>

Entity	Person (Position)	Comments
	Augusto Martins (Extension officer, Ermera municipality - Hatolia administrative post)	<i>Interviewed 13 December 2024</i>
Implementing partners		
Oxfam	Cris Caetano (National Program Manager)	<i>Interviewed 12 December 2024</i>
Raebia	Mateus Maia (Executive director)	<i>Interviewed 12 December 2024</i>
	Josefa Esperanca Gueteres (Finance and administration director)	<i>Interviewed 12 December 2024</i>
Other development partners		
TOMAK	Renato Zrnic (Team Leader)	<i>Interviewed 13 December 2024</i>
	Modesto Lopes (National Program Manager)	<i>Interviewed 13 December 2024</i>
Beneficiaries - Loes watershed, Ermera municipality		
Atsabe administrative post	Hametin farmers group	Interviewed 11 December 2024
Hatolia administrative post	Bele bele farmers group	Interviewed 10 December 2024

HAITI CASE STUDY

Entity	Person (Position)	Comments
WFP		
	Nour Salama (Project Manager)	Interviewed 28 January 2025
	Anna Law (GAFSP Focal Point)	Interviewed 28 January 2025
	Sofia Ferigolli (Partnership Officer for the GAFSP portfolio)	Interviewed 28 January 2025

Entity	Person (Position)	Comments
IADB		
	Bruno Jacquet (Project Manager)	Interviewed 21 January 2025
	Cardinael Celine Agathe (Project Team)	Interviewed 21 January 2025
	Aurelie Flavy Gilles (Project Team)	Interviewed 21 January 2025
	Jean Denis Sardou (Project Team)	Interviewed 21 January 2025
Implementing partners		
Ministry of Agriculture (PITAG and PAPAIR team)	Pierre Antoine Saintluis (Project Coordinator)	Interviewed 24 January 2025
	Jean-Robert Cherry (Technical Specialist Advisor)	Interviewed 24 January 2025
ActionAid	Elizabeth Richard (Project Manager)	Interviewed 28 January 2025
AAI	Robens Andrecy (Project Manager)	Interviewed 29 January 2025
University of Quisqueya	Gael Pressoi (Scientific Researcher)	Interviewed 30 January 2025
DDG	Luckny Zephyr (Founder)	Interviewed 30 January 2025
	Isnel Pierreva (Founder)	Interviewed 30 January 2025
Beneficiaries		
ROPAGA	Velan Gilot (Manager, Project Technical Coordinator)	Interviewed 5 February 2025

ETHIOPIA CASE STUDY

Entity	Person (Position)	Comments
FAO		
National Office	Hussein Kebede (National AGPII TA Coordinator)	Interviewed 2 and 6 December 2024

Entity	Person (Position)	Comments
	Alemayeu Musei (Irrigation engineering expert)	<i>Interviewed 2 December 2024</i>
	Wayeh Mulatu (National researcher in Agriculture)	<i>Interviewed 2 December 2024</i>
FAO Sidama Office	Eban Yigezu (Technical Officer)	<i>Interviewed 4 December 2024</i>
	Eskindir Eshetu (Technical Officer)	<i>Interviewed 4 December 2024</i>
	Dereje Asaminew (Field Office Coordinator)	<i>Interviewed 4 December 2024</i>
FAO Oromia Office	Desta Beyera (Field Office Coordinator, Oromia)	<i>Interviewed 6 December 2024</i>
	Mekonnen Kebede (Focal Person to AGPII)	<i>Interviewed 6 December 2024</i>
WB		
WB Headquarters	Jeren Kabayeva (Senior agricultural Specialist)	<i>Interviewed 6 December 2024</i>
	Felipe F. Dizon (Senior Economist, Global Department for Agriculture and Food)	<i>Interviewed 1 December 2024</i>
	Jubilee Nkechinyere Ahazie (Programme Officer Food and Nutrition Security)	<i>Interviewed 1 December 2024</i>
World Bank Addis Ababa	Karishma Wasti (Senior Agricultural Specialist)	<i>Interviewed 6 December 2024</i>
	Elioth W. Mghenyi (TTL AGP II 2012-2023)	<i>Interviewed 6 December 2024</i>
	Rahel Alemu Workneh (Agriculture and Food PG AFR3 Unit)	<i>Interviewed 2 December 2024</i>
Implementing partners		
Ministry of Agriculture	Keberu Balayneh (National Programme Manager AGP II and FRSP)	<i>Interviewed 2 December 2024</i>
	Assefa Tsegaye (Senior M , E and Learning specialist (AGP II M&E))	<i>Interviewed 2 December 2024</i>
State Bureau of Agriculture Sidama	Yohannes Dulecha (AGP II M& E specialist)	<i>Interviewed 5 December 2024</i>

Entity	Person (Position)	Comments
	Abiy Mekonini (Root Crop Expert)	<i>Interviewed 5 December 2024</i>
	Endashaw Girma Enset (Root Crop Directorate Director)	<i>Interviewed 5 December 2024</i>
	Yonas Tsegaye (Crop Production Director and IPM Expert)	<i>Interviewed 5 December 2024</i>
State Bureau of Agriculture Oromia	Abera Kebema (Forage Expert)	<i>Interviewed 6 December 2024</i>
	Taddesse Gurmu (IPM focal point)	<i>Interviewed 6 December 2024</i>
	Kebebush Dama (Nutrition and Gender Expert)	<i>Interviewed 6 December 2024</i>
	Addisu Wekamo (Climate Smart Agriculture Expert)	<i>Interviewed 6 December 2024</i>
	Demere Mezmur (Forage and Nursery Expert)	<i>Interviewed 6 December 2024</i>
	Modesto Lopes (National Program Manager)	<i>Interviewed 6 December 2024</i>
Beneficiaries - Loes watershed, Ermera municipality		
Wondo Genet	Beneficiaries of Equipment and TA support	<i>Interviewed 4 December 2024</i>
	Participants Farmers' Field School	<i>Interviewed 4 December 2024</i>
	Sidama agriculture bureau and FAO extension workers	<i>Interviewed 4 December 2024</i>
Melga	Members of Melga Milk Producers cooperative	<i>Interviewed 4 December 2024</i>

LIBERIA CASE STUDY

Entity	Person (Position)	Comments
AfDB		
	Mark Eghan (Task Team Leader of SAPEC and SADFONS)	<i>Interviewed 10 December 2024</i>

Entity	Person (Position)	Comments
	Nelly Maina (Gender Officer)	Interviewed 10 December 2024
	Alex Yeanay (Fragility and resilience officer)	Interviewed 10 December 2024
FAO		
	Octavius Quarbo (Assistant Country Representative)	Interviewed 4 December 2024
WFP		
	Kassaye Tesfay (Dep. Representative & Dep. Country Director)	Interviewed 13 December 2024
	Tariq Eltayeb (Tariq Eltayeb)	Interviewed 13 December 2024
	Mamadou Dialo (Communication and Partnerships Officer)	Interviewed 13 December 2024
Implementing Agency		
Programme Implementation Unit SADFONS	Jlopeh Dennis Wiagbe, Jr. (Project Coordinator)	Interviewed 8,9 and 13 December 2024
	Mohammed L. Kamara (Procurement Officer)	Interviewed 9 December 2024
	Menson R. Kwanwah (Agronomist)	Interviewed 9 December 2024
	Morleeta Chea (Agronomist)	Interviewed 9 December 2024
	Cleopatra Gibson- Jallay (Food & Nutrition Officer)	Interviewed 9 December 2024
	Mbakai Varpilah-Woyee (Administrative Assistant)	Interviewed 9 December 2024
	Nyangbeanquoi Aagon Yoko (M&E Officer)	Interviewed 9 December 2024
Ministry of Agriculture	J. Alexander Nuetah (Minister)	Interviewed 9 December 2024
	Edward Perry (Assistant Minister for Extension Services)	Interviewed 13 December 2024
Implementing Partners		

Entity	Person (Position)	Comments
IITA Nigeria	Michael Edet (Agronomist/Seed System Specialist)	<i>Interviewed 12 December 2024</i>
	Michael Abborta (IITA Nigeria)	<i>Interviewed 12 December 2024</i>
Africa Rice	Akintayou Inoussa (Country Representative)	<i>Interviewed 12 December 2024</i>
	Eric H. Savadogo (Seed Systems Specialist)	<i>Interviewed 12 December 2024</i>
CARI	Abitatu T. Kromah (Administrator)	<i>Interviewed 12 December 2024</i>
	Jobson A. Momo (Senior Researcher/Seed Specialist)	<i>Interviewed 12 December 2024</i>
	Jerry O. Tokao (Research Assistant)	<i>Interviewed 12 December 2024</i>
Agricultural Faculty University of Liberia	Leroy W. Cejbe (Dean of Agricultural Faculty)	<i>Interviewed 10 December 2024</i>
	Daniel H. Momolu (Farm Manager)	<i>Interviewed 10 December 2024</i>
Booker Washington Institute	Nancy T. Freeman (First Female Principal & Executive Officer)	<i>Interviewed 11 December 2024</i>
	Foday K. Rogers (Vice Principal for Study Services)	<i>Interviewed 11 December 2024</i>
	Allison Tamba Thomas (Allison Tamba Thomas)	<i>Interviewed 11 December 2024</i>
	Alice K. Bombo (Alice K. Bombo)	<i>Interviewed 11 December 2024</i>
	James Wremongar Walker (Industrial Coordinator)	<i>Interviewed 11 December 2024</i>
	David E. Norkoi (Procurement Analyst)	<i>Interviewed 11 December 2024</i>
Beneficiaries - Loes watershed, Ermera municipality		
Kakata	Cooperative in Careysburg (Focus group meeting: 18 women and 10 men)	<i>Interviewed 11 December 2024</i>
	Cooperative in Kingsville (Observation and interviews with persons at the facility)	<i>Interviewed 11 December 2024</i>

Entity	Person (Position)	Comments
	Aboubakar (Bakery Owner)	<i>Interviewed 11 December 2024</i>
Bensonville	Cassava aggregation point and processing plant	Interviewed 10 December 2024

Annex C - Consultations - Questionnaire for Projects Leads Survey

Welcome to the GAFSP Cross-Portfolio Survey

Merci de bien vouloir prendre le temps de nous faire part de vos idées et de vos expériences, en remplissant cette enquête.

Cette enquête est disponible en français. Veuillez cliquer sur le bouton en haut à droite pour changer de langue.

Thank you for your willingness and time to provide your insights and experiences, by filling in this survey. It is an instrumental part of a GAFSP-commissioned cross-portfolio evaluation of projects in Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations (FCS). The evaluation, led by Syntesia and MDF Training & Consultancy, aims to improve GAFSP's support in these challenging contexts. Your input will help GAFSP strengthen its approach to working in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

When we talk about fragility and conflict in this survey we mean:

- Fragility is defined as a systemic condition or situation characterized by an extremely low level of institutional and governance capacity which significantly impedes the state's ability to function effectively, maintain peace and foster economic and social development.
- Conflict is defined as a situation of acute insecurity driven by the use of deadly force by a group – including state forces, organized non-state groups, or other irregular entities – with a political purpose or motivation. Such force can be two-sided – involving engagement between multiple organized, armed sides, at times resulting in collateral civilian harm – or one-sided, in which a group specifically targets civilians.

When you start the survey you will be asked to answer a set of questions structured around three key areas:

- Design: if and how fragility/conflict shaped project design.
- Implementation: How fragility/conflict affected delivery.
- Results: Key project outcomes from a fragility/conflict perspective.

There are no right or wrong answers. Please do not hesitate to provide both positive and negative answers

Administrative Features:

- The survey takes 30-60 minutes to complete.
- You can pause and resume at any time using the link in your email, as long as you use the same device and browser. Previous responses will be saved.
- You can review and edit your answers using the "Previous" button, as long as you have not submitted the survey.
- Your feedback is completely confidential. This means that your personal data and name of your organization will not be shared with anyone including the GAFSP Coordination Unit or Steering Committee members. The information you provide, will not be published anywhere in a way that it would be attributable to you as an individual or your organization.
- Please submit your responses by 14 January.

In case you have any question about the survey, please contact the evaluation team at evaluation@mdf.nl

Click Next to begin

* 1. ID or project number

Please insert here the number you received in the email.

FCS-SENSITIVITY OF PROJECT DESIGN

The following section includes questions about to what extent, and if so, how fragility/conflict was considered in the project's design.

Project Identification and Design (Conceptualization)

* 2. In general, does your organization usually consider fragility/conflict in the design of your projects?

- In all our projects in both FCS and non-FCS listed countries
- In all our projects in FCS listed countries
- In most of our projects in FCS listed countries
- In some of our projects in FCS listed countries
- In a few projects in FCS listed countries
- In none of our projects
- I do not know/do not remember
- Other (please specify)

* 3. To what extent did your organization as supervising entity and/or the implementing agency consider fragility/conflict when identifying and designing the specific project funded by GAFSP?

- Not at all (did not consider fragility/conflict in project design)
- To a minimal extent (considered fragility/conflict minimally, with limited impact on project design)
- To a moderate extent (somewhat considered fragility/conflict, influencing some aspects of project design)
- To a considerable extent (actively considered fragility/conflict, significantly influencing project design)
- To a very great extent (comprehensively considered fragility/conflict, fully integrating it into project design)
- I do not know/do not remember

* 4. Why was fragility/conflict not considered?

- We did not know fragility/conflict was an issue, or necessary to be considered.
- We did not think fragility/conflict was relevant enough in our context to be considered.
- It was too complicated to take fragility/conflict into consideration.
- It was too costly to take fragility/conflict into consideration.
- I do not know/do not remember.
- Other (please specify)

* 5. Did your organization as supervising entity consider any of the following aspects that could be considered as drivers of fragility/conflict during the design of the specific project funded by GAFSP (for example in the development of the theory of change/results framework, the selection intervention areas/target groups, the identification of actions/activities to be carried out, etc.)

You can select multiple options

- Inequalities and exclusion of specific groups, unequal access to resources, services and opportunities
- Weak governance and institutions capacity
- Economic shocks, high levels of poverty and unemployment, or unequal distribution of economic

- benefits
- National resources competition, disputes of land, water, or other
- Climate change related shocks (drought, floods, hurricanes etc), climate-driven displacement and migration
- Demographic pressures, rapid population growth, combined with lack of infrastructure
- Historical grievances, unresolved conflicts, legacies of violence (presence of armed groups)
- Cross-border factors, spillovers from conflicts in neighboring countries, trans-national crime or violent extremism
- External shocks and global trends, pandemics, economic downturns of global financial crises, disruptive
- technological/cyber trends
- None of the above
- Other (please specify)

* 6. To what extent did GAFSP indications (as outlined for example in the guidelines or selection criteria of the Call for Proposal, or in the monitoring/supervision procedures or alike) promote considerations for fragility/conflict in the design of the project?

- Not at all
- To a minimal extent
- To a moderate extent
- To a considerable extent
- To a very great extent
- I do not know/do not remember

* 7. In the design of your project, did your organization conduct a context/situational assessment or analysis on fragility, conflict, and/or risks?

For example, the World Bank uses Risk and Resilience Assessment (RRA) to assess drivers of fragility, conflict and violence, risks and sources of resilience in some countries.

- Yes, we did or relied on a specific fragility/conflict assessment/analysis
- No, we did not do or rely on a specific fragility/conflict assessment/analysis
- I do not know/do not remember

* 8. Please specify what kind of assessment/analysis (e.g. project-specific analysis, area specific analysis carried out by our organization, country-specific analysis carried out by our organization, other analysis carried out by other organization, etc.).

* 9. Were the findings of the assessment/analysis taken into consideration when designing/preparing the project?

- Not at all
- To a minimal extent
- To a moderate extent
- To a considerable extent
- To a very great extent
- I do not know/do not remember

* 10. How useful was the assessment/analysis in anticipating fragility/conflict and risks to inform the design of the project?

- Not useful at all
- To a minimal extent useful
- Neutral
- To a great extent useful
- Very useful
- I do not know/do not remember

* 11. How did the project plan to address fragility and/or conflict? (you can select multiple options)

- Prevent fragility/conflict from occurring
- Strengthen preparedness for fragility/conflict that could occur
- Mitigate aspects of fragility/conflict already occurring
- Respond to aspects of fragility/conflict already occurring
- It did not plan to address aspects of fragility/conflict
- Other (please explain)

12. Please elaborate your answers above with further explanations or examples of how fragility, conflict and risks were considered and assessed (or not) in the design of the project.

Geographical location/populations targeted by the project

* 13. Please rate to what extent the following statements apply to your project:

The project deliberately targeted geographical locations (likely to be) affected by fragility/conflict.

The project deliberately targeted specific populations (likely to be) affected by fragility/conflict.

The project deliberately avoided geographical locations (likely to be) affected by fragility/conflict.

The project considered the sub-regional IPC (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification) in determining project intervention areas.

- Not at all
- To a minimal extent
- To a moderate extent
- To a considerable extent
- To a very great extent
- I do not know/do not remember

14. Please elaborate your answers with further explanations or examples of how project locations or target groups were considered or not in relation to fragility and/or conflict (as outlined for example in the guidelines or selection criteria of the Call for Proposal, or in the monitoring/supervision procedures or alike).

Cross-cutting themes

GAFSP cross-cutting outcomes are 'improved climate resilience', 'empowered women and girls', and 'improved nutrition' (source M&E Plan GAFSP: inclusion of the cross-cutting outcomes is a new feature to the ToC introduced with the 2022 revision.)

15. Please tick the box when the following statement applies to your GAFSP funded project.

(You can tick multiple boxes per cross cutting theme, if the statement or theme does not apply to your project you leave the box empty)

The cross-cutting theme...

1. Improved climate resilience
 2. Empowered women and girls
 3. Improved nutrition
- Is the top-level ambition of the project
 - Is an important objective for this project but not the principal goal
 - Was included in the problem statement
 - Received attention in the context/situational analysis
 - Was deliberately assessed (for example, gender gap analysis or climate risk assessment)
 - Specific experts/advisors are part of the project team
 - Was considered important from a fragility and conflict perspective
 - Was too burdensome to include considering fragility and conflict
 - Is included in the result framework (activities, outputs, outcome level results)
 - Is measured through specific (disaggregated) indicators
 - Is included in the scope of the evaluation of the project

* 16. To what extent did GAFSP indications (as outlined for example in the guidelines and selection criteria of the Call for Proposal) guide your organization and project partners during the design and formulation stage on the inclusion of cross-cutting themes?

1. Improved climate resilience
 2. Empowered women and girls
 3. Improved nutrition
- Not at all
 - To a minimal extent
 - To a moderate extent
 - To a considerable extent
 - To a very great extent
 - I do not know/do not remember

17. Please elaborate your answers with further explanations or examples of how crosscutting themes were relevant/useful and considered in relation to fragility and/or conflict in the design of the project. Or whether this was experienced as an additional burden.

Partnerships

* 18. In the design phase, did the project establish partnerships with organizations with expertise, experience, and or mandate, useful for fragility/conflict-sensitive project design?

- Yes
- No

- I do not know/do not remember

* 19. With which type of organizations/institutions was a partnership/collaboration established? You can select multiple options

- United Nations / International organizations (other than the SE itself)
- International humanitarian organizations or international/regional NGOs
- National NGOs
- Community-Based Organizations or Civil Society Organizations
- Research institutions
- Other (please specify)

* 20. How were these partners engaged in the design of the project / how was their expertise, experience or mandate related to fragility/conflict useful to the design and planning of the project?

FCS-SENSITIVE PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

This is the second section of the survey, you are progressing well. Please continue providing your valuable input.

The following section includes questions about whether and in what way the project was affected by fragility/conflict during implementation.

Developments around Fragility and Conflict situations in project context

* 21. What was the intensity of the fragility/conflict situation at the following stages of your project affecting the intervention locations or general implementation of the project

1. Before the start of project implementation (design)
 2. During project implementation
 3. At project closure
- No fragility and/or conflict
 - Low intensity fragility and/or conflict
 - Medium intensity fragility and/or conflict
 - High intensity fragility and/or conflict
 - I do not know/do not remember
 - Not applicable (project has not been closed yet)

22. Please explain what type of fragility and/or conflict situations your project encountered (please differentiate national level from events that were encountered at sub-national/local project locations).

23. If your project did not consider fragility and/or conflict in the design but a fragility and/or conflict situation occurred during implementation, how did the project respond to the changing fragility/conflict context?

24. If your project did not consider fragility and/or conflict situations in the design but a fragility and/or conflict situation occurred during implementation, in hindsight, what would you have done differently when designing/preparing the project?

Factors affecting project implementation

Projects are affected by numerous factors; internal to the project and within the control of the supervising entity and implementing agency, as well as external factors beyond the control of the project and its partners.

* 25. Please mention up to three important internal challenges that affected project implementation

Answer 1

Answer 2

Answer 3

* 26. Please mention up to three important external challenges that affected project implementation.

Answer 1

Answer 2

Answer 3

* 27. Please mention up to three important positive factors that supported the implementation of the project

Answer 1

Answer 2

Answer 3

Cross cutting themes

In the previous questions in this survey we asked about the cross cutting themes in relation to the design of the project. The following questions are about if and how the cross-cutting themes were implemented.

* 28. To what extent has your project managed to integrate the cross-cutting themes in project implementation?

1. Improved climate resilience
 2. Empowered women and girls
 3. Improved nutrition
- Not at all
 - To a minimal extent
 - To a moderate extent
 - To a considerable extent
 - To a very great extent
 - I do not know/do not remember

* 29. Can you provide an example of the most effective way (e.g. action/tool/instrument) to integrate the cross-cutting themes during project implementation?

Project leadership/partnerships

* 30. In the implementation phase, did the project establish or continue partnerships with organizations with expertise, experience, and or mandate, useful for fragility and/or conflict sensitive implementation?

- Yes, we continued with partnerships established at the design stage during implementation
- Yes, we established new partnerships during implementation
- No, we did not have any partnership during implementation
- I do not know/do not remember.

* 31. How were these partners engaged in the implementation of the project / how was their expertise, experience or mandate related to fragility and/or conflict, useful to the project implementation?

Alignment and coordination with government actors

32. To what extent has your organization as the supervising entity been able to properly align and coordinate with different government actors?

1. National Government (only applicable to PO-led projects and country-led projects implemented by a third party)
 2. Regional/Provincial Government
 3. District/Local Government
- Not at all
 - To a minimal extent
 - To a moderate extent
 - To a considerable extent
 - To a very great extent
 - I do not know/do not remember

* 33. Please explain what approach(es) facilitated the project's alignment and coordination with government actors at national, regional and/or local level?

* 34. Please explain what the most important bottlenecks were in aligning and coordinating with national, regional and/or local government actors.

Adjustment capacity

* 35. To what extent has the project been able to adjust to changes in the fragility/conflict context?

- Not at all
- To a minimal extent
- To a moderate extent
- To a considerable extent
- To a very great extent
- I do not know/do not remember
- Not applicable

36. Please explain your answer - provide an example of an adaptation to illustrate, if applicable.

37. Which aspects/elements of the project changed?

- Overall development objective (impact/long-term results: anticipated widespread improvements in the
- area/community)
- Anticipated outcomes (medium-term results: anticipated change in behavior/use of services/products by
- primary stakeholders and beneficiaries of the project)
- Anticipated outputs (short-term results: anticipated deliverables of project activities)
- Activities, methods or tools for project implementation
- Budget
- Timeframe of the project
- Project management arrangements
- Partnerships
- Monitoring & Evaluation arrangements
- Other (please specify)

38. Please explain to what extent and how these adjustments proved to be effective in dealing with the fragility and/or conflict situation?

39. Please explain up to three important factors that determined the project's ability to adjust.

Answer 1

Answer 2

Answer 3

* 40. Please explain any specific procedures of GAFSP or your organization as the supervising entity that hindered or facilitated the ability of the project to adapt.

RESULTS OF FCS-SENSITIVE PROJECT

This is the third and final section of the survey. You are almost done. In this section we ask a final couple of questions about the results thus far for project under implementation and final results for projects that have relatively recently closed. If it is too early to tell which are the results of your project, please proceed to the end of this survey to submit your answers.

41. To what extent have the project results been influenced by aspects of conflict and/or fragility?

- Not at all
- To a minimal extent
- To a moderate extent
- To a considerable extent
- To a very great extent
- I do not know/do not remember

42. If so, please explain how.

43. Please describe in keywords what have been up to three key results - positive or negative, planned or unexpected - of the project that were important in terms of preventing, strengthening preparedness for, mitigating, or responding to fragility and/or conflict situations?

Answer 1

Answer 2

Answer 3

44. To what extent do you think the targeted results of the project were too ambitious considering the level of fragility/conflict in the relevant country/area(s) of intervention?

- Not at all
- To a minimal extent
- To a moderate extent
- To a considerable extent
- To a very great extent
- I do not know

45. Please explain your answer:

46. What fragility and/or conflict sensitive elements, approaches or learnings from your project - if any -were picked up by a) your organization, b) implementing agency and/or c) other project partners? please describe up to three of such elements.

Answer 1

Answer 2

Answer 3

47. Do you have any other feedback or comments related to the design, implementation or achievement of results from a fragility/conflict-sensitive perspective?

Thank you for your valuable input to this evaluation!

Please press the button below to formally SUBMIT your response (after this stage you cannot make any changes anymore) If you still want to change an answer press Previous.

Annex D - Bibliography for Literature Review

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Annex E - FCS Listed Countries: FY10-FY25

Countries and territories	FY10	FY11	FY12	FY13	FY14	FY15	FY16	FY17	FY18	FY19	FY20	FY21	FY22	FY23	FY24	FY25	GAFSP FCS country classification
Afghanistan	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	HC	HC	HC	C	C	C	Always FCS
Angola	X	X	X	X	X												
Armenia													HC				
Azerbaijan													HC				
Bosnia & Herzegovina	X	X	X	X	X												
Burkina Faso											MC	MC	MC	C	C	C	Partly (late) FCS
Burundi		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	MC	F	MC	F	F	F	Always FCS
Cameroon	X										MC	HC	MC	C	C	C	
Central African Republic (CAR)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	HC	MC	MC	C	C	C	Always FCS
Chad	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	F	MC	MC	F	F	F	Always FCS
Comoros	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	F	F	F	F	F	F	
Congo, Democratic Republic of	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	MC	MC	MC	C	C	C	Always FCS
Congo, Republic of	X	X	X	X	X					X		F	F	F	F	F	
Côte d'Ivoire	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							Mostly (not late) FCS
<i>Djibouti</i>	X							X	X	X							
<i>Eritrea*</i>	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	F	F	F	F	F	F	
Ethiopia													MC	C	C	C	Partly (late) FCS
Gambia, The	X						X	X	X	X	F	F					Partly (midway) FCS
Georgia	X	X	X														
Guinea	X	X	X	X													Partly (initial) FCS
Guinea-Bissau	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	F	F	F	F	F	F	Always FCS
Iraq		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	MC	MC	MC	C	C	C	
Haiti	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	F	F	MC	F	F	C	Always FCS
Kiribati	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	F	F	F		F	F	Always FCS
Kosovo	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	F	F	F	F	F	F	
Lao PDR												F	F				Partly (late) FCS
Lebanon							X	X	X	X	F	F	F	F	F	C	
Liberia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	F	F					Mostly (not late) FCS
Libya				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	HC	HC	MC	F	F	F	
Madagascar					X	X	X	X									Partly (midway) FCS
Malawi					X												Partly (midway) FCS
Mali					X	X	X	X	X	X	MC	MC	MC	C	C	C	Mostly (not initial) FCS
Marshall Islands			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	F	F	F	F	F	F	Mostly (not initial) FCS
Micronesia, Federated States of			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	F	F	F	F	F	F	Mostly (not initial) FCS
<i>Mozambique</i>									X	X		MC	MC	C	C	C	
Myanmar	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	F	MC	MC	C	C	C	Always FCS
Nepal	X	X	X	X	X												Partly (initial) FCS
Niger											MC	MC	MC	C	C		Partly (late) FCS
Nigeria											MC	MC	MC	C	C	C	
Papua New Guinea	X							X	X	X	F	F	F	F	F	F	
São Tomé and Príncipe	X	X													F	F	
Sierra Leone	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X								Mostly (not late) FCS
Solomon Islands	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	F	F	F	F	F	F	Always FCS
Somalia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	HC	HC	HC	C	C	C	Always FCS
South Sudan				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	HC	MC	MC	C	C	C	Mostly (not initial) FCS
<i>Sudan</i>	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	MC	F	F	F	C	C	
Syrian Arab Republic				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	HC	HC	HC	C	C	C	
Tajikistan	X	X															Partly (initial) FCS
Timor-Leste	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	F	F	F	F	F	F	Mostly (not midway) FCS
Togo	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							Mostly (not late) FCS
Tonga	X																
Tuvalu				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	F	F	F	F	F	F	Mostly (not initial) FCS
Ukraine														C	C	C	
Venezuela											F	F	F	F	F	F	
West Bank and Gaza	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	F	F	F	F	F	C	
Western Sahara	X	X	X														
Yemen, Republic of	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	HC	MC	HC	C	C	C	Always FCS
Zimbabwe	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	F	F	F	F	F	F	

GAFSP countries in bold

Other FCS countries currently listed also as IDA-only in italics (* inactive)

C = Conflict (FY23-FY25)

F = Institutional and social fragility (FY20-FY25)

HC = High-intensity conflict (FY20-FY22)

MC = Medium-intensity conflict (FY20-FY22)

X = Fragile situation (FY10-FY19)

Source: WBG - (i) <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/brief/classification-of-fragile-and-conflict-affected-situations>; and (ii) <https://ida.worldbank.org/en/about/borrowing-countries#:~:text=Eligibility%20for%20IDA%20support%20depends,in%20the%20fiscal%20year%20202>

Annex F - Level of Conflict, Fragility and Climate Vulnerability

Country	FCS Status	Conflict Level	ACLED Conflict Index	Global Peace Index	Fragility Level	Fragile States Index	CPIA	Climate Vulnerability	Notre Dame Gain Index
Afghanistan	Always FCS	Severe	High	3.577272727	Severe	106.3015682	Not available	Severe	0.586
Burkina Faso	Partly FCS	High	High	2.463909091	Moderate	88.60372576	3.531481481	High	0.524
Burundi	Always FCS	High	Turbulent	2.369090909	High	97.51716214	2.967592556	High	0.554
Central African Republic (CAR)	Always FCS	Severe	Turbulent	3.284545455	Severe	108.2866392	2.534259	Severe	0.578
Chad	Always FCS	Severe	Turbulent	2.764454545	Severe	108.2961208	2.73888963	Severe	0.646
Côte d'Ivoire	Mostly FCS	Low	Low/inactive	2.321272727	High	96.50601378	3.523148111	High	0.485
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	Always FCS	Severe	High	3.280090909	High	109.5903561	2.786111185	Severe	0.562
Ethiopia	Partly FCS	Severe	High	2.679363636	High	98.1832053	3.40925963	High	0.522
Gambia, The	Partly FCS	Low	Low/inactive	2.113818182	Moderate	82.61277321	2.990740741	High	0.527
Guinea	Partly FCS	Low	Low/inactive	2.391818182	High	99.46316812	3.241666333	High	0.538
Guinea-Bissau	Always FCS	Moderate	Low/inactive	2.378454545	High	96.80690467	2.475000037	Severe	0.617
Haiti	Always FCS	Severe	High	2.354636364	Severe	102.753468	2.694444556	High	0.51
Kiribati	Always FCS	Low	Low/inactive	Not available	Low	Not available	2.960185074	Severe	0.572
Lao PDR	Partly FCS	Low	Low/inactive	1.962363636	Low	81.61317839	3.092592148	High	0.489
Liberia	Mostly FCS	Low	Low/inactive	2.113545455	Moderate	92.40029653	3.004629704	High	0.543
Madagascar	Partly FCS	Severe	Turbulent	2.037272727	Low	82.25013774	3.241667037	High	0.559
Malawi	Partly FCS	Low	Low/inactive	2.036909091	Moderate	86.90028446	3.142592556	High	0.551
Mali	Mostly FCS	Severe	High	2.806181818	Moderate	91.10175957	3.324999593	Severe	0.599
Marshall Islands	Mostly FCS	Low	Low/inactive	Not available	Moderate	Not available	2.611111111	Severe	0.587
Micronesia, Federated States of	Mostly FCS	Low	Low/inactive	Not available	Low	72.82662271	2.758333333	Severe	0.621
Myanmar	Always FCS	Severe	Extreme	2.600545455	High	96.27802215	2.727777852	High	0.51
Nepal	Partly FCS	Low	Low/inactive	2.146909091	Low	88.26735922	3.400926741	Moderate	0.494
Niger	Partly FCS	High	Turbulent	2.626909091	High	97.03717247	3.398148185	Severe	0.632
Sierra Leone	Mostly FCS	Low	Low/inactive	1.999909091	Moderate	88.34591421	3.195370778	Severe	0.598
Solomon Islands	Always FCS	Moderate	Low/inactive	Not available	Moderate	83.69644034	2.943518444	Severe	0.634
Somalia	Always FCS	High	High	3.374	Severe	112.8706968	1.363888963	Severe	0.606
South Sudan	Mostly FCS	High	Turbulent	3.461545455	Severe	95.4792504	1.582407815	Not available	
Tajikistan	Partly FCS	Low	Low/inactive	2.302272727	Low	81.35765654	3.091667556	Moderate	0.367
Timor-Leste	Mostly FCS	Low	Not available	1.678363636	Moderate	88.15856746	2.863889185	High	0.549
Togo	Mostly FCS	Low	Low/inactive	2.263636364	Moderate	86.16430547	3.349074185	High	0.499
Tuvalu	Mostly FCS	Not available	Not available	Not available	Not available	Not available	Not available	Not available	Not available
Yemen, Republic of	Always FCS	Severe	Extreme	3.352363636	Severe	106.3935855	2.064814111	High	0.521

Conflict

The **Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) Conflict Index** analyzes data on (i) deadliness, (ii) danger to civilians, (iii) geographic diffusion, and (iv) armed group fragmentation in relation to politically violent events, to classify conflict levels as extreme, high, turbulent or low/inactive. The index covers the period from 2022 to 2024 (average included in table above).

The **Global Peace Index** ranks independent states and territories based on their level of peacefulness across three domains: (i) Societal Safety and Security, (ii) Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict, and (iii) Militarization. The index covers the period from 2014 to 2024 (average included in table above). A higher score on the index indicates a lower level of peace in the respective country.

Fragility


The **Fragile States Index** (FSI), produced by The Fund for Peace (FFP), identifies when the pressures faced by states exceed their capacity to manage them based on twelve key political, social and economic indicators. It covers the period from 2006 to 2023 (average between 2010 and 2023 included in table above), with a higher score reflecting greater vulnerability of a State.

The **Country Policy and Institutional Assessment** (CPIA) is a diagnostic tool designed to assess the quality of a country's policies and institutional arrangements, focusing on 16 criteria organized into four clusters - (i) Economic Management, (ii) Structural Policies, (iii) Policies for Social Inclusion and Equity, and (iv) Public Sector Management and Institutions. The CPIA covers the period from 2015 to 2023 (average included in table above), with a score of 1 indicating low performance and 6 representing high performance.

Climate Vulnerability

The **Notre Dame Gain Index** which measures a country's exposure, sensitivity, and capacity to adapt to the negative effects of climate change. It assesses overall vulnerability by considering six life-supporting sectors: food, water, health, ecosystem services, human habitat, and infrastructure. Available only for 2022, the index assigns higher scores to countries that are less vulnerable to climate change and better prepared to manage its impacts

Annex G - Number of Approved FCS Grants by Country and Call for Proposals



Annex H - FCS Classification of GAFSP FCS Grant Portfolio

	Country	Region	Project Name	Type	SE	CfP	FCS Status on Approval	FCS Classification during Implementation	Status
1	Afghanistan	South Asia	Community Driven Irrigation Management (CDIM)	Investment	ADB	5 (2019/FCV)	Yes	n/a	Cancelled
	Afghanistan	South Asia	Community Driven Irrigation Management (CDIM)	Technical Assistance	FAO	5 (2019/FCV)	Yes	n/a	Cancelled
2	Burkina Faso	Africa	Agricultural Productivity and Food Security Project (PAPSA)	Investment	WB	3 [2013]	No	Partly (lately) FCS	Project Closed
3	Burkina Faso	Africa	West Africa Food System Resilience Program (FSRP) for Burkina Faso	Investment	WB	4 [2017]	No	Always FCS	Under Implementation
4	Burkina Faso	Africa	Projet de Renforcement durable de la Résilience à l'Insécurité Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle (P2RIA) 16239:GAFSP00198	Investment	IFAD	7 [2023]	Yes	n/a	Under Implementation
5	Burundi	Africa	National Food Security and Rural Development Programme in Imbo and Moso (PNSADR - IM)	Investment	IFAD	2 [2012]	Yes	Always FCS	Project Closed
6	Burundi	Africa	Supporting Small-scale Family Farmers who are Members of CAPAD Cooperatives in Burundi to be Resilient to the Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic- Confédération des Associations des Producteurs Agricoles pour le Développement (CAPAD)	PO Led	IFAD	6 (2021)	Yes	Always FCS	Under Implementation
7	Central African Republic (CAR)	Africa	Enhanced Resilience, Food and Nutrition Security in Kemo and Ouaka Districts (PARSANKO)	Investment	AFDB	5 (2019/FCV)	Yes	Always FCS	Under Implementation
	Central African Republic (CAR)	Africa	Enhanced Resilience, Food and Nutrition Security in Kemo and Ouaka Districts (PARSANKO)	Technical Assistance	FAO	5 (2019/FCV)	Yes	Always FCS	Under Implementation
8	Chad	Africa	Scaling Up the Management of Fish Reproductive Areas through Fishery Enclosure Systems in the Fianga	PO Led	IFAD	7 [2023]	Yes	n/a	Under Preparation

			Lacustrine Area (ELF), Mont-Illi Department, Mayo-Kebbi East Province, Chad						
9	Côte d'Ivoire	Africa	Strengthening Smallholder and Women's Livelihoods and Resilience in N'ZI Region	Investment	AFDB	5 (2019/FCV)	Yes	Partly (lately) FCS	Under Implementation ALMOST PROJECT CLOSED
10	Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	Africa	Multisectoral Nutrition and Health Project (MNHP)	Investment	WB	5 (2019/FCV)	Yes	Always FCS	Under Implementation
11	Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	Africa	Resilience and Nutrition in Great Lakes Region (RENUGL)	Technical Assistance	FAO	5 (2019/FCV)	Yes	Always FCS	Under Implementation
12	Ethiopia	Africa	Agricultural Growth Project (AGP) I	Investment	WB	1 [2010]	Yes	Always FCS	Project Closed
	Ethiopia	Africa	Agricultural Growth Project (AGP) I	Technical Assistance	FAO	1 [2010]	No	Never FCS	Project Closed
13	Ethiopia	Africa	Agriculture Growth Project (AGP) II	Investment	WB	4 [2017]	No	Never FCS	Project Closed
	Ethiopia	Africa	Agriculture Growth Project (AGP) II	Technical Assistance	FAO	4 [2017]	No	Partly (lately) FCS	Under Implementation ALMOST PROJECT CLOSED
14	Gambia	Africa	Food and Agriculture Sector Development Project (FASDEP)	Investment	AFDB	2 [2012]	No	Partly (lately) FCS	Project Closed
	Gambia	Africa	Food and Agriculture Sector Development Project (FASDEP)	Technical Assistance	FAO	2 [2012]	No	Mostly (not initially) FCS	Project Closed
15	Gambia	Africa	Gambia Agriculture and Food Security Project	Investment	AFDB	5 (2019/FCV)	No	Mostly (not initially) FCS	Under Implementation
16	Guinea	Africa	Strengthening the resilience of vegetable Producer Organizations of Lower Guinea (PRR-OPM-BG)	PO Led	FAO	7 [2023]	Yes	Never FCS	Under Preparation
17	Guinea-Bissau	Africa	Support Value Chain Development and Agricultural and Rural Entrepreneurship (PACVEAR II)	Investment	AFDB	7 [2023]	No	n/a	Under Preparation
18	Haiti	Latin America	Small Farmer Agriculture Technology Transfer Project (PTTA)	Investment	IADB	1 [2010]	Yes	n/a	Project Closed

19	Haiti	Latin America	Relaunching Agriculture: Strengthening Agriculture Public Services Project II (RESEPAG II)	Investment	WB	1 [2010]	Yes	Always FCS	Project Closed
20	Haiti	Latin America	Technological Innovation for Agroforestry and Agriculture Program (PITAG)	Investment	IADB	4 [2017]	Yes	Always FCS	Under Implementation ALMOST PROJECT CLOSED
21	Haiti	Latin America	Rural Productivity and Connectivity Program with a Territorial Approach (PAPAIR)	Investment	IADB	5 (2019/FCV)	Yes	Always FCS	Under Implementation
22	Haiti	Latin America	Promotion of Resilient Agroforestry in Grand'Anse: Scaling up and Professionalizing Small-Scale Initiatives to Build Back Better	PO Led	WFP	6 (2021)	Yes	Always FCS	Under Implementation
23	Lao PDR	East Asia and Pacific	Agriculture for Nutrition Programme	Investment	IFAD	3 [2014]	Yes	Always FCS	Project Closed
	Lao PDR	East Asia and Pacific	Agriculture for Nutrition Programme	Technical Assistance	WFP	3 [2014]	No	Partly (lately) FCS	Project Closed
24	Lao PDR	East Asia and Pacific	Agriculture for Nutrition - Phase 2 (AFN II)	Investment	IFAD	6 (2021)	No	Partly (lately) FCS	Under Implementation
	Lao PDR	East Asia and Pacific	Agriculture for Nutrition - Phase 2 (AFN II)-TA	Technical Assistance	WFP	6 (2021)	No	Never FCS	Under Implementation
25	Lao PDR	East Asia and Pacific	Sustainable Rural Infrastructure and Watershed Management Sector Project (SRIWMSP)	Investment	ADB	7 [2023]	No	Never FCS	Under Preparation
	Lao PDR	East Asia and Pacific	Sustainable Rural Infrastructure and Watershed Management Sector Project (SRIWMSP)	Technical Assistance	WFP	7 [2023]	No	n/a	Under Implementation
26	Lao PDR	East Asia and Pacific	Building smallholder farmers' resilience for food, nutrition, and income security in Lao PDR (aGreen Project)	PO Led	WFP	7 [2023]	No	Never FCS	Under Preparation
27	Liberia	Africa	Smallholder Agricultural Productivity Enhancement and Commercialization (SAPEC) Program	Investment	AFDB	1 [2011]	No	n/a	Project Closed
28	Liberia	Africa	Smallholder Agriculture Development For Food and Nutrition Security (SADFONS)	Investment	AFDB	5 (2019/FCV)	Yes	Always FCS	Under Implementation

29	Madagascar	Africa	Food Systems Resilience Project (FSRP)	Investment	WB	7 [2023]	Yes	Never FCS	Under Implementation
30	Malawi	Africa	Smallholder Irrigation and Value Addition Project (SIVAP)	Investment	AFDB	2 [2012]	No	Never FCS	Project Closed
31	Malawi	Africa	Food Systems Resilience Program (FSRP)	Investment	WB	7 [2023]	No	Partly (initially) FCS	Under Implementation
32	Mali	Africa	Food and Nutrition Security Enhancement Project (PreSAN-KL)	Investment	AFDB	3 [2013]	No	Never FCS	Project Closed
33	Mali	Africa	MMI - Inclusion of Rural Youth in Poultry and Aqua-culture Value Chains in Mali	PO Led	IFAD	MMI Call [2016]	Yes	Always FCS	Project Closed
34	Mali	Africa	MMI - Improved Rice Paddy Quality and Quality Cowpea Processing for Improved Nutrition and Increased Farmer Development	PO Led	WFP	MMI Call [2016]	Yes	Always FCS	Project Closed
35	Myanmar	East Asia and Pacific	Climate Friendly Agribusiness Value Chains Sector Project	Investment	ADB	4 [2017]	Yes	Always FCS	Under Implementation
	Myanmar	East Asia and Pacific	Climate Friendly Agribusiness Value Chains Sector Project	Technical Assistance	FAO	4 [2017]	Yes	Always FCS	Under Implementation ALMOST PROJECT CLOSED
36	Nepal	South Asia	Agriculture and Food Security Project (AFSP)	Investment	WB	1 [2011]	Yes	Always FCS	Project Closed
37	Nepal	South Asia	Food and Nutrition Security Enhancement Project (FANSEP)	Investment	WB	4 [2017]	Yes	Partly (initially) FCS	Project Closed
38	Nepal	South Asia	Food and Nutrition Security Enhancement Project (FANSEP) II	Investment	WB	7 [2023]	No	Never FCS	Under Implementation
39	Nepal	South Asia	Vegetables in Hilly Areas Project (NAFHA)	Investment	ADB	6 (2021)	No	Never FCS	Under Implementation
	Nepal	South Asia	Vegetables in Hilly Areas Project (NAFHA)	Technical Assistance	WFP	6 (2021)	No	Never FCS	Under Implementation
40	Nepal	South Asia	Improved food and nutrition security through diversified income generation and empowerment - NACCFL	PO Led	FAO	7 [2023]	No	Never FCS	Under Preparation
41	Niger	Africa	Water Mobilization to Increase Food Security in the Maradi, Tahoua, and Zinder Regions Project (PMERSA-MTZ)	Investment	AFDB	1 [2010]	No	n/a	Project Closed

42	Niger	Africa	Strengthening Farmers' Organizations to Develop Sustainable Livelihoods	PO Led	FAO	6 (2021)	No	Partly (lately) FCS	Under Preparation
43	Niger	Africa	Project to support the intensification of agricultural production in the face of the effects of climate change and insecurity in the regions of Dosso, Tahoua and Tillabéri	PO Led	IFAD	7 [2023]	Yes	n/a	Under Preparation
44	Sierra Leone	Africa	Smallholder Commercialisation Programme (SCP)	Investment	IFAD	1 [2010]	Yes	n/a	Project Closed
45	Sierra Leone	Africa	West Africa Food System Resilience Program (FSRP SL)	Investment	WB	7 [2023]	Yes	Mostly (not lately) FCS	Under Implementation
46	Somalia	Africa	Somalia Integrated and Resilient Agricultural Productivity Project (SIRAP)	Investment	IFAD	6 (2021)	No	Never FCS	Under Preparation
47	Somalia	Africa	Scaling up market-based agricultural productivity and income enhancement in Hirshabelle (SMAPIEH)	PO Led	WFP	7 [2023]	Yes	n/a	Under Implementation
48	South Sudan	Africa	Rural Enterprises for Agricultural Development (READ)	Investment	IFAD	6 (2021)	Yes	Always FCS	Under Implementation
49	South Sudan	Africa	South Sudan Livelihood and Resilience Project (SSLRP)	Investment	IFAD	7 [2023]	Yes	Always FCS	Under Implementation
50	Tajikistan	Europe & Central Asia	Second Public Employment for Sustainable Agriculture and Water Resources Management Project (PAMP II)	Investment	WB	1 [2011]	Yes	n/a	Project Closed
51	Timor-Leste	East Asia and Pacific	Sustainable Agriculture Productivity Improvement Project (SAPIP)	Investment	WB	3 [2014]	Yes	Never FCS	Under Implementation
52	Togo	Africa	Project to Support Agricultural Development in Togo (PADAT)	Investment	IFAD	1 [2010]	Yes	Mostly (not initially) FCS	Project Closed
53	Togo	Africa	Agriculture Sector Support Project (PASA)	Investment	WB	1 [2010]	Yes	Always FCS	Project Closed
54	Togo	Africa	West Africa Food System Resilience Program (FSRP) (PRSA Togo)	Investment	WB	7 [2023]	Yes	Always FCS	Under Implementation
55	Togo	Africa	Support for the promotion of agroecological market gardening in Togo (ProSMAT)	PO Led	IFAD	7 [2023]	No	Never FCS	Under Preparation

56	Yemen	Middle East	Smallholder Agricultural Production Restoration and Enhancement Program (SAPREP)	Investment	WB	3 [2013]	No	n/a	Project Closed
57	Yemen	Middle East	Food Security Response and Resilience Project (FSSRP)	Investment	WB	5 (2019/FCV)	Yes	Always FCS	Under Implementation
58	Yemen	Middle East	Yemen Rural Livelihoods Development Project (RLDP)	Investment	IFAD	7 [2023]	Yes	Always FCS	Under Preparation
59	Regional - Pacific (Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Tuvalu)	East Asia and Pacific	Small Islands Food and Water Project	Investment	IFAD	5 (2019/FCV)	Yes	n/a	Under Implementation
	Regional - Pacific (Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Tuvalu)	East Asia and Pacific	Small Islands Food and Water Project	Technical Assistance	FAO	5 (2019/FCV)	Yes	Always FCS	Under Implementation
60	Regional - Pacific (Solomon Islands & Vanuatu)	East Asia and Pacific	Agricultural Investment for Markets and Nutrition in Solomon Islands and Vanuatu	Investment	IFAD	6 (2021)	Yes	Always FCS	Under Preparation
	Regional - Pacific (Solomon Islands & Vanuatu)	East Asia and Pacific	Agricultural Investment for Markets and Nutrition in Solomon Islands and Vanuatu	Technical Assistance	FAO	6 (2021)	Yes	n/a	Under Preparation

Annex I - Number of GAFSP Proposals and Awards

	CfP 1	CfP 2	CfP 3	MMI	CfP 4	CfP 5	CfP 6		CfP 7		Total proposal	Total awards	Success rate
	FY10	FY12	FY13	FY16	FY17	FY19	Country-led FY21	PO-led FY21	Country-led FY23	PO-led FY23			
Call launch	FY11	FY12	FY14	FY17	FY17	FY20	FY22	FY22	FY23	FY23			
Afghanistan						X ²					2	2	100%
Bangladesh	X ²			X	X		X ²	X	X		8	6	75%
Benin		X	X				X	X	X		6	1	17%
Bhutan	XX	X	X				X ²			X	7	3	43%
Burkina Faso		X	X		X		X	XX	X		7	3	43%
Burundi		X				X		X(X)		X	5	2	40%
Cambodia	XX			X			X	X			5	4	80%
Central African Republic (CAR)					X	X ²					3	2	67%
Chad						X	X			X	3	1	33%
Comoros						X	X		X		3	0	0%
Cote d'Ivoire			X			X	X			X	4	1	25%
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)					X	X ²	X	X(X)	X	XX	9	3	33%
Djibouti					X	X	X				3	0	0%
Ethiopia	X ²		X		X ²		X		X	X	8	4	50%
Gambia, The	XX	X ²				X	X			XX	8	3	38%
Ghana	X	X	X					XXX	X	X	8	1	13%
Guinea			X		X					X	3	1	33%
Guinea-Bissau					X	X	X		X		4	1	25%
Guyana			X		X		X			X	4	0	0%
Haiti	XX				X	X	X	X			6	5	83%
Honduras		X	X				X	X	X	X	6	4	67%
Kenya	XX	X	X ²								5	2	40%
Kosovo						X	X				2	0	0%
Kyrgyz Republic	X	X*				X		X		XX(X)	7	4	57%
Lao PDR		X	X ²	X			X ²		X ²	X	9	7	78%
Lesotho							X		X	X	3	1	33%
Liberia	X(X)				X	X	X				5	2	40%
Madagascar					X				X	X	4	1	25%
Malawi	XX	X		X			X	XX	X		8	2	25%
Maldives, The								X			1	1	100%
Mali	XX	X	X	XX			X	XX		XX	11	3	27%
Mauritania		X	X		X		X				4	1	25%
Moldova	XX										2	0	0%
Mongolia	X ² X										3	2	67%
Mozambique			X		XX	X	X				5	0	0%
Myanmar				X	X ²	X		X			5	2	40%
Nepal	XX				X		X ²		X	X(X)	8	6	75%
Nicaragua	XX	X	X					X(X)	X	XX(X)	10	5	50%
Niger	X	X					X	X		X(X)	6	3	50%
Nigeria	XX										2	0	0%
Rwanda	X			X	X		X	XX	X	X(XX)	10	4	40%
Samoa										X	1	1	100%
Sao Tome and Principe					X						1	0	0%
Senegal	XX	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	9	4	44%
Sierra Leone	X						X	X	X		4	2	50%
Solomon Islands						X					1	0	0%
Somalia							X	X		X	3	2	67%
South Sudan							X		X		2	2	100%
Sudan							X	X			2	0	0%
Tajikistan	XX										2	1	50%
Tanzania		X			X		X	X(XX)	X	XX	9	3	33%
Timor-Leste			X								1	1	100%
Togo	XX						X		X	X	4	4	100%
Tonga					X	X					2	0	0%
Uganda	XX		X				X	X(XXXX)	X		10	2	20%
Yemen	XX	X	X			X	X	X	X		8	3	38%
Zambia			X				X	XX	X	XX	7	1	14%
Regional - East Africa (Rwanda, Tanzania & Uganda)				X							1	1	100%
Regional - Pacific (Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Tuvalu)						X ²					2	2	100%
Regional - Pacific (Solomon Islands & Vanuatu)							X ²				2	2	100%
# proposals submitted (total)	46	19	21	10	24	23	45	41	25	39	293	293	x prop
# recommended and awarded grants (total)	18	7	14	5	9	13	17	12	16	13	124	124	x awd
success rate (total)	39%	37%	67%	50%	38%	57%	38%	29%	64%	33%	42%	45%	av rate
# proposals submitted (FCS)	15	2	4	3	9	23	22	14	7	10	109		
# recommended and awarded grants (FCS)	8	1	3	2	3	13	6	4	4	3	47		
success rate (FCS)	53%	50%	75%	67%	33%	57%	27%	29%	57%	30%	43%	48%	av rate
# proposals submitted (non-FCS)	31	17	17	7	15	n/a	23	27	18	29	184		
# recommended and awarded grants (non-FCS)	10	6	11	3	6	n/a	11	8	12	10	77		
success rate (non-FCS)	32%	35%	65%	43%	40%	n/a	48%	30%	67%	34%	42%	44%	av rate

* The Kyrgyz Republic was approved for a reduced amount (\$16.5m) in Cfp2 due to unavailability of funds. It reapplied for remaining financing in Cfp3 and was awarded \$

Annex J - Application of Theoretical Framework

This annex presents the application of the theoretical framework for the interaction between FCS and food and nutrition interventions, presented in Section 4, to the projects covered by the four country case studies carried out for this Evaluation. For each project, or group of projects, the following elements have been identified:

- ▶ The salient features of the projects' intervention logic, based on the GAFSP Theory of Change.¹²⁴ This includes the main streams of activities, as well as the outputs, outcomes and impacts, by identifying which GAFSP Pillars were relevant for each intervention or group of intervention;
- ▶ The key delivery and conversion barriers;
- ▶ The positive and negative influence the project(s) had on the FCS of the country;
- ▶ The best practices adopted at design or during implementation to mitigate the effects of fragility/conflict on the implementation, as well as to avoid negative effects of the project on the context; and
- ▶ Any elements related to the fragility/conflict context that were not sufficiently taken into account at design.

¹²⁴ GAFSP, "GAFSP Monitoring and Evaluation Plan 2022", https://www.gafspfund.org/sites/default/files/2023-09/Revised%20ME%20Plan%202022%20Aug%202023%20Final%20and%20Edited_0.pdf


East Asia & the Pacific - Timor-Leste

BEST PRACTICES INCORPORATED AT DESIGN OR DURING IMPLEMENTATION

- Involvement of local communities
- Strong focus on institutional capacity building at national, local, and community level

ASPECTS INSUFFICIENTLY CONSIDERED

- Actual capacity of the IA, resulting in excessively ambitious design




Latin America & the Caribbean - Haiti (ROPAGA)

BEST PRACTICES INCORPORATED AT DESIGN OR DURING IMPLEMENTATION

- Designed to adapt to local resources, with high-quality initial analysis
- Strong experience with FCS of SE and implementing partners ensured the appropriateness of the design
- Strong focus on institutional capacity building at national, local, and community level
- Flexibility to adapt to emerging circumstances (e.g. budget increase due to surges in prices)

ASPECTS INSUFFICIENTLY CONSIDERED

- [none]




Latin America & the Caribbean - Haiti (PITAG & PAPAIR)

BEST PRACTICES INCORPORATED AT DESIGN OR DURING IMPLEMENTATION

- Decentralized approach (introduced during implementation) in collaboration with local service providers, also allowing to mitigate issues with transports due to riots
- Strong targeting of marginalized group, with high gender and youth focus

ASPECTS INSUFFICIENTLY CONSIDERED

- No formal fragility assessment at design




Sub-Saharan Africa - Ethiopia

BEST PRACTICES INCORPORATED AT DESIGN OR DURING IMPLEMENTATION

- Decentralized entities of the IA guaranteed the project execution
- Partnering with local stakeholders allowed for the continuation of the intervention on the field

ASPECTS INSUFFICIENTLY CONSIDERED

- While mainstreaming of gender was applied, targeting of specific groups with specific interests (women and youth) was not strongly applied




Sub-Saharan Africa - Liberia

BEST PRACTICES INCORPORATED AT DESIGN OR DURING IMPLEMENTATION

- Focus on institutional capacity building
- Engagement of local communities and community leaders
- Involvement of implementing partners with experience in sustainable agriculture (rice, cassava, horticulture)

ASPECTS INSUFFICIENTLY CONSIDERED

- Limited coordination of donors and development partners active in the same sector
- While mainstreaming of gender was applied, targeting of specific groups with specific interests (women and youth) was not strongly applied



Annex K - GAFSP FCS Grants' Performance Ratings

Country	Project Name	FCS status on approval	'True' FCS grant	Grant implementation FCS classification	GAFSP performance rating										Average performance
					2023	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014	Average
Burkina Faso	Agricultural Productivity and Food Security Project (PAPSA)	No	Yes	Partly (lately) FCS				1	2	2	1	1			1.4
Burkina Faso	West Africa Food System Resilience Program (FSRP) for Burkina Faso	No	Yes	Always FCS	1	3									2.0
Burundi	National Food Security and Rural Development Programme in Imbo and Moso (PNSADR - IM)	Yes	Yes	Always FCS		2	4	2	2	2	3	3	3		2.6
Central African Republic (CAR)	Enhanced Resilience, Food and Nutrition Security in Kemo and Ouaka Districts (PARSANKO)	Yes	Yes	Always FCS	3	3	3								3.0
Côte d'Ivoire	Strengthening Smallholder and Women's Livelihoods and Resilience in N'Zi Region	Yes	Yes	Partly (lately) FCS	3	3	3								3.0
Ethiopia	Agricultural Growth Project (AGP) I	No	No	Never FCS								1	1	1	1.0

Ethiopia	Agricultural Growth Project (AGP) I	No	No	Never FCS							1	1			1.0
Ethiopia	Agriculture Growth Project (AGP) II	No	Yes	Partly (lately) FCS	2	2	2	2	2	2					2.0
Ethiopia	Agriculture Growth Project (AGP) II	No	Yes	Partly (lately) FCS	2	2	2	1	1	1					1.5
Gambia, The	Food and Agriculture Sector Development Project (FASDEP)	No	Yes	Mostly (not initially) FCS			3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	3.4
Gambia, The	Food and Agriculture Sector Development Project (FASDEP)	No	Yes	Mostly (not initially) FCS				2	3	2	3	3			2.6
Gambia, The	Gambia Agriculture and Food Security Project	Yes	Yes	Never FCS	1	1	2								1.3
Haiti	Small Farmer Agriculture Technology Transfer Project (PTTA)	Yes	Yes	Always FCS				3	4	3	3	4	4	3	3.4
Haiti	Relaunching Agriculture: Strengthening Agriculture Public Services Project II (RESEPA II)	Yes	Yes	Always FCS				3	4	3	3	4	4	4	3.6
Haiti	Technological Innovation for Agroforestry and Agriculture Program (PITAG)	Yes	Yes	Always FCS	2	2	2	1	2	2					1.8

Haiti	Rural Productivity and Connectivity Program with a Territorial Approach (PAPAIR)	Yes	Yes	Always FCS	2	3									2.5
Lao PDR	Agriculture for Nutrition Programme	No	Yes	Partly (lately) FCS	1	1	1	1	2	3	2	1			1.5
Lao PDR	Agriculture for Nutrition Programme	No	Yes	Partly (lately) FCS	1	1	1	1	1	2					1.2
Lao PDR	Agriculture for Nutrition - Phase 2 (AFN II)	No	No	Never FCS	2										2.0
Lao PDR	Agriculture for Nutrition - Phase 2 (AFN II)-TA	No	No	Never FCS	2										2.0
Liberia	Smallholder Agricultural Productivity Enhancement and Commercialization (SAPEC) Program	Yes	Yes	Always FCS			3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	3.4
Liberia	Smallholder Agriculture Development For Food and Nutrition Security (SADFONS)	Yes	Yes	Never FCS	2	1	2								1.7
Malawi	Smallholder Irrigation and Value Addition Project (SIVAP)	No	Yes	Partly (initially) FCS			2	2	2	3	3	3	2	3	2.4
Mali	Food and Nutrition Security Enhancement Project (PReSAN-KL)	Yes	Yes	Always FCS		4	4	4	3	4	2	2	2		3.1

Mali	MMI - Inclusion of Rural Youth in Poultry and Aquaculture Value Chains in Mali	Yes	Yes	Always FCS		2	4	3								3.0
Mali	MMI - Improved Rice Paddy Quality and Quality Cowpea Processing for Improved Nutrition and Increased Farmer Development	Yes	Yes	Always FCS		2	2	2								2.0
Myanmar	Climate Friendly Agribusiness Value Chains Sector Project	Yes	Yes	Always FCS	2	4	4	4	3							3.4
Myanmar	Climate Friendly Agribusiness Value Chains Sector Project	Yes	Yes	Always FCS	4	3	4	3	1							3.0
Nepal	Agriculture and Food Security Project (AFSP)	Yes	Yes	Partly (initially) FCS						1	1	2	1	1		1.2
Nepal	Food and Nutrition Security Enhancement Project (FANSEP)	No	No	Never FCS	1	2	2	3	3	2						2.2
Niger	Water Mobilization to Increase Food Security in the Maradi, Tahoua, and Zinder Regions Project (PMERSA-MTZ)	No	Yes	Partly (lately) FCS			1	1	2	2	2	2	3	3		1.9

Sierra Leone	Smallholder Commercialisation Programme (SCP)	Yes	Yes	Mostly (not lately) FCS				2	3	3	3	4	4	4	3.3
Tajikistan	Second Public Employment for Sustainable Agriculture and Water Resources Management Project (PAMP II)	Yes	Yes	Never FCS				1	1	1	1	1	3	3	1.6
Timor-Leste	Sustainable Agriculture Productivity Improvement Project (SAPIP)	Yes	Yes	Mostly (not initially) FCS	1	3	3	2	3	3	2				2.4
Togo	Project to Support Agricultural Development in Togo (PADAT)	Yes	Yes	Always FCS							3	3	3	3	3.0
Togo	Agriculture Sector Support Project (PASA)	Yes	Yes	Always FCS							1	2	3	3	2.3
Yemen	Smallholder Agricultural Production Restoration and Enhancement Program (SAPREP)	Yes	Yes	Always FCS			2	2	2						2.0
Yemen	Food Security Response and Resilience Project (FSSRP)	Yes	Yes	Always FCS	2	2	1								1.7

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GAFSP Steering Committee Response to the Recommendations of the FCS Evaluation

Overall Comments:

- The GAFSP Steering Committee (SC) welcomes the Independent Cross-Portfolio Evaluation on GAFSP in Fragile and Conflict Situations (FCS) and thanks the team for the portfolio-wide assessment of GAFSP's grant interventions in Fragile and Conflict Situations (FCS). The SC notes the high relevance of the topic in GAFSP's strategic positioning of serving underserved regions and populations while managing its risk tolerance and confirms that FCS countries/regions are precisely where poverty, vulnerability, fragility, extreme hunger overlap.
- The SC appreciates the finding that since its inception to date, GAFSP has supported initiatives in 32 countries listed as FCS by the WBG in at least one fiscal year (FY) during the implementation of GAFSP as a program (2010-2025), and that using this definition, FCS countries constitute the majority (63%) of the 51 countries supported by GAFSP thus far. The evaluation uses a wider definition of FCS classification than that which the CU has been using following the reasoning that even if a country is listed as FCS only for a few years, some level of fragility/conflict before and/or after the listed period persists. The evaluation further notes that fragility/conflict situations may also exist in areas, or 'pockets', within countries that are not FCS-listed.
- The SC acknowledges the evaluation's finding that using the definition as described in the report, there was no difference in the overall success rate between FCS and non-FCS proposals in accessing awards through past GAFSP Call for Proposals, and as such does not recommend another Call for Proposals limited only to FCS countries (as was done in 2019). However, the SC also notes and appreciates the specific recommendations around the Call for Proposals (Recommendations 3, 4, 5 and 8) to improve operational relevance and the portfolio quality for projects in FCS countries and will take them into consideration in future Call for Proposals.

Response to Evaluation Recommendations

Recommendation	SC Response
#1 GAFSP as a Partnership Platform GAFSP should be leveraged as a multi-stakeholder platform for the setting of strategic priorities around FCS engagements. GAFSP's upcoming Vision 2030 envisages the broadening of partnerships (as well as linkages between GAFSP's financing tracks), which could support the SC in the strategic orientation of GAFSP's engagement in FCS contexts. In line with the proposed operational principle of capturing and disseminating knowledge within the forthcoming Vision 2030, GAFSP could also serve as a knowledge platform for sharing learnings from FCS engagements and FCS-sensitive best practices within agriculture development and food security interventions.	Agreed. In the April 2025 SC meeting, the SC endorsed Vision 2030 as an aspirational narrative and framework. Vision 2030 envisions GAFSP serving as a more effective global platform for sharing knowledge and connecting key agriculture and food security initiatives, particularly those implemented under the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty launched during Brazil's G20 Presidency, the African Union's CAADP post-Malabo process, and other vertical funds. As a next step, GAFSP will develop a Strategic Plan for the period 2025-2030 based on different scenarios for aligning GAFSP budgets and financing tools to deliver maximum impact, while considering current GAFSP funds, available donor resources, and the remaining 5-year time horizon for the GAFSP. Furthermore, following delivery of the PO-Led Track Stocktaking Moment this FY, GAFSP intends to convene partners for its next full Knowledge Forum (KF) during the next FY. The KF

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	serves as a venue for sharing of lessons, challenges and experience across partners, in support of programmatic learning, and lessons around operating in FCS will likely be amongst the themes covered
<p>#2 SE Coordination</p> <p>Leveraging GAFSP as a partnership platform, SEs should foster more tactical coordination of agriculture development and food security projects in FCS countries. The more systematic coordination between SEs should go beyond the complementarity of parallel investment/TA interventions towards, ultimately, overcoming challenges with institutional capacities for broader policy development and coordination of development partners in target countries.</p>	<p>Agreed. This recommendation aligns with similar recommendations in the GAFSP 5-year Program Evaluation, which called for increased collaboration in project activities and implementers across financing tracks. At the April 2025 SC meeting, SC provided guidance to the CU for the pre-award phase (purposefully designing collaboration into the Grant-based Financing Track (GBFT)'s Call for Proposal guidelines, and TAC TORs) as well as the post-award phase (improvements in knowledge management to capture lessons and successes in collaboration; as well as using the Business Investment Financing Track (BIFT) pilot to catalyze collaboration between the private and public sector and building on lessons learned from the UK-funded pilot to enhance collaboration between country-led and PrSW projects.</p>
<p>#3 Further GAFSP Support in FCS</p> <p>Continued GAFSP engagement in FCS contexts is strongly encouraged but does not require dedicated calls. Depending on the strategic orientation of GAFSP (see Recommendation #1 above) and without losing the value of GAFSP as a competitive process, a minimum share of funding within future calls could be dedicated to finance (valid) projects in FCS or - as for BIFT - FCS countries could be prioritized within the eligibility criteria.</p>	<p>Agreed on not requiring a dedicated Call for Proposals for the GBFT and providing guidance to TAC to give extra points to proposals from FCS countries (following BIFT approach). This will be implemented in the forthcoming 8th Call for Proposals for PO projects.</p>
<p>#4 Selection Criteria and Guidelines</p> <p>The awarding of GAFSP grant funding should remain a competitive process also for FCS countries, but FCS-sensitivity could be incentivized through the selection criteria and strengthened within the instructions for both country- and PO-led calls. Certain aspects could be given extra points and more weight in the selection or encouraged within guidelines and proposal templates.</p>	<p>Agreed. For the forthcoming 8th Call for Proposals for PO projects, the guidelines for the Call include several new features that are aligned with seeking FCS-sensitivity (also referenced in the response to #3). For example, the Call is guided by two key principles: subsidiarity and partnership. Both aspects are aligned with the lessons from the report that emphasized partnership and community engagement to improve service delivery as well as mitigate conflicts and build more resilient communities (pp. 59-60 of the report). Furthermore, related to another lesson learned identified in the report, the Call has strengthened</p>

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	the review of PO's institutional capacity by requiring submission of a formal capacity assessment, which is a new requirement. GAFSP will strive to continue these efforts in future Calls.
<p>#5 Application Process</p> <p>Towards improving the quality of proposals, and hence eventually also project design, the two-step application process should be strengthened. This could involve a more technical screening (i.e. going beyond a mere due diligence check) of EoIs, or concept notes. This would result in a more restricted shortlist which would be invited to submit full proposals and offered the opportunity to receive TA for its preparation. The timeline for proposal submission should also be extended.</p>	<p>To be considered for each future Call for Proposals. For the forthcoming 8th Call for Proposals for PO projects, <i>Disagreed</i> on technical screening of EOIs and <i>Agreed</i> on a longer submission period. Technical Screening: For the forthcoming 8th Call for Proposals, the SC deliberated on a technical screening of EOIs by a smaller Technical Advisory Committee (i.e., mini-TAC) to ensure that only high-quality proposals moved to the development of full proposals. However, the SC ultimately decided not to institute this to simplify the process and avoid lengthening the entire Call for Proposals cycle duration. Longer submission period: The preparation time for both the EOI and Full Proposals has been significantly lengthened from the previous Call (EOI: 2.5 months vs 5 weeks and Full Proposal: 4.5 months vs 2.5 months). Pending review of lessons learned from this Call, GAFSP will strive to continue these efforts in future Calls. For future Call for Proposals, lessons from the 8th Call as well as previous Calls and this Recommendation will be reviewed and re-assessed each time.</p>
<p>#6 Preparation Support</p> <p>The provision of TA during the application phase – and namely after the first screening (EOI stage) - can assist in improving project design and proposal quality. Such assistance could be provided not only at the application stage, but also after approval (i.e. during preparation when project designs are firmed up). Preparatory support could be provided either through FAO and WFP (as for the special FCV call) or any of the other SEs, or – perhaps more 'neutrally' - through the setting up of a dedicated group or roster of external professionals.</p>	<p>To be considered for each future Call for Proposals. Pre-award support: The 5-year Program Evaluation also recommended the provision of TA during the pre-award phase for proposal development. Thus, this idea (which was implemented only once in the past for the 2019 Special Call for Proposals for FCV countries) was explored for the forthcoming 8th Call for Proposals. However, upon discussions with the GAFSP Trustee, it was noted that transferring funds for a project that has yet to be approved is not allowed under current GAFSP procedures and legal framework. Post-award (but pre-SE approval) support: This was explored in 2017 (4th Call for Proposals for country-led projects) and 2019 (Special Call for FCV countries) with the provision of Project Preparation Grants. However, the experience was not positive due to low uptake and low utilization of funds made available. Additionally, prior experience has shown some</p>

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	<p>concerns on how preparation funds may have compromised the autonomy of the applicant country, or created a potential conflict of interest, leading to implementation challenges. Beyond the Project Preparation Grants, it is noted that under current GAFSP policy, funds to support final project development can already be requested by SEs post-award as part of SE fees.</p>
<p>#7 Additional Financing GAFSP could consider the establishment of a dedicated window through which projects already under implementation can apply for additional financing in case of unforeseen events. Instead of launching calls for additional financing when seemingly necessary (such as the call in response to the Covid-19 pandemic), this would allow interventions to adjust to changing circumstances (which is particularly important in fluid fragility/conflict-affected contexts) should project extensions or restructuring of activities/components not be sufficient to support progress towards completion.</p>	<p>Disagreed. It would be preferable to avoid the proliferation of Financing Windows for GAFSP and this approach, as proposed, goes against the Call for Proposals approach that the GBFT has been using and which is a non-negotiable feature of GAFSP operations. However, the BIFT (which receives applications from a much smaller pool of applicants and Supervising Entities) employs an open structure where proposals can be submitted anytime during a specified period. GAFSP will incorporate any lessons learned from the BIFT pilot into future GBFT Calls.</p>
<p>#8 Thematic Calls for Proposals Other possible themes relevant from an FCS perspective could be considered for upcoming calls for GAFSP funding. For example, youth is an important target group that has yet to be embedded in GAFSP-supported projects. A stronger focus on climate resilience within a dedicated call could be considered given its particular relevance in fragility/conflict-affected contexts.</p>	<p>To be considered for each future Call for Proposals. While the SC has the discretion to consider whether a thematic call may add value at a given time, to date, GAFSP has never launched a thematic Call for Proposals, largely to honor its foundational principle of being a demand-driven fund with countries and POs leading the design of their proposals. However, climate resilience is a required element under GAFSP's current M&E Plan and as specified in Call guidelines, including for the forthcoming 8th Call for Proposals for PO projects. GAFSP has not directly tracked the inclusion of youth in its portfolio to date as it is not one of the core cross cutting outcomes established in its Governance Document.</p>
<p>#9 Program M&E The FCS-sensitiveness of GAFSP monitoring should be strengthened. A first step would involve 'flagging' projects not only according to the country's FCS listing in the year of approval, but also during the years of preparation/implementation.</p>	<p>Agreed. CU will alter the methodology of how it tracks FCS in its portfolio. Currently, a project received a 'FCS tag' at the time of SC approval of the proposal and the tag stays with the project until it closes. Moving forward, every FY the CU will track the FCS status of each project at the beginning of each FY and track FCS status annually.</p>

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<p>#10 Other Areas of Investigation</p> <p>Future portfolio reviews or assessments of selected projects could consider more specific topics relevant from an FCS perspective. It would, for example, be useful to do a more systemic analysis of how climate change interacts with structural drivers of fragility/conflict in supported countries, as well as of if and how projects focusing on building climate resilience have actually promoted longer-terms results in terms of improved capacity of communities to withstand climate shocks (and in turn mitigate fragility/conflict). In addition to climate-related aspects, youth could also be considered towards looking more closely at approaches that not only include young people in activities but effectively engage them as well as the challenges and bottlenecks for their empowerment. Finally, projects and approaches addressing GBV and forced displacement could also be explored further.</p>	<p>Agreed. Suggested topics (e.g., impact of climate resilience activities on intended outcomes, impact on youth empowerment, and on gender based violence) will be considered in future programming of analytical work to be undertaken by the CU through thematic reviews, cross-portfolio reviews, and selected project-level impact evaluations (GAFSP is exploring piloting a small window to finance targeted intervention-level impact evaluations).</p>